University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural
Economics

Agricultural Economics Department

4-2022

Essays on Socioeconomic Shocks and Policies in Agriculture
Wilman Iglesias
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, wilman.iglesias@huskers.unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Econometrics Commons, Economic
Theory Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons

Iglesias, Wilman, "Essays on Socioeconomic Shocks and Policies in Agriculture" (2022). Dissertations and
Theses in Agricultural Economics. 73.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss/73

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses
in Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

ESSAYS ON SOCIOECONOMIC SHOCKS AND POLICIES IN
AGRICULTURE

by

Wilman J. Iglesias Pinedo

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Agricultural Economics

Under the Supervision of Professors Lilyan E. Fulginiti and Richard K. Perrin

Lincoln, Nebraska

April 2022

ESSAYS ON SOCIOECONOMIC SHOCKS AND POLICIES IN AGRICULTURE
Wilman J. Iglesias Pinedo, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2021

Advisors: Lilyan E. Fulginiti and Richard K. Perrin

The three chapters of this doctoral dissertation estimate the responses of
agricultural productivity, production value of agriculture, and crop supply to some
external shocks and policies. Using unique panel datasets for Colombia and the United
States, this research provides new insights regarding the responsiveness of agriculture to
some socioeconomic effects and related market policies.
Chapter 1 studies the effect of armed conflicts in rural areas on agricultural
productivity in Colombia by using a production function that includes violence shocks
such as the forced intra-national displacement of the rural population from 1995 to 2017.
Although the relevance of the agricultural sector to the Colombian economy, the annual
growth rate of the value of agricultural production has fluctuated significantly over the
last two decades with a relatively low growth rate. Therefore, it is of imperative interest
to understand how violence and the internal displacement of persons have affected the
use of resources and productivity in Colombian agriculture.
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of anti-drug strategies implemented under a joint
US-Colombia policy (Plan Colombia) on the value of agricultural production of
Colombian regions with coca crops. This chapter uses a difference-in-difference
approach to evaluate the impact of the anti-drug policies on the GDP of agriculture in the
coca-growing areas.

Chapter 3 examines the effects of a policy in the ethanol market on the supply of
biomass from corn production at the extensive and intensive margins. This chapter
employs a profit function framework, simultaneous equations panel models, and
instrumental variables approach to analyze the land allocation and crop yield responses to
the US 2007’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). This policy mandated specified
quantities of total biofuels creating exogenous market shocks to corn prices in several
counties along the US Great Plains. It is of particular interest to assess the corn supply
and cropland allocation responsiveness to the price increase structurally generated by the
mandates.
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CHAPTER 1
THE COST OF VIOLENCE FOR LEGAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY:
EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIAN ARMED CONFLICT

1.1.

Introduction

The violence from armed conflict in Colombia has been costly to agriculture. In
the last fifty years, violence shocks mainly affected the Colombian rural population
through forced intra-national displacement and war-related casualties. Previous studies
have found that the Colombian armed conflict has internally displaced 4.7 million people
since 1996, killed nearly a quarter of a million since the late 50s, and kidnapped around
27 thousand since 1970 (Arias et al., 2019; Morales, 2018; Dueñas et al., 2014). These
violence shocks displacing people alter rural labor and the agricultural enterprise's risk
and uncertainty, leading to reductions in investments and technology adoption that
significantly reduce the sectorial productivity1. Studies of productivity growth in
Colombia should consider this issue to understand economic sectors' evolution and the
characteristics of their technical change.
The agricultural sector has traditionally been crucial to the Colombian economy.2
However, annual growth rates of the production value of agriculture fluctuated
significantly over the last two decades, with a relatively low growth rate of 1.6% since
1990 (see Jiménez et al., 2018, for more details, and Figure 1.2 for a visual perspective of
Colombian agricultural GDP and its growth rate evolution in 1995-2017). This research

Because productivity might be an ambiguous concept, the term “productivity” used in this study refers to
any potential change in output from a given level of inputs. A productivity variation may occur due to a
technology change or fluctuations in the technical efficiency with which the inputs are used (Dogramaci et
al., 1988; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993).
2
Colombia’s agriculture consists of 4 sub-sectors: farming, livestock, forestry, and fisheries, where the
latter two sectors are relatively small. Although the agricultural sector has historically been one of the
major engines of Colombian economic development, the share of agriculture in Colombia’s gross domestic
product (GDP) has almost fallen consistently since 1995, especially after 1999 (see Figure 1.1). Figure 1.1
indicates that the average value-added in the agricultural sector as a percentage of Colombia’s GDP during
1995-2017 was 8.25 percent, with a minimum of 5.39 percent in 2013 and a maximum of 14.02 percent in
1995. The latest value from 2017 is 6.39 percent (see Figure 1.1).
1

2

employs a production function that includes violence shocks at the department level3
from 1995 to 2017. The objective is to explore the effect of the armed conflict on the
agricultural productivity of Colombia. This chapter examines the conflict effects through
internally displaced persons (IDP)4 and the number of war-related casualties on
Colombian agricultural productivity.
One essential assumption here is that agricultural productivity may be affected by
IDP and casualties, which are two of the most relevant outcomes of violence shocks and
uncertainty generated by the armed conflict. We examine this issue using a unique panel
dataset consisting of 26 departments of Colombia. The conceptual framework
implemented was an aggregate agricultural production function where conflict-related
variables are assumed to significantly contribute to determining the productivity of
traditional inputs such as labor and capital. This relationship implies that the conflict
imposes costs on economic productivity through two broad channels. First, armed
combats and terrorist attacks destroy capital and assets that reduce the productive
capacity of firms (including farms and households) and food security, especially in rural
areas (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; George et al., 2019; Collier, 1999; Ibáñez and Moya,
2010; Justino, 2011; Arias et al., 2019). This mechanism hence affects incentives to
innovate. Second, the presence of non-state armed actors prompts individuals to run away
from rural areas as they experience shocks such as aggression against the civilian
population deteriorating the labor supply through abductions, killings, and maiming
(Camacho, 2008; Arias et al., 2019; George et al., 2019). This channel thus affects
incentives to invest in human capital.

3

Colombia consists of 1,123 municipalities grouped into 32 departments (31 continental departments and
the Island of San Andrés and Providencia). The continental departments constitute five major
administrative regions (Amazon, Andean, Caribbean, Orinoco, and Pacific). Municipalities are analogous
to counties in the U.S., whereas departments are political divisions like states in the U.S.
4
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1999) describes a displaced person as “… anyone
who has been forced to migrate within the national boundaries, leaving aside his/her residence or his/her
habitual economic activities because either his/her life, his/her physical integrity or his/her freedom have
been either violated or threatened by situations such as armed conflict, generalized violence, violation of
human rights, and any other situation that may alter public order…”. Moreover, IDP should not be
confused with refugees because they do not cross-national frontiers. Thus their protection is primarily the
responsibility of the national State concerned (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees –UNHCR-, 2007).

3

The main research question addressed by this chapter is: Have violence shocks
from armed conflict in rural areas of Colombia affected agricultural productivity? It is
relevant to consider the relationship between factors of production and the armed conflict
for productivity analysis of the Colombian agricultural sector. There is an expected
negative link between violence shocks from armed conflict and the productivity of factors
used in agricultural production. For instance, Dube and Vargas (2013) show that
commodity price shocks affect the dynamic of armed rural conflicts in Colombia by
changing the amount of labor supplied to conflict activity. The authors examine
exogenous changes in the world price of agricultural commodities and found that income
shocks induced by those changes are negatively related to rural conflicts because of an
opportunity cost effect on Colombian agriculture.5
We analyze the relationship between agricultural inputs and violence shocks as
they affect agricultural productivity. That is to say, the intensification of armed conflicts
leads to outcomes such as forced IDP from rural to urban areas of Colombia that directly
affect both the availability and the productivity of inputs in agriculture. The increased
risk and uncertainty introduced by violence from such conflicts may indirectly affect
innovation investments in the sector. Violence shocks can discourage investments in
human capital that may lead to adverse shocks in productivity by affecting the marginal
productivity of inputs.
Colombian rural areas have been scenarios of persistent violence, armed conflicts,
social tensions, poverty traps, and thus extreme vulnerability of their population’s
socioeconomic activities. However, armed conflicts and violent events triggered by the
war between insurgent groups and the government forces in the rural regions are the main
reason for the departure of people from rural to urban areas in Colombia. Economic
literature related to this issue has focused on identifying whether violence or armed
conflicts impact economic growth. This impact is associated with (a) changes in
productive factors accumulation by reducing labor supply (Odozi and Oyelere, 2021;

5

The opportunity cost effect here implies that positive agricultural income shocks increase Colombian
agriculture wages and reduce violence from the conflict in rural areas by reducing the labor supplied to
criminal activities (Dube and Vargas, 2013).
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Blattman and Miguel, 2010a), (b) lifetime labor productivity (Blattman and Miguel,
2010a,b) or (c) increasing capital costs (Gaviria and Vélez, 2001; Riascos and Vargas,
2004; World Bank, 2009; Pshisva and Suarez, 2010; Thomson, 2011; Dube and Vargas,
2013; Maher, 2015a,b). However, there is little evidence about the effects of violence
expressed in irreversible outcomes such as the armed conflict-related casualties and
internal displacement of the rural population on the productivity of Colombian
agriculture. This study provides insights into how such violence shocks may have
affected Colombia’s agricultural sector yields and productivity. Blattman and Miguel
(2010) pointed out that an economic growth theory framework may help in analyzing the
consequences of conflicts. They assert that: "...If conflict affects economic performance,
it must be because it affects a factor of production (physical capital, labor, or human
capital), the technology, institutions, and culture that augment these factors, or prices
(e.g., costs of capital). The growth framework also clarifies the possible nature of the
impacts, not only on income levels and economic growth in equilibrium, but also out-ofequilibrium dynamics...." (Blattman and Miguel, 2010b, p. 38).
The remainder of the chapter organizes as follows. Section 1.2 provides
background on the context of the Colombian armed conflict. Section 1.3 describes how
past conflict outcomes shocks can affect current levels of agricultural productivity.
Section 1.4 describes the data and the methodology for estimating the productivity
elasticities using department panel data. Section 1.5 presents and discusses the main
results. Section 1.6 concludes.

1.2.

The Colombian Conflict

Colombia provides a scenario for analyzing the effects of violence shocks from
armed conflict on agricultural productivity.6 This violence impacts mainly the rural areas

6

Political violence in Colombia is rooted in the conflict about an unequal and exclusionary agrarian system
in which land ownership inequality represents a key explanatory factor for the country’s history of violence
(Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; González and López, 2007). Other crucial elements explaining the history of
Colombian violence in rural areas have been poverty, weak institutional factors such as ineffective
government intervention in marginal areas as well as the rent-seeking motives by nonstate armed actors

5

in Colombia. As Bejarano (1997) pointed out, about 93% of the municipalities affected
by the actions of non-governmental armed groups are primarily rural, where these actions
impact negatively and particularly agricultural activities. Moreover, there is a wideranging variation in the incidence of violence from the armed conflict across Colombian
rural areas (Echandia, 2003; Brauer et al., 2004) that provides a case study to analyze the
effects of the armed conflict on agricultural productivity.
The rural armed conflict in Colombia started with the launch of a communist
insurgency in the 1960s. Three main groups have been involved in this conflict: the state,
the guerrillas, and the paramilitaries. The guerrillas are represented mainly by the Armed
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC by its Spanish acronym) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN by its Spanish acronym). These groups engaged in the conflict
with the ideological motivation to force a redistribution of land by overthrowing the
government (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Fajardo, 2002; González and López, 2007).
However, the guerrillas were also motivated by their profitable involvement in the
conflict and rent-seeking activities regarding illegal but profitable drug production
(Rubio, 2005; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Richani, 1997). A salient example of such
assertion is that the FARC and the ELN had an estimated income of 800 million US
dollars in 1996 when the FARC was considered the worldwide richest guerrilla army
(Richani, 1997).
During the 1980s, the Colombian conflict was relatively low, and the conflict
escalated dramatically during the 1990s. The armed conflict intensified sharply because
of the guerrilla defeat of narcotraffickers and the rise of paramilitary groups. Although
the organization of anti-insurgent self-defense groups (known today as paramilitaries) by
rural landowners and drug barons arose as a response to guerrilla extortions, since the late
1980s, paramilitarism did not emerge as an organized third force with a significant
regional presence until the mid-1990s (Dube and Vargas, 2013). The United Self-Defense
Groups of Colombia (AUC by its Spanish acronym) appeared specifically in 1997
through the official coalition of the earlier fragmented paramilitary groups. The entry of
related to drug and oil production and distribution (González and López, 2007; Rubio, 2005). For a more
detailed review of the determinants of violence in Colombia, see Martinez (2001).
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the AUC is linked to a severe intensification in overall casualties mainly because the
paramilitaries also targeted civilians that they perceived to be allied with the guerrillas
(For more details, see Restrepo et al., 2003 and Acemoglu et al., 2020).
In the 1995-2003 period, the armed conflict in Colombia was technically threesided, with all the groups fighting one another, but, in some cases, there was collusion
between the government army and the paramilitaries in countering the guerrilla groups
(Dube and Vargas, 2013; Gutiérrez and Barón, 2005). Paramilitarism has gone beyond
the military alliance between the government and the AUC. There is evidence of an
episode of Colombian history known as the “para-politics” scandal. This incident consists
of the involvement of paramilitary groups with politicians that accepted illegal assistance
in getting elected through both eliminations of opponents and paramilitary coercion of
voters in exchange for policies favoring ex-paramilitary members (Acemoglu et al.,
2013). Fergusson et al. (2014) prove that significant defeats for the insurgents reduce the
probability that some politicians fight them, especially in electorally salient places. Their
conclusion supports the hypothesis that the Colombian armed conflict is political to the
extent that politicians need to keep enemies alive to maintain their political advantage.
A noteworthy event occurred in 2003 when the AUC declared a partial cease-fire,
and many paramilitary units started to participate in a demilitarization program.
However, the demobilization process did not disarm all blocks, which led to a short-term
decline in paramilitary violence along with the formation of a new generation of
paramilitaries (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Figure 1.3 shows a remarkable structural
trend change in the number of armed conflict-related casualties after 2002 that could be
somewhat related to such demobilization. We can also observe in Figure 1.3 that the time
series regarding forced IDP follows a similar trend, with significant structural changes in
2002 and 2007.
As violence shocks in Colombia involve armed conflicts among the government,
the guerrillas, and the paramilitaries, the non-governmental armed groups have had
alternate periods of dramatic expansion and decline in the number of fronts. One key
feature attributed to these variations has been the enlargement of the illegal armed
activity responsible for expanding the production of illicit crops such as coca and poppies
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(Díaz and Sánchez, 2004). Because of this, the Colombian government intensified aerial
spraying of glyphosate on coca plantations and conducted counterinsurgency actions that
increased the expansion of non-governmental actors’ fronts fostering further criminal and
violent acts (González and López, 2007).
Although several factors account for the overall productivity of the Colombian
agricultural sector, the present study aims to identify the role of violence shocks from the
armed conflict. Since conflict imposes costs on economic productivity (e.g., through
devastation and uncertainty caused by violence shocks), this research seeks to estimate
the violence effects on agricultural productivity as the responsiveness of a metaproduction function to the armed conflict shocks. For this purpose, we also provide
background on the factors used to identify these shocks in the next section.

1.3.

Effects of Violence shocks and Illegal Crops on Agricultural Productivity

Agricultural productivity can be affected directly and indirectly by the violence
from the armed conflict. The direct effects can result from farms or agricultural
production units caught in the armed conflict that could account for significant disruptive
impacts that lower productivity (González and López, 2007). The indirect effects can
result from diverting resources into unproductive uses (Collier 1999), reducing the
returns of productive activities such as legal agriculture by making more attractive rentseeking, corruption, and criminality, among other illegal activities. Thus, more resources
allocated to illegal activities indirectly detract productive investments in either physical
or human capital by reducing the accumulation of capital inputs, knowledge, and skills
that lower productivity in legal agriculture.
The rural areas of Colombia (where mainly the armed conflict occurs) face the
war effects directly through the disruptions in agricultural activities. These disruptions
could materialize in high constraints to the sale and transportation of outputs, destruction
of productive assets, killing of farmers or potential workers, and disturbing vandalic acts.
These direct impacts would imply additional costs to exert the economic activities as

8

more resources have to be employed to sell outputs or acquire inputs in the areas of
conflict (González and López, 2007). If the armed conflict results in many casualties, the
fear of death may prompt forced displacement of the rural population and the consequent
abandonment of agricultural land and productive assets (Morrison 1993). Colombia has
ranked second in the number of IDPs because of decades of armed conflict compounded
by a high prevalence of drug trafficking.
The paramilitaries and guerrillas are not only involved in the appropriation of
resources through criminal activities (e.g., predation on public funds, kidnapping, and
extortion) but also in the cocaine trade (see, e.g., Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Dube and
Vargas, 2013; Mejia and Restrepo, 2013, 2016; Rincón-Ruiz et al., 2013). Angrist and
Kugler (2008) provide evidence that violence increased in Colombian rural areas where
coca cultivation increased, generating non or few economic benefits for residents as the
profits from coca-growing are practically taxed away by combatants dissipated through
nonproductive activities. On the other hand, many agricultural areas have been rendered
unfit for agriculture because of the government’s aerial herbicide spraying of coca
plantations that unintentionally affected neighboring legal crops (González and López,
2007; Rozo, 2014). As the presence of coca cultivation leads to aerial spraying, side
effects in rural areas with coca plantations reflect in alleged harmful impacts on health,
legal crops, the environment, and the socio-economic conditions of coca-producing areas
(Camacho and Mejía, 2015; Relyea, 2005; Rozo 2014; Mejía et al., 2017).
In the areas cultivated with coca, the eradication efforts and military interventions
aimed at disrupting the production of cocaine impose additional costs to agricultural
productivity. These costs can appear as losses resulting from conventional agriculture
disturbed by government fights with drug producers over the effective control of the land
used for illegal crop production. These conflicts take the form of both forced eradication
campaigns and confrontations between government forces and the non-state armed
groups involved in coca cultivation and cocaine production. The misallocation of
productive resources can also distort agricultural productivity, for example, when money
laundering and drug traffickers’ investment in land endorse land used for livestock in
areas suitable for crops (the Republic of Colombia, 2000).
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Although the distortion of market prices may be relevant in the areas affected by
the conflict, this research focuses on the productivity effects of violence due to the rural
armed conflict. As pointed out by Alvarez (1995): “coca cultivation per se may do little
to enrich the cultivators, since—as with the relationship between the farmgate price of
coffee and the beans we buy at Starbucks—the price of raw coca leaf makes up a small
fraction of the price of cocaine” (Angrist and Kugler, 2008, p. 192). However, some
previous studies suggest that cocaine plays a crucial role in the Colombian economy due
mainly to shifts in the demand for coca leaves to have a perceptible economic effect (See
Angrist and Kugler, 2008 and the references therein). Steiner (1998) estimated the
Colombian income from illegal drugs at 4%–6% of GDP in the first half of the 1990s.
This financial resource has a significant impact on violence by increasing the resources
available to insurgent groups and coca production and reducing the overall level of
economic activity (Suárez, 2000; Angrist and Kugler, 2008). The link between
agricultural productivity with violence and illegal crop production is especially relevant
in Colombia, which has experienced striking adverse shocks related to the armed conflict,
primarily in rural areas.

1.4.

Methodology and Data

1.4.1. Theoretical Framework

To account for external factors such as the effect of violence shocks, we define a
production function for Colombian agriculture as 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑿; 𝜷). This is a real-valued
function characterizing the maximum amount of output 𝑌 produced from any given set of
conventionally measured inputs 𝑿 = (𝑋1 , … , 𝑋𝑛 ), and 𝜷 represents the vector of all
parameters. The production function is assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable
implying that 𝑓𝑋𝑖 > 0, and 𝑓𝑋𝑖 𝑋𝑖 < 0 ∀ 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. A relevant assumption is that
places with a greater incidence of violence due exclusively to the armed conflict led to
more casualties, higher presence of internally displaced persons (IDP), and lower
availability of inputs to produce 𝑌. The parameters in 𝜷 are assumed to be variable and
determined at any place and time by previous choices as well as the current
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technological, natural, and institutional environment, i.e., 𝛽𝑖 = 𝐺𝑖 (𝑣1 , … , 𝑣𝑚 ), where
variables 𝑣𝑘 , 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑚, represent the technology changing variables as in Fulginiti and
Perrin (1993). Following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993), we use the concept of elasticity of
productivity for the 𝑣𝑘 : 𝜑𝑘 = 𝜕𝑌/𝜕𝑣𝑘 (𝑣𝑘 /𝑌) which indicates the percentage by which
output would change with inputs fixed in response to a 1% change in 𝑣𝑘 . The focus of
this study is mainly on the effect of violence shocks as technology-changing variables.

1.4.2. Empirical Approach

This study estimates agricultural productivity in Colombia at the level of the
Department by estimating a production function for the sector. At this level of
aggregation, we assume constant returns-to-scale (CRS) −dividing the output and the
inputs by the agricultural land area− and specify yields (𝑦) as a function of inputs (per
unit of land) and technology:
𝑛
𝛽 (𝒗)

𝑦(𝒙; 𝜷) = 𝐴(𝒗) ∏ 𝑥𝑖 𝑖

(1)

𝑖=1

where
ln𝐴 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝑚
𝑘=1 𝛾𝑘 𝑣𝑘 + 𝛿0 𝜏 + 𝑢0 ,
𝑘 = 1, … . 𝑚

(1a)

𝑖 = 1, … . 𝑛

(1b)

𝛽𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖0 + ∑𝑚
𝑘=1 𝛼𝑖𝑘 𝑣𝑘 + 𝛿𝑖 𝜏 + 𝑢𝑖 ,
where 𝑣𝑘 ’s are the technological changing variables all contained in vector
𝒗=(𝑣1 , … , 𝑣𝑚 ); 𝜏 denotes time (or a trend) as a proxy for exogenous technical change7;
7

Besides the technology changing variables used here for Colombia, the model allows the introduction of
the trend 𝜏 as well as time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (𝛼0𝑑 , where 𝑑 indicates the unit of analysis,
let us say a department or region) and unobserved time-variant factors, let us say in the form of 𝛼𝑑 × 𝜏.
This could be appealing if one has strong reasons to believe that the omission of those factors is relevant
enough to bias the results of the structural model by attributing the effect of the omitted variables to those
that were included. This concern can be useful to test for sensitivity of the results to other relevant-omitted
sources of technological change that affect a particular region’s agricultural productivity, given that
agricultural technology could be highly sensitive to local environmental\institutional conditions and
spillovers of technology. Otherwise, all other more general factors (either time-invariant or time-variant)
would affect all units of study in a similar way through 𝜏.
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the 𝛼’s, 𝛾’s and 𝛿’s represent fixed parameters to be estimated; 𝑢0 represents a random
variable distributed independently of the 𝑥’s, 𝜏, and the 𝑣’s; 𝑢𝑖 ’s are random variables
independent of the 𝑣𝑘 ’s, and 𝜏, with mean zero and finite positive semi-definite
covariance matrix. The 𝛽’s are the elasticities of production concerning each of the
variable inputs 𝑥’s. These output elasticities are thus affected by the technology-changing
variables in the sense that these variables are taken by the decision-makers as parameters
(or state variables) for the current production period (Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993; Mundlak
et al., 2012). We obtain the following convenient econometric model by expressing
equation (1) in natural logs as
𝑛

𝑛

𝑚

𝑛

ln𝑦 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖0 ln𝑥𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘 (𝑣𝑘 ∙ ln𝑥𝑖 ) + 𝛿0 𝜏 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖 (𝜏 ∙ ln𝑥𝑖 )
𝑖=1

𝑖=1 𝑘=1

𝑚

+∑

𝑖=1

𝑛

(2)

𝛾𝑘 𝑣𝑘 + ∑ 𝑢𝑖 ln𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢0

𝑘=1

𝑖=1

With this specification, it is feasible to directly estimate the technological impacts
of violence shocks from armed conflict and the presence of illicit but profitable crops that
compete for resources with legal agriculture. For simplicity, the technology changing
variables are expressed in logs as 𝑣𝑘 = ln𝑧𝑘 , ∀𝑘 = 1, … 𝑚. Using (2), the elasticity of
productivity for 𝑧𝑘 is
𝑛

dln𝑦
𝜑𝑘 =
= ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘 ln𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾𝑘
dln𝑧𝑘

(3)

𝑖=1

The effect of violence shocks and illegal crop production activities on current
productivity could be thus summarized by the productivity elasticities given by (3). The
exogenous rate of technical change can be similarly obtained by dln𝑦/d𝜏 = 𝛿0 +
∑𝑖 𝛿𝑖 ln𝑥𝑖 . This analytical framework is used to measure the effect of violence shocks on
agricultural productivity for Colombian agriculture represented by 26 departments that
are traditionally agricultural.8
8

The information used in this research is based on surveys whose scope of study consists mainly of 26
departments in continental Colombia that are considered as “traditionally agricultural”. These departments
are Antioquia, Arauca, Atlántico, Bolívar, Boyacá, Caldas, Caquetá, Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Córdoba,
Cundinamarca, Chocó, Huila, La Guajira, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Quindío,
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1.4.3. Data and Empirical Estimation
1.4.3.1.

Data on Production

Data are from several sources. We use the publicly available annual data on
agricultural outputs and inputs from 1995 to 2017 at the department level based on the
National Survey of Agriculture (ENA), the Large Integrated Household Survey (GEIH),
and the Vital Statistics microdata obtained from the National Administrative Department
of Statistics (DANE).
The ENA estimates the total land use, size, distribution of sampling segments, and
the number and size of Agricultural Production Units (APUs).9 The universe of the ENA
consists of the total rural area of Colombia with potential agricultural use. Hence, large
areas not used for agricultural purposes corresponding to the extensions of natural forests
and bodies of water are all excluded. The survey provides aggregated data on agricultural
land, production, and yields of major temporary and permanent crops, pasture area, milk
production, and livestock inventory. We use the department-level figures available for
2010-2016 and published by the DANE. We then combine this information with the
statistics per departments and municipalities from the survey of agricultural evaluations
(EVA)10 of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR) for the period
1995-2009 related to the number of APUs, area planted and harvested, production and
yields of permanent and transitory crops. Regarding livestock activity, ENA and EVA
provide information on the inventory of cattle and other animal species such as horses
and sheep. After matching the data in ENA and EVA, eliminating incomplete
Putumayo, Risaralda, Santander, Sucre, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca. The Island of San Andrés and
Providencia is also classified as a “traditionally agricultural department”, but the surveys did not collected
information on agricultural activities in such insular department during most of the years analyzed in the
present study. Thus, the “traditionally non-agricultural departments” of Amazonas, Guainía, Guaviare,
Vichada, and Vaupés as well as the Island of San Andrés and Providencia are not included in the analysis.
9
An Agricultural Production Unit (APU) or enterprise is an economic production unit with a clearly
defined management that includes all agricultural or/and fishing activities exerted in it, regardless of its
property title, legal status, or size.
10
The municipalities’ survey of agricultural evaluations are investigations carried out since 1970 by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. These evaluations record the productive activities of crop
production, livestock, forestry, and aquaculture in Colombia.
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information, and linearly interpolating missing data, the sample consists of 598
observations (26 departments × 23 years).
Information about the population in rural areas is from the GEIH and the
Population and Demography Series from the DANE. The DANE specifically provides
national, departmental, and municipal estimates (projections) of the population by
urban/rural area and age groups for the 1985-2020 period. The Colombian rural workingage population was calculated here as the number of people aged ten years and over in
rural areas of each department.
The data for the specification of the variables used in the estimation are: the
output (Y) as the value of agricultural production in millions of 2005 US dollars; land
(𝑋0) as thousands of hectares of arable and permanent cropland, and permanent pastures;
labor (𝑋1) as thousands of individuals in the working-age population in rural zones;
livestock (𝑋2) as the number of cow equivalent livestock units as calculated by Hayami
and Ruttan (1970); and, finally, a year fixed effect or trend (𝜏) as a proxy for exogenous
technological change in the agricultural sector.11

1.4.3.2.

Data on Violence Shocks
The displacement data are from the Colombian government’s Unique Registration

System (URS) -Sistema Único de Registro-. We used consolidated statistical information
from CODHES-SISDES (Information System on Human Rights and Displacement) on
the number of forced internally displaced persons that exited the municipality/department
from year to year. The Colombian government compiles the URS with non-governmental
agencies and the Catholic Church. IDP refers to migrants forced to abandon their physical
residence and employment (economic) activity because of the Colombian armed conflict,
generalized violence, massive human rights violations, or other circumstances that
threaten or drastically alter public order. The URS distinguishes between
municipalities/departments where the displacements occurred and the
11

We also use a control variable for farm size measured as the average APU size calculated as the total
number of hectares covered by the UPAs divided by the total number of UPAs.
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municipalities/departments where displaced persons relocated. We use specific
information on the number of armed conflict victims classified as displaced due to the
violence from armed conflicts. In areas with high-level displacement, we expect
cultivation to decline due to the disruption of agricultural activities and the local labor
markets. For this study, the variable 𝑧1 (Internally Displaced Persons- IDP) measures the
ratio between the annual number of displaced persons and the total population in the
department of origin per 100 thousand inhabitants. More specifically, we construct 𝑧1 as
the (one-year) lagged ratio of the annual number of IDP to the total population per one
hundred thousand inhabitants in the department where the displacement occurred.
To specify the variable 𝑧2 (Casualties), we employ a unique event-based dataset
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and
Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden. The dataset contains four measures
of the violence from the armed conflict across Colombian municipalities from 1975 to
2019: guerrilla attacks, paramilitary attacks, clashes, and war-associated casualties. We
aggregate the annual number of armed conflict-related deaths of civilians and fighters to
the department-year level and use these aggregated figures to proxy for direct political
violence. The variable 𝑧2 is specified then as the one-year lagged ratio of the annual
number of casualties to the total population in the department of the recorded deaths per
100 thousand inhabitants. According to our data, the Colombian civil war resulted in at
least 78,560 deaths and 7,053,250 IDPs from 1995 to 2017 in the twenty-six Colombian
departments we are studying. Although the chapter focuses on the effect of violent shocks
from the rural armed conflict, other factors are also included, such as environmental,
institutional, and the effect of past prices as technology-changing variables.

1.4.3.3.

Data on Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Prices
To measure the effects of coca cultivation, we use a 23-year panel of the 26

Colombian departments (19 of which grew coca at some point during the 1995–2017
period). The panel dataset uses the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)
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information. The UNODC has conducted satellite surveys of coca crops in every
municipality of the country since 199912. These surveys use satellite photography and
measure the number of hectares of coca in a given area (usually a municipality) at the end
of each year.
Because the UNODC and the Colombian government achieved full national
coverage in the year 2001, the data on coca leaves cultivation for the period 1995-1998
comes from information in Angrist and Kugler (2007), “Cuadro 1.” in Ramírez (2002),
and Uribe (1997). The UNODC and the Colombian government use satellite imagery and
verification flights over coca-growing areas to monitor the location and spread of coca
cultivation. In 2005, for example, the area within each department with active coca
cultivation was between 28 and 17,305 hectares, with seven departments having no
reportable levels of coca cultivation.
The UNODC also provides information on illicit drugs' estimated prices and
purity. To specify the variable proxy of illegal crop production, we use the international
retail cocaine prices (street prices) in 2018 US dollars per gram. The price time series for
cocaine (inflation-adjusted to 2018 US$) used in the present study is an average weighted
by population (in Europe and USA) available for the period 1990-2018.
The variable 𝑧3 (past cocaine price) is specified such that it may capture potential
cross-sectional effects of annual exogenous changes in the cocaine price on Colombian
illicit drug cultivation. This variable is a proxy for the annual value of coca cultivation (or
economic relevance of cocaine production) for the areas growing coca leaves. Thus, 𝑧3 is
equal to the one-year lagged retail cocaine price weighted by the ratio between the area
planted with coca in each department/year to the total (national) area cultivated with coca
in the corresponding year. An increase in the international retail cocaine price or a higher
area proportion devoted to coca cultivation would reflect a higher incentive to invest in
(or more productive resources allocated to) cocaine production and, consequently, cocagrowing instead of legal agriculture.
12

Although there is no precise data on the amount of coca cultivated or the amount of cocaine produced
and subsequently exported, both the UNODC and the U.S. State Department make annual estimations of
the size of the illicit industry. The present study uses those estimations that are available at
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-monitoring/?tag=Colombia.
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1.4.3.4.

Data on Weather

Additional department-level technology-changing variables include rainfall (𝑧4 )
and temperature (𝑧5 ). These weather variables were constructed based on the data
regarding the Agrometeorological Indicators produced on behalf of the Copernicus
Climate Change Service. This dataset covers the world time series daily surface
meteorological data from 1979 to 2020. The dataset relies on the hourly ECMWF-ERA5
data geo-localized and available at a spatial (horizontal) resolution of 0.1° × 0.1° (about
10km2). More specifically, we use the information on (1) 2m temperature, indicating the
daily average air temperature at the height of 2 meters above the surface; and (2)
precipitation flux, defined as the total volume of liquid water (mm3) precipitated over the
period 00h-24h local time per unit of area (mm2), per day. The data were subsequently
averaged to the monthly/municipality level using a shapefile13 for all the Colombian
municipalities.
Because we carry out a department-year analysis of the effect of potential weather
shocks on the agricultural productivity, each year, temperature (𝑧4 ) and rainfall (𝑧5 ) are
measured as an (annual/department) average of the municipality-monthly values of 2m
temperature and precipitation flux, respectively. The use of rainfall and temperature as
technology-changing variables relies on the fact that weather shocks can lead to more
prolific or lean harvests that can be directly associated with changes in profits from rural
activities, potentially affecting incentives to invest in agriculture.14 Thus, as the focus
here is on rural areas in Colombia, weather shocks are among the most critical risk
factors faced by rural households because of the potentially harmful effects of weather

13

A shapefile is a geospatial vector data format for storing geometric locations suitable to geographic
information system (GIS) software.
14
Colombia has been particularly affected by rainfall and temperature shocks. According to the Global
Climate Risk Index (Harmeling, 2011), the country ranked third (after Pakistan and Guatemala) in 2010
among the countries most affected by weather-related events such as droughts, floods, and heatwaves.
Moreover, the number of disaster events registered in Colombia in the first decade of the 2000s increased
by more than 60% with respect to the number in 1970–99 (Campos et al., 2011; Andalón et al., 2016).
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shocks on the agricultural activities on which the rural population generally relies
(Giné et al., 2008; Andalón et al., 2016).

1.4.3.5.

Data on Output Price

Following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993), we also include a technology-changing
variable related to past price expectations 𝑧6 (output prices).15 At least two theoretical
reasons can justify the inclusion of the past output prices as an argument for the
agricultural production function. First, output price is a crucial mechanism for the
adoption of new production techniques, and they also create strong incentives for
innovation such that the price regime of one period could significantly affect the
technology relevant to a subsequent period (Mundlak, 1988; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993;
Mundlak et al., 2012). Second, any technical change (expressed as a new production
technique) can have an equivalent unique combination of inputs defined in a production
function (Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993; Mundlak et al., 2012). As a proxy for 𝑧6 , we use a
three-year moving average of Törnqvist-Theil indexes of prices received for the main
agricultural products of Colombia. These indexes were constructed for each department,
using deflated price series for the relevant commodities. The Törnqvist index here is the
weighted geometric mean of the relative prices using averages of the value shares in the
two periods as weights. The data used are the prices received by producers and quantities
produced in metric tons every two years, (𝑡 − 1) and (𝑡), for each of 𝑚 crops indexed by
𝑗. Denoting the price of crop 𝑗 at year 𝑡 − 1 by 𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1 , and, analogously, defining 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 as
the amount of crop 𝑗 produced in year 𝑡, then, the Törnqvist price index 𝑃𝑡 at the year 𝑡
can be calculated as follows:
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Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) developed a model involving a production function specification that posits
that past prices can determine current productivity levels. Output prices are among the technologychanging variables that can determine the choice of techniques and thus productivity. This link between
prices and productivity implies that the higher (lower) are prices in agriculture, the faster (slower) the rate
of both technological innovation and productivity growth (Schultz, 1978; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993;
Anderson, 2009).
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𝑚

1
[

𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1 𝑞𝑗,𝑡−1

𝑝𝑗,𝑡 2 ∑𝑚
𝑃𝑡
𝑗=1(𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1 𝑞𝑗,𝑡−1 )
= ∏(
)
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1

𝑝𝑗,𝑡 𝑞𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝑚
]
∑𝑗=1(𝑝𝑗,𝑡 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 )

(8)

𝑗=1

The information on the prices came from the Producer Prices (in 2005 US$) per
ton of the Colombian agricultural commodities available for the 1991-2018 period. The
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) provides annual data on
Agriculture Producer Prices. These Prices are prices received by farmers for primary
crops, live animals, and primary livestock products as collected at the point of initial sale
(price paid at the farm gate). To complete the series for some agricultural products, we
use data from the Colombian Confederation of Agricultural Producers Associations
(FEDEAGRO) and MADR (deflated prices converted to dollars at the 2005 official
exchange rate). The primary transitory and permanent crops production data are from the
EVA and are available for the 1985-2017 period. The transitory crops used are sesame,
cotton, rice, barley, beans, corn, potatoes, soy, sorghum, and wheat. The perennial crops
include banana, coffee, cocoa, sugarcane, yam, palm oil, tobacco, and cassava. We
calculate a cross-department price index from a Törnqvist index value for each
department in 1999 relative to a base consisting of the 26-departments average price and
quantity for each commodity. Finally, we divided the price index series for each
department by the 1999 cross-department index value.
Another reason for including past output prices as a technology-changing variable
is that they can reflect crucial changes in the incentives to invest in the sector producing
such output. These investments may take the form of both physical and human capital,
production techniques enhancement, or technology and infrastructural development that
have a significant role in improving productivity.16 The prices in the production function
is different from specifying a supply function in which variation in output prices
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In agriculture, these investments can take the form of either physical capital stock (land, equipment,
irrigation, machinery, storage facilities, livestock) or human capital (stock of knowledge, expertise, or
management ability). Also, other investment type closely linked to agricultural productivity are public
investments, such as infrastructural development, R&D, extension/training and technical assistance system,
technology, or sustainable natural resources management. These public investments also promote and
complement private investment in the agricultural sector, fostering technology adoption and increasing
productivity.
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generates a spread of points on a given production function used to identify the supply
function (Mundlak, 1988). However, the inclusion of the price in the production function
here implies changes in output given the inputs, i.e., shifts of that production function that
create a different set of implemented functions affecting productivity. Therefore, the
assumption is that past prices are among the technology-changing variables that can
determine the techniques available and thus the production function and productivity.
This assumption implies that the higher (lower) are prices in agriculture, the faster
(slower) the rate of both technological innovation and productivity growth (Schultz,
1979; Schuh, 1974; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993). An econometrical reason is to mitigate
concerns about reverse causality regarding the indirect effects of agricultural income
shocks on violence. In the economics literature, the prices of agricultural commodities are
associated negatively with armed conflict: output price increases lead to a decline in
violence from armed conflicts in regions that produce more of the corresponding output
(see, e.g., Dube and Vargas, 2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014).

1.4.4. Empirical Estimation
Table 1.1 presents a simple description and summary statistics of the key
empirical variables used in the analysis. The CRS assumption has been imposed by
dividing the output (𝑌) and input variables 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 by land (𝑋0). This results in yield
(𝑦 = 𝑌/𝑋0 ) and the vector of relative inputs 𝒙 = (𝑥1 ,𝑥2 ), where 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 /𝑋0, 𝑖 =1,2. The
following baseline structure is estimated by department 𝑑 (= 1…, 26) and year 𝑡 (=
1995…, 2017):
2

2

6

ln𝑦𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖0 ln𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘 (𝑣𝑘𝑑𝑡 ∙ ln𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑡 )
𝑖=1

𝑖=1 𝑘=1
2

6

2

+ 𝛿0 𝜏 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖 (𝜏 ∙ ln𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑡 ) + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑣𝑘𝑑𝑡 + ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡 ln𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢0𝑑𝑡
𝑖=1

𝑘=1

(9)

𝑖=1

We have specified the technology-changing variables in logs for the productivity
elasticities calculation: 𝑣𝑘 = log (𝑧𝑘 ). Pooling all departments and years together in a
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single equation of the form specified in (9) gives 598 observations. We estimate the
parameters in equation (9) with OLS. Unobservable factors that jointly determine
violence and agricultural decisions may vary smoothly across departments and could be
potentially relevant omitted variables. In some specifications, we include region-fixed
effects (𝛼0𝑑 ) and region-specific time trends (𝛼𝑑 × 𝜏).17 An essential hypothesis in this
chapter is that rural areas with more violence intensity from the armed conflict are more
likely to exhibit a higher presence of both war-related outcomes (such as casualties and
IDP from rural to urban zones) and illegal drug production. Consequently, all of this
would alter both the use of inputs and productivity in agricultural activities.

1.5.

Empirical Results and Discussion
Table 1.2 shows the estimated coefficients of the parameters in equation (4). This

table contains twenty-two coefficients, seven of which are significant at the 1% level,
three at the 5% level, and four at the 10% level. We use the estimates in Table 1.2 to
calculate the average production and productivity elasticities evaluated at the mean of all
the observations.18 All the technology-changing variables are in logs. Hence, each
elasticity of productivity for any of these variables represents the percentage by which
productivity (percentage output change with inputs fixed) would change in response to a
1% change in the corresponding variable. Overall, the mean values of the estimated
coefficients in Table 1.3 show significant effects of the technology-changing variables.
The productivity elasticities of most interest here are the elasticities related to
violence shocks from armed conflict and illegal crop cultivation. The coefficients for the
technology-changing variables IDP and cocaine price are negative and significantly
17

The Colombian regions considered are: Amazon containing the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo;
Andean consisting of Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Cundinamarca, Huila, Norte de Santander, Quindío,
Risaralda, Santander, and Tolima; Caribbean including Atlántico, Bolívar, Cesar, Cordoba, La Guajira,
Magdalena, and Sucre; Orinoco that is constituted by Arauca, Casanare, and Meta; and Pacific which group
the departments of Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca. We include the region-fixed effects (𝛼0𝑑 )
and region-specific time trends (𝛼𝑑 × 𝜏) to control for time-invariant and time-variant unobservable factors
of the analyzed regions, respectively.
18
See Table A.1.1 for sensitivity analysis of the baseline model to some alternative specifications of
equation (9).
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different from zero. The productivity elasticity for war-related casualties is negative but
not statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for the IDP indicates that a 1%
increase in the ratio of IDP to the total population per 100,000 people due to the armed
conflict (averaging 1,296) would produce a 0.041% downward permanent shift in the
annual production function. Similarly, an increase of 1% in the ratio of war-related
casualties (averaging 19) to the total population per 100,000 inhabitants and the past
cocaine price shocks would shift the annual production function down by 0.012% and
0.611%, respectively.19
The technology-changing variables related to weather indicate that a 1% increase
in the mean annual temperature would temporarily lower the productivity of Colombian
legal agriculture by approximately 1.578%. A 1% increase in the yearly mean
precipitation would increase Colombian agricultural productivity by about 0.235%. The
productivity elasticity for the past output price indicates that a 1% increase in the
previous three-year average output price would cause an approximated 0.416%
temporary upward shift of the Colombian agricultural production function. This price
effect implies that a boom in agricultural commodity prices like that in the 2000-2007
period or the first five years of the 2010s created incentives to invest in Colombia’s
agriculture. These incentives would promote the innovation and adoption of new
production techniques because the price regime during the boom would positively affect
the technology relevant to subsequent periods. However, a downturn in the price of
agricultural goods could counterbalance those productivity enhancements during such a
boom or even reduce them if the decline in the price of commodities from agriculture
cancels out the effects of past periods of high output prices.

19

It is worth mentioning that the magnitude of the estimated productivity elasticities for violence shocks are
relatively small because the regressions control for crucial factors affecting both productivity and violence.
Some of these factors include the weather and income shocks that may explain changes in violence through
mechanisms related to variations in economic incentives to invest in the agricultural sector. Once the
regressions include some of these factors, the estimations mitigate endogeneity concerns. Therefore, the
estimated productivity effects may be attributed mainly to variations in the violence and not those other
factors affecting the Colombian agricultural sector. Moreover, the productivity effects of violence shocks
estimated here represent permanent changes in agricultural productivity or shifts in the meta-production
function of Colombia’s agriculture.
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The second panel in column 2 of Table 3 displays the production elasticities
evaluated at the average values of the variables and the semielasticity related to 𝜏. All the
estimated average production elasticities are statistically significant between 0 and 1. We
find that the mean (averaged over the 26 departments and the period 1995-2017)
production elasticity for the inputs, i.e., labor and livestock are 0.52 and 0.40,
respectively. The trend coefficient suggests that the average rate of exogeneous technical
change in the Colombian agricultural sector is 1% per year.
The last column of Table 3 shows the estimates of a conventional Cobb-Douglas
production function.20 From this model, the elasticity of production for labor is 0.73 and
for livestock is about 0.12. The estimated annual exogenous technical change from this
model is around 0.8%. We can note that the elasticity of labor input is somewhat lower
relative to that estimated from the variable coefficients model, even though it is still
higher than the elasticity of livestock. This result is reasonable because Colombian
agriculture is labor-intensive, and the agricultural output is relatively highly responsive to
changes in the rural labor force potentially used in agriculture. By contrast, the inclusion
of technology-changing variables increases the estimated livestock production elasticity.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient for the exogenous technical change slightly
increased, but its statistical significance decreased with the inclusion of the technologychanging variables. These changes in the production elasticities and the exogenous
technical change come basically from the impact of the included technology-changing
variables.
One of the main differences between the results of this study and related previous
literature is that we attribute higher production elasticities to labor. Some previous studies
estimate labor elasticity in the range of 0.14-0.4621 compared to our 0.52 (see, e.g., the

This model is equivalent to impose the constraint 𝛼𝑖𝑘 = 𝛾𝑘 = 0, for all i=1,2 and k=1…,6 in equation (4),
which implies that both the total factor productivity (A) and the output elasticities (𝛽𝑖 , for the inputs i=1,2)
do not depend on the technology-changing variables 𝑣𝑘 , for k=1…,6. The overall R2 of this model is 0.62,
while it is 0.85 for the variable coefficients model in Table 2. This difference could imply that the unexplained
error in the fixed coefficients model reduces up to 61% when including the technology-changing variables.
An F-test, with F(31, 514)=114.61, indicates that this addition is significantly different from zero.
21
See Fulginiti and Perrin (1993), Table 2 in Fuglie (2008), Mundlak et al. (2012), and Trindade and Fulginiti
(2015) for the comparisons to previous estimates.
20
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cost shares for labor input of 0.46 in Everson and Fuglie, 2010; and the average
production elasticity of 0.14 for labor in Trindade and Fulginiti, 2015). The CobbDouglas production function estimates for Colombia’s agriculture from 1975-to 2013 by
Jiménez et al. (2018) indicate that the labor elasticity ranges from 0.07 and 0.44 when
assuming constant technological change. The average livestock elasticity estimated here
is thus within the range established by some previous estimates. For instance, the average
production elasticities using a stochastic frontier model are 0.55 for livestock in Trindade
and Fulginiti (2015); 0.24 in Bharati and Fulginiti (2007); and 0.14-0.25 in Everson and
Fuglie (2010). Moreover, Jiménez et al. (2018) find that the livestock production
elasticity is 0.927 for Colombia’s agricultural sector.
A noteworthy result is that the past output price coefficient is positive while the
past cocaine price coefficient is negative. These estimations are consistent with a positive
productivity response to output price changes and inverse productivity response to the
risk of conflict and diverted agricultural resources to illegal drug production. The former
is in line with the inference of a positive response of productivity to the implemented
technology insofar as higher output prices create incentives to invest in the sector. The
latter is consistent with previous studies documenting that to the extent that coca finances
the Colombian armed conflict, increased coca cultivation may have reduced the overall
level of economic activity, especially in agriculture (see Angrist and Kugler, 2007; Dube
and Vargas, 2013).
The elasticity of productivity for the past output prices is about 0.42, and the
cocaine price is −0.61. These are sizable values. Using the same framework, Fulginiti and
Perrin (1993) report a past price elasticity of productivity of 0.13 for a group of 18
countries in the period 1961-1984 (0.028 for Colombia), whereas by using a somewhat
different framework, Mundlak et al. (2012) compute a price elasticity of productivity of
0.2. The price elasticity of productivity estimated here is slightly more than double that of
Mundlak et al. (2012) and is significantly larger than that of Fulginiti and Perrin (1993).
This is because these previous studies conducted cross-country analysis such that
aggregated data generally produces lower elasticity estimates, as does when controlling
for unit-level fixed effects in panel data analysis (Miller and Alberini, 2016). For the coca
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price elasticity of productivity, there is both suggestive and quantitative evidence that
illegal resources such as coca cultivation increase the duration of civil conflicts (Angrist
and Kugler, 2008; Ross, 2004). Angrist and Kugler (2008) provide empirical evidence on
this issue from a quasi-experimental research design that studies the impact of demand
shocks for illicit resources on rural economic conditions and civil conflict. Their paper
shows that an exogenous upsurge in coca prices and cultivation in Colombia implies that
the rural areas that saw accelerated coca production became considerably more violent.
This link is evidence that the financial opportunities that coca provides and the rentseeking by combatants limit the economic gains from coca production to the detriment of
main productive activities such as legal agriculture in rural areas.
The productivity effects calculated here can be crucial for studying Colombian
agriculture as the technology-changing variables used here reflect some of the main
events that affected the sector from 1995 to 2017. These events include not only
profitability/macroeconomic crisis or unstable agricultural policies, but mainly the
country’s crisis related to the armed conflict, drug traffic/illicit crop production,
agricultural commodity price shocks, and some weather effects.22
We computed elasticities for each observation in the sample and show the average
elasticities of the model per department from 1995-to 2017 in Table 1.4 and the 26
departments’ average elasticities per year in Table 1.5. Note that all 26 departments have
been negatively affected in agricultural productivity terms by the internal displacement of
people due to the violence from the armed rural conflict (see Table 4). The departments
with the highest productivity elasticities of IDP are La Guajira, Meta, Casanare, Arauca,
Cauca, Norte de Santander, Huila, Putumayo, Caquetá, Tolima, Santander, Bolívar,
Nariño, and Valle del Cauca. Consistent with this, Defensoría del Pueblo (2016) pointed
out that 40% of the Colombian IDPs come from the departments of Nariño, Cauca,
Chocó, and Valle del Cauca. This is also consistent with the fact that at most 70% (18 of
the 26 departments) of the productivity elasticities for casualties in Table 1.4 indicate a
22

See Appendix A in Jiménez et al. (2018) for a detailed list of the most remarkable events in Colombia’s
agriculture from 1975-to 2013, and Chapter 8 (about Colombia ) of the series of annual reports on
Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation for 2015-2018 from the OECD available at https://www.oecdilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation_22217371.
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permanent downward shift of the production function, being the most sensitive La
Guajira, Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo, Huila, Norte de Santander, Risaralda, Valle del
Cauca, Tolima, Meta, Quindío, Caldas, Bolívar, Santander, Chocó, and Antioquia. These
findings are consistent with reports (see, e.g., Gallego, 2020) showing that the
departments with more than 46% of the total armed conflict victims in Colombia are
Cauca, Antioquia, Nariño, Chocó, Bolívar, and Caldas. These are also departments where
the highest prevalence of murders of social leaders and former guerrillas occur (Gallego,
2020).
Regarding past cocaine prices, the productivity elasticities coefficients averaged
over 1995-2017 have all a negative sign, indicating significant downward production
function shifts in the agriculture of Córdoba, Sucre, Boyacá, Chocó, Cundinamarca,
Cesar, Magdalena, Antioquia, Caldas, Bolívar, and Valle del Cauca. These results are
consistent with the departmental exposure to international cocaine price shocks (with its
intensity measured as the value of cocaine production weighted by coca cultivation). The
higher the value of coca cultivation to a department (either because of increases in the
international cocaine prices creating incentives to invest in coca production or relatively
more relevant participation of a department in the national coca cultivation), the lower the
legal agricultural productivity.
The productivity elasticities for the annual mean temperature are negative
everywhere. They indicate that a 1% change in temperature would temporarily shift the
production function down by at least 1% (in Córdoba) and up to 2% (in Meta). The
elasticities of productivity concerning annual rainfall show positive effects across the
departments. These results are somewhat consistent with Lachaud et al. (2017) assessing
the agricultural productivity in Latin America in the presence of weather shocks. First,
their study points out that a gap in the (agricultural) productivity literature is still the
omission of climatic variables as regressors in the models used to derive TFP measures.
Second, the authors developed climate-adjusted TFP measures to estimate random
parameter stochastic production frontier models and assess the impact of climatic
variability on TFP. Finally, they find that adverse weather socks harm productivity with
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an average reduction in output across the region ranging between 0.02 and 22.7% over
the period 2000-2012 relative to 1961–1999. This estimate would reveal an adverse
impact of climatic variability on agricultural output and productivity in the region.
However, their results do not indicate a negative climatic effect on Colombia. The
present study also accounts for climatic effects in analyzing Colombian agriculture.
However, our results show that an increase in temperature (or a decrease in precipitation)
would reduce the productivity of Colombian agriculture. The last column in Table 1.4
shows that the output price productivity elasticities are all positive across the
departments, being the most elastic Arauca, Casanare, and Meta.
Table 1.5 shows that the productivity elasticities for IDP, casualties, (past) cocaine
price, and temperature were negative for each year from 1995 to 2017, reflecting an
increasingly higher estimated responsiveness of agricultural productivity to such
technology-changing variables. The rainfall and price productivity elasticities are
estimated to be positive for the 1995-2017 period. These estimated elasticities show a
relatively stable trend in magnitude for rainfall and those estimated coefficients on past
output price elasticities within the range between 0.38 in 1999 and 0.45 in 1997.
The last three columns of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the estimated production
elasticities and exogenous technical change at the department and year levels,
respectively. We calculate the production elasticities concerning each input as the 𝛽’s in
equation (1b) and the exogenous rate of technical change as the semielasticity given by
dln𝑦/d𝜏 = 𝛿0 + ∑𝑖 𝛿𝑖 ln𝑥𝑖 . The input elasticities for labor and livestock range across
departments between 0.27−0.70 and 0.03−0.76, respectively (see Table 1.4). The last
column of Table 1.4 shows that the exogenous rate of technical change varies among the
26 departments from -0.93% to 1.9%. The estimates of the annual production elasticities
presented in Table 1.5 for labor and livestock concentrated in the range of 0.41-0.64 and
0.20-0.55, respectively. The last column of Table 1.5 indicates that the annual rate of
exogeneous technical change for the agriculture of the 26 departments varies across years
from 0.75% to 1.17% during 1999-2017, which overlaps with the interval 0.8-1.3% for
the period 1975-2013 estimated by Jiménez et al. (2018).
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3.1. Estimated Cost of Violence in Terms of Productivity Effects
One of the main implications of our results is the implicit economic costs imposed
by the armed conflict in terms of agricultural productivity loss. We attempt to compute a
lower bound monetary measure of this productivity loss due to violence shocks from the
armed conflict using the estimates in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. We assume that the productivity
of Colombian agriculture is highly affected by violence causing direct and indirect costs
to the sector. In general, we estimate a monetary measure (a shadow cost or gain) in
agricultural productivity terms from any percentage change in the technology-changing
variables for any department 𝑑 in any year 𝑡 as
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑑𝑡 = 𝜑𝑘𝑑𝑡 × %∆𝑣𝑘𝑑𝑡 × 𝑌𝑑𝑡

(10)

where 𝜑𝑘𝑑𝑡 is the elasticity of productivity for 𝑣𝑘 of 𝑑 at 𝑡; %∆𝑣𝑘𝑑𝑡 is the coefficient of
variation (CV) for 𝑣𝑘 of 𝑑 at 𝑡, and 𝑌𝑑𝑡 is the value of agricultural production in millions
of 2005 US dollars for a department 𝑑 at year 𝑡. Table 1.6 displays the estimated average
costs (gains) from the percentage change of each technology-changing variable given by
its CV at the department level for the whole period of study. We can observe that the cost
of violence (IDP and casualties) from the armed conflict was specially and significantly
constraining for the departments of Córdoba, Cesar, Sucre, Magdalena, Caquetá,
Casanare, and Atlántico. The shadow cost of violence shocks for these departments is
between 1.3%-6.8% of their mean annual agricultural GDP. Although in less intensity,
we can observe that the other departments that bear a significant shadow cost of IDP in
terms of their agricultural GDP are La Guajira, Casanare, Meta, Cauca, Arauca, Huila,
Putumayo, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Caquetá, Tolima, Santander, Bolívar, Valle del
Cauca, Caldas, Atlántico, Cesar, and Magdalena. For these departments, the cost of this
violence shock is between 0.6% and 2% of their agricultural GDP per year. The rural
areas of some of these departments are historically the most affected by the armed
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conflict because of the persistent presence of guerrilla groups and paramilitaries and
conflict-related events.23 24
Regarding the cost of past cocaine prices to agricultural productivity in cocaproducing departments, we can infer from Table 1.6 that the illegal drug crop cultivation
has represented a loss in productivity that ranges from 22% (in Meta) to eleven-tenths (in
Caldas) of their mean annual agricultural GDP. The shadow cost of coca crops to
agricultural productivity has significantly constrained the departments of Caldas, Chocó,
Córdoba, Valle del Cauca, Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Cesar, Magdalena, Arauca, and
Santander, whereas in less intensity the departments of Caquetá, Antioquia, Nariño,
Norte de Santander, Bolívar, Cauca, and Putumayo.
Table 1.7 presents the estimated costs (gains) from each technology-changing
variable at the annual level for Colombian agriculture. We can observe that the cost of
violence across the years analyzed here has been quite persistent in terms of the GDP of
agriculture from the 26 traditionally agricultural departments considered in the analysis.
The cost of violence measured as a loss of agricultural productivity (due to IDP and warrelated casualties) could vary from 1% to 7% of the GDP of Colombian agriculture
during the 1995-2017 period. From 1996 to 1998 and the last six years in the sample
since 2012, violence imposed the highest costs in terms of productivity loss measured as
a proportion of the agricultural GDP (more than 2.9%). In addition, violence shocks
impacted productivity in a slightly less intensive but still highly substantial way, the
Colombian agricultural GDP in 2000 and 2004 (more than 2%). To provide some context
23

Although the armed conflict has extended to several areas of rural Colombia, it is critical to point out that
leading paramilitary groups emerged from the Magdalena Medio Region (constituted by the departments of
Antioquia, Bolívar, Boyacá, Cesar, and Santander) and Córdoba department. The main guerrilla groups,
FARC and ELN, originated from the Southern departments (Cauca and Tolima) and the department of
Santander, respectively. See Dube and Vargas (2013) for more details on the origin of non-state armed actors
in Colombia.
24
Historically, the departments with the most violent presence of the FARC are Cauca, Huila, Nariño, Meta,
Tolima, Antioquia, Bolívar, Córdoba, La Guajira, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo; with the ELN are
Nariño, Cauca, Risaralda, Chocó, Antioquia, Arauca, Santander, Norte de Santander, Bolívar, and Cesar; and
with paramilitaries Antioquia, Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Bolívar, Chocó, La Guajira, Magdalena,
Atlántico, Putumayo, and Risaralda. Regarding force displacement, the departments of Colombia with the
historical highest number of displaced people victims of the armed conflict are Nariño, Antioquia, Cauca,
Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca, and in less proportion Caquetá, Tolima, Huila, and
Putumayo. For more details on historical presence of nonstate armed groups and forced internal displacement
of persons in Colombia, see CERAC (2011), López (2011), Ibáñez (2009), and Defensoría del Pueblo (2016).
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for these percentages, we can point out some remarkable events related to Colombia’s
agriculture during the analyzed period following Jiménez et al. (2018) and the reports on
Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation from 2015 to 2018 elaborated by the
OECD. The 1990-1997 period exhibited unstable agricultural policies, increased drug
traffic, and the armed conflict intensification, all of which discouraged the spread of
environments for productivity and private investments. Among the most remarkable
events affecting Colombian agriculture during 1998-2002: (1) the armed conflict intensity
prompting many people to leave rural areas discouraging even more private investment;
and (2) the Colombian government did not prioritize the agricultural development
because of an ongoing macroeconomic crisis and the armed conflict intensification.
Although the 2003-2013 period was characterized by a boom in agricultural commodity
prices worldwide from 2006 to 2011 and by the security policy focused on restoring
confidence to invest in the Colombian economy, there were also a series of shocks that
could have lessened the beneficial effects of such striking events. First, violence was still
a crucial problem in rural areas. Second, Colombian legal agriculture exhibited a lack of
innovation and technological development that projected a profitability crisis due
partially to the decrease in worldwide agricultural commodity prices from 2010-to 2013.
Finally, during the last period of our sample (2014-2017), the agricultural sector in
Colombia faced significant constraints to hinder productivity. Agriculture operates in an
environment with underinvestment in public goods and services, poor land management,
and unsuccessful land tenure reforms. This latter aspect reflects that more than 40% of
land ownership continues to be informal. The long-running armed conflict also relates to
drug trafficking generating millions of victims and IDP, which has deeply affected the
performance of the Colombian agricultural sector. From Table 1.7, we can also estimate
the total cost of violence and the presence of drug crop production as a monetary measure
of the loss in agricultural productivity. The estimated cost of violence from 1995 to 2017
would be approximately $6.6 billion (2005 USD), while the (shadow) cost generated by
coca cultivation (historically and significantly linked to the armed conflict persistence) in
the same period could be around $129.2 billion (of 2005 USD). Alternatively, using the
coefficient of variation (CV) for IDP and casualties, we could have a more consistent
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computation of the total effect of violence on the production function. We use the means
and standard deviations in Table 1.1 for IDP and casualties and the corresponding
average productivity elasticities for these technology-changing variables in Table 1.3.
From these calculations, we can infer that the violence in Colombia would have shifted
downward the Colombian agricultural production function by 20.1% from 1995 to 2017.

4. Conclusions
The central issue addressed by this study is whether violence has a significant effect
on the productivity of agricultural resources. We use a production function for Colombian
agriculture, where violence shocks and other “technology-changing variables” determine
the productivity of inputs in legal agriculture. We provide quantitative evidence of a
significant negative association of violence shocks and illegal crop production incidence
with the productivity of the agricultural sector of Colombia. We also find that the past
agricultural output prices and current productivity of Colombian agriculture are positively
correlated. Other results imply that weather shocks such as higher mean temperatures and
lower rainfall conditions reduce the productivity of agricultural activities on which rural
areas generally rely. Overall, we can distinguish two primary blocks of effects: the
productivity effect and the scale effect. The productivity effect implies that a 1% increase
in the armed conflict-related internally displaced people and casualties permanently lower
productivity in Colombian agriculture by around 0.041% and 0.012%, respectively. We
also find that the past cocaine price incidence (given coca cultivation intensity) and mean
temperature can temporarily reduce agricultural productivity by approximately 0.61% and
1.58%, respectively. A 1% increase in past output price expectations and mean
precipitation would temporarily shift the production function of Colombian agriculture
upward by 0.42% and 0.24%, respectively. Exogenous technical change is approximately
1%, on average, and it varies across departments from -0.92% in Arauca to almost 2% in
Chocó. The scale effect indicates a significant variation of the input elasticities due to the
inclusion of the technology-changing variables. Production elasticities, on average, are
0.52 for labor and 0.40 for livestock but have a wide range across departments depending
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on the level of the departmental productivity changing variables. In particular, the violence
from the armed conflict in rural areas of Colombia was costly to agriculture because it
implied a downward shift in the production function or a productivity reduction of almost
20.1% from 1995 to 2017. The estimated cost of this violence for legal agriculture in
Colombia would have been approximately 2005 USD 6.6 billion from 1995 to 2017 (only
through the violence shocks considered here and in terms of productivity loss). In a postconflict Colombian context, it is thus imperative to understand how and why the armed
conflict hindered access to crucial factors of production and affected yields and agricultural
productivity.
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Table 1. 1− Definition and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Sample, 26
departments from 1995 to 2017
Short Description
Production Variables:
𝑌
𝑋0
𝑋1
𝑋2
Technology Changing Variables:
𝑣1
𝑣2
𝑣3
𝑣4
𝑣5
𝑣6
𝜏
Other Variables:
Farm Size
Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Region 5

Output (million USD$)
Land (thousand ha)
Labor (thousand persons)
Livestock (thousand
animals)
IDP per 100,000
inhabitants
Casualties per 100,000
inhabitants
Cocaine price per gram ($)
weighted by coca
cultivation
Mean temperature (Celsius)
Mean precipitation (mm)
Lagged output Price
(Törnqvist index, average
of past three years)
Unexplained exogeneous
technological change (time
trend)
Average farm size (ha per
UPA)
Amazon region
Andean region
Caribbean region
Orinco region
Pacific region

Mean

SD

Min

Max

1.53
1,393.4
311.4

1.37
1,080
236.3

69
50.24
11.97

7.11
5,221.2
1,116.2

909.5

790

30.93

9,249.5

1,296

1,967

1

17,798

19

215

0

5,065

2.61
21.04
9.56

5.33
3.89
5.67

0
13.67
1.83

35.31
27.55
28.87

1.26

0.32

0.43

2.44

12

6.64

1
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48.93
0.08
0.38
0.27
0.12
0.15

58.44
0.27
0.49
0.44
0.32
0.36

0.81
0
0
0
0
0

362.06
1
1
1
1
1

Notes: The output (Y) is the value of agricultural production in millions of 2005 US dollars; land (𝑋0 ) is in thousands
of hectares of arable and permanent cropland and permanent pastures; labor (𝑋1 ) is in thousands of individuals in
the working-age population in rural zones; livestock (𝑋2 ) represents the number of cow equivalent livestock units;
the variable 𝑣1 is the (one-year) lagged ratio of the annual number of IDP to the total population per one hundred
thousand inhabitants in the department where the displacement occurred; the variable 𝑣2 is the (one-year) lagged
ratio of the annual number of conflict-related casualties to the total population in the department of the recorded
deaths per 100 thousand inhabitants; the variable 𝑣3 (past cocaine price) is the (one-year) lagged retail cocaine price
weighted by the ratio between the area planted with coca in each department/year to the national area cultivated with
coca in the corresponding year; the variable 𝑣4 is the (annual/department) mean of the municipality-monthly values
of temperature; the variable 𝑣5 is the (annual/department) mean of the municipality-monthly values of precipitation
flux; and the variable 𝑣6 is the a cross-department price index (a Törnqvist index) relative to a base consisting of a
1999 cross-department index value. The other variables used in the analysis are Farm Size as the average APU size
(total number of hectares covered by the UPAs divided by the total number of UPAs) and the dummy variables
Region 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for the Amazon, Andean, Caribbean, Orinoco, and Pacific region,
respectively.
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Table 1. 2 − Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Equation (9) with dependent
variable ln𝑦, 26 departments

Linear terms (αi0 )

Inputs
Labor (lnx1 )
Livestock (lnx2 )
-0.5642
-1.7590
[0.5347]
[0.7528]**

Intercept
(α0 , γk, δ0 )
-4.1469
[0.7062]***

IDP (αi1 )

0.0112
[0.0092]

0.0497
[0.0291]*

Casualties (αi2 )

-0.0104
[0.0144]

0.0570
[0.0343]*

Past Cocaine Price (αi3 )

-0.0378
[0.0490]

-0.3762
[0.1967]*

-0.8501
[0.1568]***

Temperature (αi4 )

0.1770
[0.1616]

0.4609
[0.2527]*

-1.0925
[0.2156]***

Rainfall (αi5 )

0.2042
[0.0463]***

0.2087
[0.0829]**

0.6383
[0.0737]***

Past Output Price (αi6 )

-0.2035
[0.0781]***

-0.1540
[0.1622]

0.0403
[0.1456]

Trend (τ) (δi )

0.0064
[0.0028]**

0.0100
[0.0072]

0.0243
[0.0055]***

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. The estimates are based on 546 observations during the years 1995 and
2017. Overall 𝑅2 =0.85, between 𝑅2 =0.90, and within 𝑅2 =0.33..
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1. 3 − Productivity and Production Elasticities, 26 departments during 19952017
Regression Model
Variable
Fixed
Elasticitya
Elasticityb
Productivity elasticity for technology-changing variable:
IDP (𝜑1 )
Casualties (𝜑2 )

-0.0408
[0.0176]*
-0.0123
[0.0230]

Past Cocaine Price (𝜑3 )

-0.6112
[0.1259]**

Temperature (𝜑4 )

-1.5784
[0.2224]***

Rainfall (𝜑5 )

0.2349
[0.0716]*

Past Output Price (𝜑6 )

0.4161
[0.1272]**

Production elasticity for input variable and trend:
Labor (ln𝑥1 )

0.5153
[0.0556]***

0. .7333
[0.0357]***

Livestock (ln𝑥2 )

0.4034
[0.1192]*

0.1194
[0.0271]***

Trend (Exogeneous Technical Change)

0.0100
[0.0051]

0.0082
[0.0012]***

Notes: The elasticities are evaluated at the mean of all the observations. Standard errors in brackets are computed
with the delta method provided by Papke and Wooldridge (2005).
a Equation (4). b Equation (4) restricted by 𝛼
𝑖𝑘 = 𝛾𝑘 = 0 for all 𝑖 and 𝑘.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1. 4 − Estimated Productivity Elasticities at the Department Level, 1995-2017
Department
Antioquia
Arauca
Atlántico
Bolívar
Boyacá
Caldas
Caquetá
Casanare
Cauca
Cesar
Chocó
Córdoba
Cundinamarca
Guajira
Huila
Magdalena
Meta
Nariño
N. Santander
Putumayo
Quindío
Risaralda
Santander
Sucre
Tolima
V. Cauca

IDP
(𝜑1 )
-0.027
[0.013]**
-0.076
[0.033]**
-0.017
[0.012]
-0.036
[0.012]***
-0.018
[0.010]**
-0.026
[0.010]*
-0.053
[0.020]**
-0.079
[0.030]**
-0.063
[0.029]**
-0.029
[0.018]
-0.014
[0.010]
-0.001
[0.016]
-0.020
[0.008]*
-0.094
[0.034]***
-0.057
[0.020]***
-0.028
[0.013]*
-0.087
[0.027]***
-0.035
[0.021]*
-0.060
[0.020]***
-0.056
[0.021]***
-0.027
[0.010]*
-0.026
[0.015]*
-0.037
[0.012]***
-0.012
[0.013]
-0.049
[0.015]***
-0.031
[0.013]**

Casualties
(𝜑2 )
-0.006
[0.017]
0.015
[0.053]
0.005
[0.016]
-0.009
[0.015]
0.003
[0.014]
-0.010
[0.012]
0.003
[0.031]
-0.002
[0.045]
-0.057
[0.033]*
0.016
[0.028]
-0.007
[0.014]
0.026
[0.024]
-0.002
[0.011]
-0.062
[0.037]
-0.034
[0.021]
0.007
[0.021]
-0.016
[0.038]
-0.040
[0.025]
-0.032
[0.022]
-0.040
[0.023]*
-0.014
[0.012]
-0.029
[0.018]*
-0.007
[0.017]
0.016
[0.020]
-0.022
[0.018]
-0.022
[0.014]

Productivity elasticity for
Past Cocaine
Temperature
Price (𝜑3 )
(𝜑4 )
-0.693
-1.427
[0.133]**
[0.163]***
-0.479
-2.123
[0.172]**
[0.533]***
-0.768
-1.330
[0.134]***
[0.155]**
-0.642
-1.530
[0.092]***
[0.136]***
-0.762
-1.328
[0.128]***
[0.149]**
-0.692
-1.403
[0.106]***
[0.141]***
-0.581
-1.779
[0.112]**
[0.282]***
-0.430
-2.108
[0.164]**
[0.453]***
-0.404
-1.723
[0.136]**
[0.271]***
-0.729
-1.518
[0.134]***
[0.220]***
-0.762
-1.249
[0.137]***
[0.197]***
-0.901
-1.182
[0.187]***
[0.189]***
-0.744
-1.338
[0.117]***
[0.134]***
-0.230
-2.113
[0.188]
[0.318]***
-0.483
-1.717
[0.094]***
[0.182]***
-0.715
-1.477
[0.118]***
[0.162]***
-0.362
-2.155
[0.154]*
[0.407]***
-0.585
-1.416
[0.110]***
[0.267]***
-0.472
-1.761
[0.100]**
[0.190]***
-0.474
-1.695
[0.100]***
[0.197]***
-0.679
-1.401
[0.104]***
[0.152]***
-0.657
-1.329
[0.109]***
[0.241]***
-0.640
-1.549
[0.094]***
[0.143]***
-0.818
-1.303
[0.152]***
[0.160]***
-0.548
-1.657
[0.083]***
[0.157]***
-0.641
-1.427
[0.113]**
[0.182]***

Rainfall
(𝜑5 )
0.353
[0.059]**
-0.375
[0.158]**
0.401
[0.058]***
0.267
[0.047]***
0.411
[0.055]***
0.387
[0.049]***
-0.012
[0.087]
-0.298
[0.137]*
0.273
[0.077]**
0.182
[0.073]**
0.521
[0.067]***
0.454
[0.073]***
0.418
[0.050]***
-0.071
[0.100]
0.190
[0.056]***
0.256
[0.057]***
-0.284
[0.125]**
0.494
[0.075]***
0.140
[0.060]*
0.232
[0.058]**
0.405
[0.051]***
0.533
[0.070]***
0.244
[0.050]***
0.381
[0.062]***
0.199
[0.050]***
0.412
[0.058]**

Past Output
Price (𝜑6 )
0.308
[0.110]**
1.021
[0.256]***
0.271
[0.108]**
0.388
[0.082]***
0.260
[0.104]**
0.273
[0.093]**
0.665
[0.138]***
0.934
[0.226]***
0.344
[0.144]**
0.489
[0.119]***
0.147
[0.127]
0.238
[0.140]*
0.250
[0.096]**
0.670
[0.186]***
0.442
[0.100]***
0.411
[0.097]***
0.909
[0.208]***
0.146
[0.137]
0.492
[0.105]***
0.398
[0.107]***
0.252
[0.096]**
0.118
[0.130]
0.412
[0.084]***
0.299
[0.114]**
0.443
[0.086]***
0.239
[0.110]*

Production elasticity for
Labor
Livestock
(ln𝑥1 )
(ln𝑥2 )
0.526
0.311
[0.049]***
[0.104]*
0.428
0.518
[0.037]***
[0.139]***
0.412
0.305
[0.072]***
[0.153]
0.555
0.498
[0.060]**
[0.100]***
0.274
0.044
[0.096]**
[0.136]
0.602
0.486
[0.049]***
[0.115]***
0.467
0.384
[0.037]***
[0.139]**
0.402
0.412
[0.039]***
[0.120]***
0.659
0.438
[0.067]***
[0.121]***
0.563
0.571
[0.049]***
[0.093]***
0.700
0.763
[0.055]***
[0.151]***
0.558
0.551
[0.062]***
[0.085]***
0.442
0.252
[0.062]***
[0.116]
0.524
0.518
[0.060]***
[0.089]***
0.453
0.339
[0.059]***
[0.087]**
0.482
0.513
[0.046]***
[0.107]***
0.440
0.316
[0.036]***
[0.115]*
0.482
0.030
[0.058]***
[0.181]
0.375
0.165
[0.060]***
[0.111]
0.507
0.263
[0.049]***
[0.164]
0.646
0.492
[0.059]***
[0.134]***
0.604
0.480
[0.056]***
[0.131]***
0.520
0.363
[0.048]***
[0.097]**
0.589
0.584
[0.073]***
[0.097]***
0.482
0.402
[0.049]***
[0.088]***
0.704
0.491
[0.061]***
[0.128]**

Trend
(𝜏)
0.014
[0.005]**
-0.009
[0.009]
0.016
[0.004]***
0.011
[0.003]***
0.017
[0.004]***
0.015
[0.004]***
0.002
[0.005]
-0.007
[0.008]
0.009
[0.007]
0.010
[0.005]**
0.020
[0.005]***
0.019
[0.006]***
0.017
[0.004]***
-0.003
[0.008]
0.007
[0.004]
0.012
[0.004]***
-0.008
[0.007]
0.017
[0.006]***
0.006
[0.004]
0.008
[0.005]
0.016
[0.004]***
0.019
[0.005]***
0.011
[0.003]***
0.016
[0.005]***
0.008
[0.004]**
0.016
[0.005]**

Notes: The elasticities are evaluated at the mean. Standard errors in brackets are computed with the delta method
provided by Papke and Wooldridge (2005).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1. 5 − Annual Productivity Elasticities for Colombian Agriculture, 26
departments
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

IDP
(𝜑1 )
-0.035
[0.016]
-0.040
[0.019]
-0.054
[0.024]
-0.043
[0.019]
-0.034
[0.019]*
-0.043
[0.018]*
-0.039
[0.021]
-0.040
[0.018]
-0.043
[0.018]
-0.042
[0.017]*
-0.041
[0.017]*
-0.039
[0.016]*
-0.039
[0.016]*
-0.040
[0.016]*
-0.037
[0.016]*
-0.036
[0.016]*
-0.037
[0.015]*
-0.042
[0.017]**
-0.041
[0.017]*
-0.041
[0.016]*
-0.043
[0.018]*
-0.043
[0.017]*
-0.045
[0.019]*

Casualties
(𝜑2 )
-0.006
[0.022]
-0.011
[0.025]
-0.027
[0.029]
-0.015
[0.024]
-0.006
[0.025]
-0.014
[0.023]
-0.009
[0.027]
-0.010
[0.024]
-0.013
[0.023]
-0.012
[0.022]
-0.009
[0.023]
-0.008
[0.022]
-0.008
[0.022]
-0.010
[0.022]
-0.008
[0.022]
-0.008
[0.021]
-0.010
[0.020]
-0.015
[0.022]
-0.015
[0.022]
-0.014
[0.021]
-0.017
[0.022]
-0.018
[0.022]
-0.020
[0.024]

Productivity elasticity for
Past Cocaine
Temperature
Price (𝜑3 )
(𝜑4 )
-0.655
-1.525
[0.125]***
[0.211]***
-0.615
-1.577
[0.140]*
[0.234]***
-0.514
-1.696
[0.157]
[0.265]***
-0.594
-1.596
[0.132]**
[0.232]***
-0.660
-1.507
[0.144]***
[0.240]**
-0.593
-1.607
[0.119]***
[0.221]***
-0.627
-1.567
[0.148]**
[0.248]**
-0.620
-1.576
[0.140]**
[0.231]***
-0.600
-1.603
[0.127]**
[0.225]***
-0.605
-1.600
[0.122]**
[0.219]***
-0.615
-1.593
[0.122]***
[0.218]***
-0.627
-1.570
[0.122]**
[0.216]***
-0.628
-1.571
[0.120]***
[0.212]***
-0.622
-1.574
[0.117]**
[0.211]***
-0.638
-1.549
[0.121]***
[0.212]***
-0.645
-1.533
[0.118]***
[0.211]***
-0.635
-1.539
[0.117]**
[0.208]***
-0.602
-1.581
[0.116]**
[0.213]***
-0.602
-1.580
[0.113]***
[0.212]***
-0.608
-1.569
[0.118]**
[0.213]***
-0.590
-1.591
[0.119]**
[0.219]***
-0.589
-1.588
[0.117]**
[0.217]***
-0.573
-1.612
[0.122]**
[0.230]***

Rainfall
(𝜑5 )
0.259
[0.069]*
0.233
[0.076]*
0.184
[0.084]
0.230
[0.074]*
0.277
[0.078]*
0.217
[0.070]*
0.232
[0.080]*
0.229
[0.076]**
0.214
[0.073]**
0.212
[0.071]*
0.210
[0.070]**
0.227
[0.070]**
0.227
[0.069]**
0.228
[0.068]**
0.245
[0.069]*
0.259
[0.068]*
0.262
[0.067]*
0.242
[0.068]*
0.243
[0.067]*
0.251
[0.068]**
0.243
[0.069]**
0.247
[0.069]*
0.232
[0.072]*

Past Output
Price (𝜑6 )
0.399
[0.122]**
0.419
[0.136]**
0.453
[0.154]**
0.418
[0.134]*
0.381
[0.142]*
0.432
[0.124]**
0.421
[0.145]*
0.424
[0.136]*
0.436
[0.129]**
0.439
[0.124]**
0.442
[0.124]**
0.427
[0.124]**
0.427
[0.121]**
0.425
[0.119]**
0.410
[0.121]**
0.397
[0.119]**
0.392
[0.119]*
0.408
[0.120]**
0.406
[0.118]*
0.399
[0.121]*
0.405
[0.123]*
0.400
[0.122]*
0.413
[0.128]**

Production elasticity for
Labor
Livestock
(ln𝑥1)
(ln𝑥2)

0.416
[0.065]***
0.471
[0.059]***
0.523
[0.059]***
0.521
[0.057]***
0.479
[0.057]***
0.488
[0.059]***
0.503
[0.057]***
0.479
[0.056]***
0.476
[0.051]***
0.477
[0.049]***
0.483
[0.049]***
0.531
[0.050]***
0.522
[0.051]***
0.559
[0.049]***
0.539
[0.048]***
0.532
[0.052]***
0.591
[0.058]***
0.522
[0.058]***
0.557
[0.059]***
0.641
[0.057]***
0.511
[0.066]***

0.200
[0.127]
0.278
[0.120]
0.340
[0.112]*
0.344
[0.109]
0.323
[0.105]
0.377
[0.104]
0.395
[0.110]*
0.354
[0.112]
0.408
[0.106]*
0.415
[0.105]*
0.408
[0.112]*
0.462
[0.120]*
0.437
[0.110]*
0.490
[0.109]**
0.463
[0.117]*
0.441
[0.120]*
0.497
[0.124]*
0.460
[0.125]*
0.472
[0.134]*
0.558
[0.143]**
0.350
[0.179]

Trend
(𝜏)
0.011
[0.005]
0.010
[0.006]
0.008
[0.006]
0.010
[0.005]
0.012
[0.006]
0.009
[0.005]
0.010
[0.006]
0.010
[0.005]
0.009
[0.005]
0.009
[0.005]
0.009
[0.005]*
0.010
[0.005]*
0.010
[0.005]*
0.010
[0.005]
0.011
[0.005]
0.011
[0.005]
0.011
[0.005]
0.010
[0.005]
0.010
[0.005]
0.010
[0.005]
0.010
[0.005]
0.010
[0.005]
0.010
[0.005]

Notes: The elasticities are evaluated at the mean. Standard errors in brackets are computed with the delta method
provided by Papke and Wooldridge (2005).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1. 6 − Productivity Cost (Gain) per Department for the 1995-2017 Period
Department

AGDP

IDP

Casualties

Cocaine Price

Temperature

Rainfall

Output Price

Antioquia

2,106

-6.7

11.2

-888.1

-331.1

473.7

5.2

[3.0]**

[33.8]

[163.6]**

[36.2]***

[76.2]**

[1.8]**

-3.3

21.3

-153.4

-73.2

-26.0

1.3

[1.4]**

[74.2]

[52.1]**

[17.9]***

[11.5]**

[0.3]***

-0.8

-0.8

-

-48.6

118.7

0.2

[0.5]

[4.3]

-

[5.5]**

[16.9]***

[0.1]**

-3.1

6.6

-133.8

-99.0

-269.1

0.9

[1.0]***

[11.5]

[19.2]***

[8.8]***

[47.5]***

[0.2]***

-3.7

-4.2

-642.4

-129.2

112.8

1.2

[2.1]**

[30.6]

[107.2]***

[14.3]**

[15.1]***

[0.5]**

-3.2

7.8

-512.7

-42.6

110.0

0.9

[1.2]*

[10.3]

[78.7]***

[4.3]***

[14.0]***

[0.3]***

-1.4

-1.3

-82.8

-32.0

-0.9

0.6

[0.5]**

[13.4]

[15.9]***

[5.1]***

[5.4]

[0.1]***

-5.5

0.1

-

-108.4

-26.7

1.3

[2.1]**

[54.2]

-

[23.4]***

[12.7]*

[0.3]***

-7.6

45.2

-156.5

-55.5

-100.4

1.2

[3.5]**

[25.9]*

[51.2]*

[8.7]***

[27.6]**

[0.5]**

-3.1

-16.3

-366.1

-104.6

164.0

1.5

[2.0]

[28.5]

[67.6]***

[15.3]***

[65.9]***

[0.4]***

-0.3

8.8

-188.3

-19.1

37.6

0.2

[0.2]

[14.9]

[34.0]***

[3.1]***

[4.9]***

[0.2]

0.0

-43.8

-501.2

-111.6

-188.5

0.8

[1.3]

[39.1]

[104.4]***

[17.9]***

[30.3]***

[0.5]*

-13.2

9.1

-1,835.4

-201.6

401.9

2.9

[5.1]*

[48.4]

[288.8]***

[20.1]***

[48.2]***

[1.1]**

-3.4

20.1

-40.2

-68.2

26.6

0.6

[1.2]***

[12.2]

[31.2]

[10.2]***

[37.9]

[0.2]***

-7.4

35.7

-

-165.8

132.5

1.5

[2.6]***

[22.2]

-

[17.6]***

[38.2]***

[0.3]***

-3.8

-6.9

-389.6

-157.2

104.0

1.5

[1.8]*

[20.8]

[64.1]***

[17.3]***

[23.2]***

[0.4]***

-8.6

32.9

-137.1

-141.0

-60.2

2.5

[2.7]***

[76.5]

[56.2]*

[26.4]***

[26.9]**

[0.6]***

-5.9

24.2

-219.7

-44.7

90.1

0.6

[3.5]*

[14.7]

[41.4]***

[8.4]***

[13.7]***

[0.6]

Arauca

Atlántico

Bolívar

Boyacá

Caldas

Caquetá

Casanare

Cauca

Cesar

Chocó

Córdoba

Cundinamarca

La Guajira

Huila

Magdalena

Meta

Nariño

299

119

421

855

464

174

372

573

494

219

643

2,419

170

684

613

611

615
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Table 1. 7 − (continued)
Department

AGDP

IDP

Casualties

Cocaine Price

N. Santander

469

-4.4

22.7

-164.3

[1.4]***

[16.0]

-0.8

Putumayo

Quindío

Risaralda

Santander

Sucre

Tolima

V. del Cauca

78

400

306

1,258

220

1,001

1,546

Temperature

Rainfall

Output Price

-160.6

31.7

1.4

[33.4]**

[17.1]***

[12.8]*

[0.3]***

15.2

-19.6

-12.6

15.4

0.2

[0.3]***

[8.8]*

[4.2]***

[1.5]***

[3.8]**

[0.1]***

-2.4

25.4

-

-34.9

103.3

0.8

[0.9]*

[22.1]

-

[3.8]***

[12.9]***

[0.3]**

-1.4

25.8

-

-23.5

102.2

0.3

[0.8]*

[15.6]*

-

[4.3]***

[13.4]***

[0.3]

-9.5

15.0

-629.8

-117.9

150.7

2.7

[3.1]***

[36.3]

[91.8]***

[10.9]***

[30.8]***

[0.6]***

-0.5

-5.3

-

-48.3

-40.7

0.4

[0.6]

[6.5]

-

[5.9]***

[6.6]***

[0.2]***

-7.7

25.4

-

-229.4

148.5

2.2

[2.4]***

[21.0]

-

[21.6]***

[37.4]***

[0.4]***

-10.9

28.8

-1,178.8

-111.5

955.9

2.4

[4.4]**

[18.4]

[205.6]**

[14.2]***

[131.9]**

[1.1]*

Notes: The values are in 2005 US$1 million. The exchange rate in 2005 was approximately US$1 = 2,321.5 COP
Colombian Peso. AGDP indicates the Annual Average Agricultural GDP. Standard errors in brackets are
computed with the delta method provided by Papke and Wooldridge (2005).
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Table 1. 8 − Annual productivity cost (gain) for technology-changing variable, 26
departments
Year

AGDP

IDP

Casualties

Cocaine Price

Temperature

Rainfall

Output Price

1995

10,020.9

-55.47

34.06

-5,178.99

-1,518.21

1,774.65

19.35

[0.95]

[15.01]

[48.63]**

[7.39]***

[17.15]*

[0.25]**

-72.87

272.75

-4,594.30

-1,664.59

1,228.57

22.94

[1.35]

[18.41]

[61.50]**

[9.88]***

[21.05]*

[0.36]**

-111.60

580.74

-3,465.62

-1,710.61

777.33

23.96

[1.84]

[20.39]

[58.80]

[9.45]***

[23.15]

[0.33]**

-79.61

279.37

-4,543.88

-1,576.04

1,403.22

20.29

[1.26]

[15.76]

[46.82]**

[7.99]***

[18.45]*

[0.27]*

-52.97

69.80

-5,282.81

-1,418.53

2,002.50

15.44

[1.20]*

[15.75]

[54.19]***

[8.96]**

[19.89]*

[0.32]*

-71.45

156.78

-4,922.99

-1,591.87

1,413.52

20.84

[1.14]*

[14.60]

[46.29]***

[7.58]***

[16.83]*

[0.25]**

-64.09

22.72

-5,276.19

-1,602.88

1,486.71

21.15

[1.51]

[19.02]

[56.83]**

[8.96]**

[18.47]*

[0.29]*

-70.71

126.56

-5,482.86

-1,673.52

1,796.36

21.95

[1.17]

[14.94]

[52.14]*

[7.96]***

[19.18]**

[0.28]*

-71.00

104.57

-5,593.13

-1,718.24

1,639.08

23.11

[1.32]*

[16.53]

[54.56]**

[8.16]***

[18.79]**

[0.28]**

-77.83

158.11

-5,374.63

-1,754.02

1,590.64

23.72

[1.16]*

[15.39]

[48.90]**

[8.07]***

[18.51]*

[0.27]**

-76.49

135.53

-5,560.51

-1,753.54

1,648.50

24.49

[1.22]*

[16.42]

[51.63]***

[8.29]***

[18.90]**

[0.27]**

-73.27

132.59

-5,712.53

-1,768.02

1,836.71

23.78

[1.14]*

[15.86]

[51.60]**

[8.30]***

[19.23]**

[0.28]**

-75.70

128.59

-6,028.40

-1,823.60

1,855.54

24.83

[1.18]*

[16.70]

[54.71]***

[8.49]***

[19.89]**

[0.29]**

-75.91

124.74

-5,992.22

-1,844.17

1,741.33

25.06

[1.20]*

[17.50]

[54.03]**

[8.55]***

[19.46]**

[0.28]**

-72.61

100.30

-5,992.98

-1,800.29

1,837.27

24.22

[1.16]*

[17.66]

[54.39]***

[8.47]***

[19.32]*

[0.28]**

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

9,917.8

9,929.5

10,103.4

10,010.3

10,134.6

10,334.9

10,939.5

11,156.8

11,170.6

11,267.3

11,523.1

11,953.2

11,865.4

11,742.0
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Table 1. 9 − (continued)
Year
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

AGDP
11,817.2

12,062.5

12,345.7

13,142.3

13,526.6

14,044.2

14,389.0

15,225.9

IDP

Casualties

Cocaine Price

Temperature

Rainfall

Output Price

-73.58

114.94

-5,948.67

-1,793.41

1,973.31

23.24

[1.17]*

[17.50]

[52.65]***

[8.46]***

[19.15]*

[0.29]**

-75.23

157.71

-6,004.85

-1,834.61

2,050.38

23.35

[1.11]*

[17.06]

[53.27]**

[8.65]***

[19.77]*

[0.29]*

-86.87

273.46

-5,920.35

-1,948.56

1,836.85

25.65

[1.27]**

[18.62]

[52.46]**

[9.05]***

[19.83]*

[0.30]**

-91.87

285.11

-6,316.15

-2,074.72

2,019.80

27.03

[1.32]*

[19.50]

[55.99]***

[9.59]***

[21.24]*

[0.31]*

-91.60

271.85

-6,509.76

-2,114.61

2,124.06

27.16

[1.33]*

[19.26]

[58.50]**

[9.86]***

[22.20]**

[0.33]*

-102.56

353.07

-6,503.36

-2,207.21

2,163.57

28.65

[1.49]*

[21.05]

[58.23]*

[10.38]***

[22.88]**

[0.34]*

-106.21

384.17

-6,538.57

-2,268.71

2,175.03

29.36

[1.54]*

[21.75]

[58.01]**

[10.63]***

[23.17]*

[0.35]*

-130.05

477.16

-6,496.31

-2,453.46

1,886.66

34.11

[1.92]*

[25.64]

[62.96]**

[11.79]***

[25.30]*

[0.38]**

Notes The values are in 2005 US$1 million. The exchange rate in 2005 was approximately US$1 = 2,321.5 COP
Colombian Peso. AGDP indicates the Total Agricultural GDP of the 26 departments. Standard errors in brackets are
computed with the delta method provided by Papke and Wooldridge (2005).
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Figure 1. 1 – Colombian GDP Share of Agriculture in 1995-2017

Source: Own calculations based on data from The World Bank.

Figure 1. 2– Value of Colombian Agricultural Output and its Growth Rates, 26
departments

Source: Own calculations based on data from DANE.
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Figure 1. 3 – Evolution of the IDP and Conflict-Related Casualties in Colombia, 26 departments

Source: Own calculations based on data from CODHES-SISDES and UCDP.
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APPENDIX

A.1. Sensitivity Analysis of the Baseline Estimates from the Structural Model
The implementation of our model allows the inclusion of potentially relevant
omitted variables. We thus control for farm size, time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity, and unobserved time-variant factors. The omission of these factors could
be problematic if one believes that the structural model specification leads to biased
estimates by attributing the effect of the omitted variables to the technology-changing
variables included. This concern validates tests for the sensitivity of our results to other
relevant-omitted sources of technological change that affect a particular region’s
agricultural productivity, given that the technology in Colombian agriculture could be
sensitive to local environmental\institutional conditions and technological spillovers.
Otherwise, all other more general time-variant factors would similarly affect all units
of study through 𝜏. Table A.1 shows our estimated productivity and production
elasticities using alternative econometric specifications.
The elasticities in Table A.1 represent the mean of all the elasticities calculated
for each observation. The baseline estimates from equation (4) are in column (1) of this
table. Column (2) shows that including farm size as a control variable does not virtually
affect the results. The standard errors in column (3) are clustered at the regional level
to account for possible serial correlation across departments over time. This
clusterization generates similar estimates to those in column (1). The inclusion of the
linear term for department fixed effects in column (4) does not substantially affect our
baseline estimates. Column (5) includes department-specific trends to the specification
in column (4). Again, the estimated elasticities do not vary substantially compared to
those in column (1). By including regional fixed effects in column (6), we can observe
that controls for regional fixed effects reduce the statistical significance and magnitudes
of all the estimated elasticities, except rainfall and labor input. Finally, column (7) (that
controls for regional specific effects) shows similar results to those in column (6), with
the exception that the cocaine price elasticity is less attenuated compared to the rest of
the estimates.
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Table A.1- Productivity and Production Elasticities with Some Alternative
Specifications
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.0408
[0.0176]*

-0.0407
[0.0177]*

-0.0408
[0.0161]*

-0.0433
[0.0175]*

-0.0437
[0.0174]*

-0.0348
[0.0164]*

-0.0338
[0.0158]*

-0.0123
[0.0230]

-0.0123
[0.0231]

-0.0123
[0.0244]

-0.0157
[0.0224]

-0.0178
[0.0222]

0.0046
[0.0221]

0.0051
[0.0220]

Past Coca Price (𝜑3 )

-0.6112
[0.1259]**

-0.6114
[0.1266]**

-0.6112
[0.1209]**

-0.5524
[0.1168]**

-0.5356
[0.1132]**

-0.2685
[0.1135]*

-0.4491
[0.1023]*

Temperature (𝜑4 )

-1.5784
[0.2224]***

-1.5586
[0.2483]***

-1.5784
[0.1812]***

-1.5204
[0.2195]***

-1.5338
[0.2189]***

0.5229
[0.3526]

0.6356
[0.3412]

Rainfall (𝜑5 )

0.2349
[0.0716]*

0.2367
[0.07276]*

0.2349
[0.06149]*

0.2132
[0.0696]*

0.2067
[0.0699]*

0.2628
[0.0810]*

0.2828
[0.0795]**

Past Output Price (𝜑6 )

0.4161
[0.1272]**

0.4153
[0.1280]**

0.4161
[0.1101]**

0.4341
[0.1265]**

0.4297
[0.1256]**

0.3841
[0.1312]*

0.3620
[0.1290]*

Technical Change (𝜏)

0.0100
[0.0051]

0.0102
[0.0052]

0.0100
[0.0049]

0.0104
[0.0050]

0.0103
[0.0059]

0.0081
[0.0050]

0.0094
[0.0070]

0.5153
[0.0556]***

0.5118
[0.0598]***

0.5153
[0.0506]***

0.5343
[0.0564]***

0.5040
[0.0567]***

0.5343
[0.0676]***

0.5300
[0.0731]***

0.4034
[0.1192]*

0.4025
[0.1201]*

0.4034
[0.0813]*

0.4684
[0.1183]**

0.4823
[0.1175]**

0.2835
[0.1241]*

0.2546
[0.1160]

Productivity elasticity for
IDP (𝜑1 )
Casualties (𝜑2 )

Production elasticity for
Labor (ln𝑥1)
Livestock (ln𝑥2 )

Notes: The elasticities represent the mean of all the elasticities calculated for each observation. Standard errors in
brackets are computed using the delta method provided by Papke and Wooldridge (2005). Column (1) replicates our
baseline estimates of Equation (4). Column (2) includes a control for farm size (or average APU size) defined here
as the total number of hectares covered by the UPAs divided by the total number of UPAs. In column (3), the error
term 𝑢0𝑑𝑡 of (4) is clustered at the regional level to account for possible serial correlation across departments over
time. Column (4) includes a linear term for department fixed effects. Column (5) incorporates a variable identifying
the departments and a linear trend for department-specific trends. Column (6) controls for regional fixed effects as
time-invariant factors 𝛼0𝑟 , where 𝑟 indicates the region, with the Amazon Region as the omitted category. Column
(7) adds time-variant omitted variables of the form 𝛼𝑟 × 𝜏 to the estimation in column (2) to account for regional
specific effects.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure A.1. 1 - Spatial Distribution of the Rate of IDP per 100,000 inhabitants

Source: Own calculations based on data from CODHES-SISDES.
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Figure A.1. 2 - Spatial Distribution of Conflict-Related Casualties per 100,000
inhabitants

Source: Own calculations based on data from UCDP.
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Figure A.1. 3 - Spatial Distribution of Coca Production Intensity

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF PLAN COLOMBIA ON THE VALUE OF LEGAL
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

2.1.

Introduction
Colombia is among the three largest coca leaf producers and the world's leading

supplier of cocaine to the US (UNODC, 2009). Because of the socio-economic costs
resulting from this, both nations have aggressively pursued forced coca eradication and
introduced a robust anti-drug policy named Plan Colombia (PC)25 to combat cocaine
production. The policy has used three primary strategies in practice for this: (i)
eradication of coca cultivation by aerial spraying with pesticides over planted fields and
manual coca crops destruction; (ii) alternative livelihood programs for coca-producing
regions aimed at increasing the relative profit of non-coca agricultural activities by
providing monetary subsidies in exchange for not cultivating coca; and (iii) interdiction
of cocaine-producing laboratories and related facilities.26
Although the cost of the anti-drug policy was around 5.5 billion US dollars from 2000
to 2007 (ONDCP, 2006; GAO, 2008), its effectiveness in reducing coca cultivation is still
controversial.27 The literature has focused on quantifying the policy effects on the
25

Launched bilaterally in 2000, Plan Colombia (PC) was a US foreign-military aid and diplomatic
initiative. The policy aimed to combat Colombian illegal drug production, organized crime, and drug
trafficking organizations. In the first phase of PC (2000-2006), aid resources reached USD$4.8 billion,
mainly invested in the defense industry (National Planning Department-DNP-, 2016). The second phase
(2007-2009), called the "Strategy for Strengthening Democracy and Social Development," was focused on
institutional strengthening in areas affected by violence and with investments of USD$2.1 billion aimed at
improving the population's socio-economic conditions in municipalities with the presence of either
demobilized or active illegal armed groups. The last phase of the Plan (2010-2015) implied USD$2.7
billion for supporting the socio-economic development of the most vulnerable populations to both the
violent confrontations between drug trafficking organizations and the Colombian government and the
adverse effects of coca crops eradication campaigns.
26
An interdiction strategy (interdiction policy) is defined here as the set of Colombian government
operations and direct interventions to dismantle or destroy cocaine processing facilities (or laboratories)
and increase coca base, coca leaves, and cocaine seizures. The government invested in these strategies to
reduce the cocaine supply by targeting its intermediate and final production stages (Cote, 2019).
27
There is still little empirical work assessing the efficacy of drug control policies under Plan Colombia.
This gap is particularly evident in the case of coca eradication, which targets the farmers that produce coca
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population of areas with coca production.28 No empirical studies have assessed their
effects on the value of agricultural production in the areas growing coca. This chapter
uses a 21-year panel covering almost 97% of the entire country in the 1995–2015 period
to estimate these effects. More specifically, this study examines the effects of the policies
controlling coca supply in Colombia on the value of legal agricultural production.
The cultivation of coca leaves in Colombia links to cocaine processing, given that
coca leaf is the essential input in cocaine production. The other leading coca leaf growing
countries (i.e., Bolivia and Peru) clearly distinguish coca for cocaine production and its
use for culturally tied consumption such as chewing, tea, and medicine (Koops, 2009;
UNODC, 2014). Although there has been a remarkable decline in the total area under
coca cultivation29 , little of this reduction has been attributed to successful eradication
campaigns alone, which have been the dominant anti-drug policy in the last three decades
in Colombia (Vargas, 2005; Reyes, 2014; Mejía et al., 2017). Some studies have argued
that indiscriminate aerial spraying of glyphosate destroys legal agriculture proximate to
coca plantations. (Bishop 2003; Ibañez and Martinsson, 2013; Camacho and Mejía, 2015;
Relyea, 2005; Rozo 2014;). Other studies assert that such aerial spraying campaigns
generate negative economic, social, environmental, political, and health consequences
(Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003; Vargas, 2005; Dion and Russler, 2008).
Previous literature has documented diverse responses of coca farmers to the risk of
eradication. Some farmers plant coca more extensively (Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003),
while others either reduce or abandon coca production such that coca supply declines and
the international coca price increases. This increase in coca price may incentivize farmers
to expand coca cultivation in other locations (Dion and Russler, 2008; Robledo, 2015).
The Colombian government has sporadically and not consistently carried out some social

leaf, the primary input of cocaine (Reyes, 2014). Only Moreno-Sanchez et al. (2003), Dion and Russler
(2008), and Reyes (2014) have attempted to estimate the effectiveness of coca eradication in Colombia at
the national, departmental, and municipal levels, respectively. Nevertheless, there is no research relating
the effectiveness of Plan Colombia to the agricultural production value of licit or conventional crops.
28
The main alternative crops that directly compete for land allocation with coca are coffee and cocoa.
29
The area under coca cultivation decreased by almost a half: falling from 248,189 hectares (ha) in 2007 to
98,899 ha in 2013 (UNODC Coca Cultivation Survey, 2014). More generally, Plan Colombia reduced coca
cultivation from 160,000 ha in 2000 to 48,000 ha in 2013, and the estimated value of Colombia's drugrelated economy shrank from US$7.5 billion in 2008 to US$4.5 billion in 2013 (Mejía, 2016).
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programs to encourage farmers to abandon coca cultivation by identifying alternative
legal crops that could replace coca labor and income. However, these strategies have
historically received less support than eradication efforts (Vargas, 2005). Empirical
evidence suggests that alternative crops to coca production are generally more effective
than eradication campaigns in reducing coca supply in the short and long run (MorenoSanchez et al., 2003; Ibañez and Carlsson, 2010; Tabares and Rosales, 2005; Ibañez and
Martinsson, 2013). Also, a higher presence of governmental institutions and public forces
in coca-growing regions links to a significant coca cultivation reduction (Dion and
Russler, 2008). The lack of governance and the presence of insurgent groups, in turn,
promote an illegal environment that induces farmers to grow and supply coca leaves to
the cocaine production system (Holmes et al., 2006; Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Dube and
Varga, 2013; Ibañez et al., 2013; UNODC, 2014). Therefore, alternative crops alone
appear not to provide farmers with enough incentives to abandon coca cultivation.
Suggestive evidence has shown that the threat of violence, economic risks, and the fall in
the prices of legal crops increases the incentives for farmers to switch to illicit crops
(Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Ibañez et al., 2013).
According to Robledo (2015), the eradication of coca cultivation has produced little
real impact and, in some cases, the opposite effect by increasing the area under coca
cultivation. Alternative crop policy and livelihood programs for coca-producing regions
implemented by the Colombian government have not even been significantly more
effective than the eradication policy (Robledo, 2015; Mejía, 2016). By contrast, Mejía
(2016), Mejía and Restrepo (2016), Mejía et al. (2017), and Cote (2019) show that the
interdiction of coca-and-cocaine-producing laboratories and related facilities, especially
since 2007, has proven to be the most effective and even cost-effective counternarcotics
strategy used by Colombia.
The US Government Accountability Office has reported that the annual US funding
for the military component of PC was, on average, 540 million USD per year between
2000 and 2008. This funding added to the 812 million USD invested by the Colombian
government per year in the war on illegal drug production and trafficking, representing
around 1.2% of Colombia’s average annual GDP during the 2000-2008 period. The
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results on PC effectiveness are considered mixed despite such substantial investments.
Figure A.2.1 in Appendix A displays the number of hectares of coca grown, the number
of hectares sprayed in aerial eradication campaigns, and the number of hectares subjected
to manual eradication between 1995 and 2014. The figure shows that despite the efforts
to reduce coca plantations through intensive eradication campaigns, the annual number of
hectares devoted to coca cultivation did not significantly fall, especially between 2005
and 2008, when both strategies were at their peaks. Although the area under coca
cultivation fell rapidly from about 140,000 hectares in 2000 to 80,000 in 2002, areas
planted with coca were relatively stable at an average of about 85,000 hectares in 20032006.30 However, coca cultivation decreased again from 2007 to 2013, declining to about
48,000 hectares even when coca eradication efforts were substantially reduced (see
Figure A.2.1).
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.1 provides a background of
the interdiction policy under the PC since 2007. Section 2 presents the data used and
describes the empirical strategy implemented in the chapter. Section 3 presents and
discusses the main results. Finally, Section 4 concludes the chapter.

30

In 1978, the Colombian government launched aerial fumigation to eradicate cannabis crops
with the herbicide Paraquat (Vargas, 2002). Because of the ecological risks associated with this
herbicide, the Colombian government replaced it with glyphosate, known commercially as
Roundup, around the mid-1980s. Since then, aerial spraying of glyphosate-based defoliants has
been the most common anti-drug policy followed by Colombian governments (Davalos, 2016).
The aerial fumigation program began officially in the 1990s continuing then for 21 years until the
Colombian government halted it in 2014 because of the devastating health or environmental
impacts caused by glyphosate (For more details on these aspects, see the World Health
Organization report, 1994; Fritschi et al., 2015; and Camacho and Mejía, 2015). Manual
eradication is not associated with environmental or health risks, but it is a more expensive policy
because it is a labor-intensive activity. According to Davalos (2016), the Colombian government
also carried out manual eradication campaigns when and where aerial spraying was restricted or
in easy-access areas without armed conflict (less than 10% of total eradication actions). However,
manual eradication was only an official anti-drug policy in 2004. It became a national program
with a budget from the Colombian government in 2004, and Plan Colombia was allocated
exclusively to this activity (DNP, 2010; Davalos. 2016).
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2.1.1. Interdiction Strategies
During former President Álvaro Uribe’s second term, Ex-President Juan Manuel
Santos became defense minister in 2006. The emphasis of Colombia’s anti-drug
strategies shifted radically since Santos and his team decided to reduce eradication
campaigns of coca cultivation and put more effort toward dismantling cocaine production
and trafficking. Figure 2.1 shows that the number of hectares under aerial spraying
declined from about 152,000 in 2006 to 80,000 in 2009 (a reduction of 48%). Figure
A.2.2 illustrates that the number of laboratories destroyed increased from around 2,100 in
2006 to 3,000 in 2008 (an increase of 43%). This new anti-drug strategy reduced the net
supply of cocaine by more than 50%, a supply shock that impacted the entire region and
the street price of cocaine in the United States (see Figure A.2.3 in Appendix A of this
chapter). Figure A.2.4 in Appendix A displays coca base and cocaine seizures series and
coca crop cultivation from 1999 to 2014. These seizures derived from three policies
designed for reducing the cocaine supply. (1) interdictions of the labs and facilities where
cocaine is processed; (2) disruption of cocaine shipments en route to consumption
markets; and (3) imposition of stricter state controls on the sales of chemicals used to turn
coca leaves into coca base. We can observe that cocaine hydrochloride seizures increased
from 127 kilograms in 2006 to almost 200 in 2009 (an increase of 57%).
The interdiction of coca base and cocaine-processing facilities seems to have had
much higher effects—not only on cocaine trafficking but also on coca cultivation— than
eradication and other policies. Empirical evidence suggests that the sharp decline in
Colombia’s cocaine supply from 2007 to 2009 induced by such an anti-drug strategy
pushed drug trafficking organizations’ bases away from Colombia while embraced by other
locations such as Central America and Mexico (Castillo et al., 2020). Mejía and Restrepo
(2013) find that for every cocaine-laboratory interdiction (detected and destroyed by the
authorities), the area under coca cultivation decreases by approximately three hectares. The
systematic elimination of cocaine-processing facilities could have represented a negative
shock to the demand for coca leaves, at least in the short run, and thus coca cultivation
declined.

60

A simple demand and supply representation of the markets for cocaine and coca
can illustrate the essential hypothesis of the present research. This conjecture can be
associated with a Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF) relationship between coca and
alternative conventional crops with and without anti-drug policies (see Figures B.2.1-B.2.3
in Appendix B of this chapter). Intuitively, the 2008 negative shock in the net cocaine
supply of Colombia (displayed in Figure A.2.3) can be represented in Figure B.2.1 as a
leftward (or an upward) shift of the worldwide cocaine supply curve so that the
international price of cocaine will be higher. As Figure B.2.2 illustrates, this shock would
imply that the demand for coca leaves in Colombia shifts to the left (or downwardly) to a
lower price level when the cocaine production decreases because of the interdiction policy
(making more costly the processing and sale of cocaine). Figure B.2.3 exemplifies through
a PPF scheme that the shock could ultimately affect the relative prices of illicit crops (coca)
to licit crops, ceteris paribus. This association perhaps implied that a significant decline in
coca cultivation could increase the value of legal agricultural production to the extent that
licit crops divert resources from producing coca.
This chapter uses department-level data to assess the effect of the policies
implemented under PC for reducing illicit crop cultivation on the value of agricultural
production in areas identified as coca-growing. This study examines the hypothesis that the
production value of licit crops in Colombia is mostly negatively related to cocaine
production in those areas with coca plantations. Figure 2.1 shows the intensity of coca
cultivation among Colombian departments. Figure 2.3 illustrates the evolution of the
agricultural GDP of coca-growing and non-coca growing departments and their difference
across years. We can roughly observe that both groups follow a similar trend before PC.
Their trend difference has increasingly augmented over the years during PC, notably during
the official interdiction policy period.

2.2.

Methodology and Data
This chapter examines a potential induced effect of interdiction anti-drug policy

on the value of legal agricultural production. This link implies that the higher the relative
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returns from conventional crops such as coffee and cocoa, the more likely the area under
coca farming to be lower. Alternatively, an effective anti-drug policy generating a
systematic reduction of coca cultivation may induce many farmers to switch from coca
cultivation to conventional crops. Given this reverse causality, we might need at least a
plausibly exogenous source of variation in either coca cultivation or legal crops to
identify any impact of the change in one on the other. This study exploits the three main
strategies used by the Colombian government under PC to reduce cocaine supply as an
exogenous variation in coca cultivation to the value of legal agricultural production. The
two first strategies focused on illicit crop controls through forced eradication campaigns
directly targeting coca farming in two different ways, i.e., aerial spraying and manual
eradication. The third strategy consists of redirecting interdiction efforts to target the
intermediate and final stages of cocaine production.
Total hectares with coca leaves may not be by itself a proxy for the economic
relevance of coca production in most regions since it may not reflect the benefit
associated with growing coca. Thus, we use the plausibly exogenous changes in coca
cultivation induced by the policies for reducing the illegal drug trade, which increases the
cost of drug production. The primary mechanism explaining such variation relies on the
effectiveness of these interventions to increase costs associated with coca farming,
limiting its profitability, discouraging farmers from growing coca, and leading them to
adopt alternative production activities.

2.3.

Data

2.3.1. Coca Related Variables

To measure coca cultivation, we constructed a 21-year panel of 31 Colombian
departments (24 of which grew coca at some point during the 1995–2015 period). We use
data from the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC has
conducted satellite surveys of coca crops in every municipality of the country since
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199931. These surveys use satellite photography to measure the number of hectares with
coca plantations in a given area\municipality on December 31st of each year.
The UNODC and the Colombian government use satellite imagery and
verification flights over coca-growing areas to monitor the location and spread of coca
cultivation. Although the UNODC and the Colombian government achieved full national
coverage in the year 2001, the information on coca leaves cultivation for the period 19951998 was estimated based on Angrist and Kugler (2007), "Cuadro 1." in Ramírez (2002),
and Uribe (1997). In 2005, for example, the area within each department with active coca
cultivation was between 28 and 17,305 hectares, with seven departments having no
reportable levels of coca cultivation.
We identified the departments with coca-growing areas and their participation in
the national total coca cultivation with the variable on coca crops. The variable captures
the cross-sectional variation of coca cultivation (see Figure 2.1) and time-variation of
coca crops in Colombia (see Figure 2.2). We also obtain the ratio between the area
planted with coca in each department/year to the total (national) area cultivated with coca
in the corresponding year to measure coca farming intensity.
Regarding the coca-eradication-interdiction policy variables, we use direct
indicators for each policy that capture variations in the profitability from coca-growing
for the various departments of Colombia. These indicators are the number of hectares
with coca subjected to aerial spraying and manual eradication and the number of cocaine
processing facilities destroyed. Alternatively, the interdiction policy is proxied as the
amount (in kilograms) of coca base, coca leaves, and cocaine seized each year. Based on
this information, we create a variable indicating the department level of exposition to
each of the three annual indicators before 2000 (the year of PC's implementation). These
indicators have been available only since 1999. Thus, we use this year's information for
the pre-intervention analysis in some specifications.

31

Although there is no data on the exact amount of coca cultivated and cocaine produced and subsequently
exported, both the UNODC and the US State Department make annual estimates of the size of the illicit
industry. The present study uses such estimates.
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2.3.2. Agricultural Production Variables

We use the available annual data on the value added by the department and
economic activity series with the base year 2005 over the 1995–2015 period from the
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). The departmental GDP
measures the productive activity of different country departments, and it defines the
behavior, development, and economic structure for analysis and regional decisionmaking. We also use the information at the department level available for the period of
study from the statistics per department and municipality agricultural evaluations
(EVA)32 from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR) related to the
area planted, production, and yields of permanent and transitory crops. The final sample
consists of 651 observations (31 departments × 21 years).
Information about the population in rural areas is from the DANE’s departmental
estimates of population projections by urban/rural area and age groups of 0-80 and more
years for the 1985-2020 period. The Colombian rural working-age population was
calculated here as the people aged ten years and over in rural areas of each department.
The variables on legal agricultural output used in the estimation are the output variable
(agricultural GDP), given by the value of agricultural production in 2005 US million
dollars; agricultural land defined as thousands of hectares of arable and permanent
cropland and permanent pastures; rural population and the number of participants in the
working-age population in rural zones. We also calculate departmental GDP per capita
and the value-added in the agricultural sector as percent of GDP (or GDP share of
agriculture).

32

The agricultural evaluations of municipalities are investigations that have been carried out since 1970 by
the Ministry of Agriculture and record the productive activity related to agriculture, livestock, forestry, and
aquaculture throughout Colombia’s territory.
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2.3.3. Other variables

We use data also on the internal displacement of people from the Colombian
government’s Unique Registration System. We used consolidated statistical information
from CODHES-SISDES (Information System on Human Rights and Displacement) on
the number of forced internally displaced persons corresponding to each municipality
(that we aggregate to the department level) from year to year. This database defines
internally displaced persons as those forced to abandon their physical residences and
employment activity because of armed conflict, generalized violence, massive human
rights violations, or other circumstances that threaten or drastically alter public order. We
specify the variable as the ratio of the annual number of displaced persons to the total
population in the department of origin per 100 thousand inhabitants.
Other variables include measures of weather variables, i.e., temperature and rainfall.
The construction of these variables uses data regarding the Agrometeorological Indicators
produced on behalf of the Copernicus Climate Change Service. This dataset covers the
world time series daily surface meteorological data from 1979 to 2020. The dataset
consists of the hourly ECMWF-ERA5 data geo-localized and available at a spatial
(horizontal) resolution of 0.1° x 0.1° (10km2). More specifically, we use the information
on (1) precipitation flux, defined as the total volume of liquid water (mm3) precipitated
over the period 00h-24h local time per unit of area (mm2), per day; and (2) 2m
temperature indicating the daily air temperature at 2 meters above the surface. We then
aggregated the data to the monthly/municipality level. Finally, temperature and rainfall
represent the annual department means of the municipality\monthly values of 2m
temperature and precipitation flux variables, respectively. We use these variables
considering that weather shocks can lead to more prolific or lean harvests directly
associated with changes in profits from rural activities, potentially affecting incentives to
invest in legal agricultural activities.33 Thus, the focus is on rural areas in Colombia.

33

Colombia has been particularly affected by rainfall and temperature shocks. According to the Global
Climate Risk Index (Harmeling, 2011), the country ranked third (after Pakistan and Guatemala) in 2010
among the countries more affected by weather-related events such as droughts, floods, and heatwaves.
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Weather shocks are among the most relevant risk factors faced by rural households
because of the potentially harmful effects of weather shocks on the agricultural activities
on which rural populations generally rely (Giné et al., 2008; Andalón et al., 2016).

2.4.

Empirical Implementation

Our empirical strategy follows a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator by
assessing whether changes in the PC policies to reduce coca cultivation affect the value
of agricultural production disproportionately in coca-growing departments. In this
approach, time variation depends on the official year each policy started under the PC
(2000-15). Aerial spraying of glyphosate is assumed to start at the beginning of the PC in
2000. As stated before, manual eradication started as a national program in 2004. Finally,
as the Colombian government redefined its anti-drug strategy in 2006, emphasizing the
interdiction of drug shipments and the detection and destruction of cocaine processing
labs over the eradication of coca crops, the interdiction policy is thus considered official
under the PC since 2007.
The variation we explore to identify the effect of these strategies on the value of
agricultural production or agricultural GDP (AGDP) thus combines the timing of the
policy changes and a direct measure of their implementation under the PC across
different areas. With this empirical strategy, we test if the AGDP increase after each of
these policies is higher in coca-growing departments and to what extent that increase
results from such policies. The interventions' timing is unique for the entire country, so
the effect identification comes mainly from the heterogeneous response of different areas
to the policies.
We create a dummy variable equal to 1 for the interval between 2000 and 2003,
capturing the first illicit coca crops control strategy used under the PC (aerial spraying of
glyphosate). Then, we create a second dummy variable equal to 1 between 2004 and
2006, corresponding to the manual eradication program implemented in 2004.
Moreover, the number of disaster events registered in Colombia in the first decade of the 2000s increased
by more than 60% from 1970–to 99 (Campos et al., 2011; Andalón et al., 2016).
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Furthermore, we include a third dummy equal to 1 starting in 2007, identifying the years
of increased interdiction policies from the Colombian government. Our baseline
specification follows the difference-in-differences regression:
𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ (𝐷2000≤𝑡≤2003 × Coca1𝑖 )
+ 𝛽2 ∙ (𝐷2004≤𝑡≤2006 × Coca2𝑖 )
+ 𝛽3 ∙ (𝐷𝑡≥2007 × Coca3𝑖 ) + 𝐗 𝑖𝑡 𝜙 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

(1)

where 𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the (real-valued) agricultural production in millions of 2005 US dollars.
for department 𝑖 in the year 𝑡; 𝐷2000≤𝑡≤2003 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for years
between 2000 and 2003; 𝐷2004≤𝑡≤2006 is a dummy variable equal to 1 between 2004 and
2006; 𝐷𝑡≥2007 is a dummy equal to 1 for 2007 and all following years; Coca𝑗𝑖 for 𝑗 =
1,2,3 is a variable indicating the number of hectares (aerially) sprayed with glyphosate,
the number of hectares manually eradicated, and the number of coca base and cocaine
processing labs destroyed, respectively34 35; 𝐗 𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying control
variables; 𝛼𝑖 are department-fixed effects; 𝛽𝑟𝑡 is a region-specific year dummy for
Colombia’s five major regions (Amazon, Andean, Caribbean, Orinoco, and Pacific); 𝜀𝑖𝑡
indicates a random term; and 𝛼0 , 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝜙 are parameters. OLS estimation of
equation (1) would produce unbiased estimates of the 𝛽s under the usual assumptions
that:
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡 |𝐷2000≤𝑡≤2003 , 𝐷2004≤𝑡≤2006 , 𝐷𝑡≥2007 , Coca1𝑖 , Coca2𝑖 , Coca3𝑖 , 𝐗 𝑖𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑟𝑡 ] =0

(2)

In some robustness exercises, we also use the information on the indicators before
PC. This information is available only for 1999, so we create two sets of variables: one
related to the level of each policy indicator for 1999 (before PC) and another indicating
the annual variation of each policy indicator after PC. The former set provides a proxy for

34

Each indicator is equal to zero for the departments identified as non-coca-growing in our sample (i.e.,
they did not grow coca from 1995 to 2015). This framework aims to identify the primary treatment and
control groups. These departments are considered the primary control group consisting of the departments
of Atlántico, Casanare, Huila, Quindío, Risaralda, Sucre, and Tolima (see Figure 1.2).
35
Coca𝑗𝑖 with 𝑗 = 1,2, and 3 are variables indicating coca and cocaine production constraints, increasing
the costs associated with coca cultivation. They could also reflect the relative economic relevance (or
perhaps relative profitability) of coca production for a given area. Coca 3𝑖 is alternatively specified in some
specifications like the amount (in kilograms) of coca base, coca leaves, and cocaine seized each year at the
department level.
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the initial level of constraint on the coca production in the local economies before the
policies under PC. The latter corresponds to a direct measure of losses to the cocaine
production sector, constraining coca cultivation during the PC period. As the second set
of variables differs by department, when they interact with the dummies for the timing of
each policy implementation, a sort of triple differences estimator is created like in
Chimeli and Soares (2007). This triple-differences estimation compares coca-growing
departments to the other departments and evaluates whether the policy changes affect the
outcome variable disproportionally in departments with coca cultivation.
It is noteworthy to mention some potential concerns with this difference-indifferences (DID) strategy, such as omitted variables and differential dynamic behavior
of the value of agricultural production. There may be changes happening simultaneously
to the implementation and effectiveness of the policies. Because a fraction of the
government's budget accrues to implement the policies, such a fraction is a part of the
GDP that equivalently has the agricultural GDP of each department as a component.
Moreover, the policies' effectiveness may also depend on the heterogeneous
institutional/geographic environment within Colombia that could have significant
economic impacts that may affect the evolution of the value of legal agricultural
production. Agricultural inputs endowments (quality and availability) and the prices of
commodities from legal agriculture and coca-related products could also be strong
predictors of 𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃 and the effectiveness of the policy. Another important caveat would
be the incidence of violence due to the armed conflict in rural Colombia that may be
highly associated with legal agricultural activities and illicit crop production. More
generally, worsened environmental and socioeconomic conditions can also debilitate
legal agriculture by pushing many farmers toward illegal crop production. This
relationship can further constrain the intensity of each policy's execution and
effectiveness. Some pervasive side effects of such policies (e.g., aerial spraying) may
cause detrimental consequences to the profitability of agriculture. Farmers can also
migrate to areas where they can cultivate coca. This migration would significantly change
the sample composition of the treated group (and\or comparison group) by generating
attrition effects. All these aspects can represent relevant driving factors changing the
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pattern of legal agricultural activity and illicit crops simultaneously in the production
possibilities frontier of agriculture. We allow for regional-specific time dummies that
immediately account for any systematic difference across regions due to the policy,
environment, or socioeconomic changes to mitigate these concerns.
Some specifications also allow for flexible time trends as functions of departments'
initial characteristics. Given that most of the control variables observed at the department
level could be technically endogenous to the restrictions on coca cultivation, we include
the interactions of the baseline values (in 1995 or 1996 according to the availability of
data) of such controls with time dummies. The control variables are at the department
level. These variables are agricultural land (measured as thousands of hectares of arable
and permanent cropland and permanent pastures); the working-age population in rural
zones; GDP per capita (in logs); the share of GDP in agriculture; the rural conflict-related
number of internally displaced persons (from rural to urban zones) and casualties; the
ratio between the area planted with coca of each department to the total (national) area
cultivated with coca; and the average levels of temperature and precipitation. This
specification also includes an interaction between the baseline value of agricultural
production (in constant prices) and time dummies to allow for differential dynamics of
legal agriculture.
It is also worth mentioning that, by construction, the variance of 𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃 is directly
related to agricultural production. Thus, we weighted all regressions by the departmental
total crop production in metric tons. The DID analysis may also underestimate standard
errors because of autocorrelation in the residuals. Therefore, following Bertrand et
al. (2004) and Chimeli and Soares (2017), the standard errors are clustered at the
department level to account for any arbitrary structural correlation over time.

2.5.

Empirical Results

2.5.1. Baseline Results

Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for coca and non-coca-growing
departments for the sample. The table shows the average agricultural GDP (𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃), GDP
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per capita, the fraction of GDP in agriculture, agricultural land, rural population, and
annual average temperature and rainfall between 1995 and 2015. The pre-2000 period
refers to the years before PC, and the post-2000 indicates the PC period in which the
analyzed policies occurred. The objective of the table is to characterize the differences
between departments with coca cultivation and those without coca crops.
The table shows that coca and non-coca-producing departments were not much
different in their GDP per capita, agricultural land, or weather characteristics. However,
non-coca departments have smaller average agricultural GDP, departmental GDP, and
population, and they are also more dependent on agriculture relative to coca-producing
departments. Although these differences, it is imperative to note that we are mainly
interested in looking at the changes in such differences during the analyzed period.
Regarding the comparison in this way, we can infer from Table 2.1 that the
differences between coca and non-coca departments in terms of agricultural GDP,
departmental GDP, GDP per capita, temperature, and population increased by
approximately 21%, 34%, 35%, 13.0%, and 28%, respectively. These differences do not
necessarily imply a methodological issue because the DID method allows comparison
groups to start at different outcome levels (DID focuses on changes rather than absolute
levels). The differences between the two groups regarding the importance of agriculture
in the departmental economy (GDP share of agriculture), land for agricultural activities,
and mean precipitation reduced by approximately 2%, 33.4%, and 5%, respectively. To
estimate any impact of the policies on curbing coca/cocaine supply under PC, we rely
mainly on the three assumptions for the internal validity of the empirical strategy or DID
approach. The first assumption is that comparison groups follow a parallel outcome trend
before treatment (Parallel Trend Assumption). Second, the composition of groups
pre/post-change is stable (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption). Finally, the
intervention is unrelated to the outcome at baseline (allocation of the intervention was
undetermined by outcome variable). We verify if these assumptions hold later in section
2.5.2.
The main results for the sample of all coca-growing departments are in Table 2.2.
Column 1 does not include any control. In col-umn 2, we incorporate region-specific time
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dummies. Column 3 adds interactions of time dummies with baseline values for all the
control variables used. These variables are the ratio of coca planted area to the national
area under coca cultivation, agricultural land, GDP per capita, and share of GDP in
agriculture; the working-age population in rural zones, rate of internally displaced
persons (from rural to urban areas), and the rate of rural conflict-associated casualties; the
average levels of temperature and precipitation; the proportions of permanent and
transitory crops production relative to the total crops production plus the value of legal
agricultural production.
Columns 1 to 3 reveal significant effects of the variables manual eradication
(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 2004) and interdiction policy (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2007) on legal agricultural
production's (real) value. The estimated coefficient for the variable indicating aerial
spraying (𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000) is nonsignificant in column 1 and significant but much smaller
than those related to the other policies in columns 2 and 3. Overall, the estimated
coefficient on the first policy change (𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000) is always smaller than those on those
other policies (𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 2004 and 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2007), considering that the three
coefficients are estimated precisely, except in column 1, which does not include control
variables. Therefore, coca-growing departments exhibit a relative increase in the (real)
value of their legal agricultural production during the PC period. This increase was
particularly significant between 2004 and 2006, and more intense after 2007.
Note that when we introduce the region-specific time dummies in column 2, the
magnitude and the statistical significance of the coefficients for all the policies turn into
more sizable ones. The coefficients on the first and the third policy become statistically
more statistically significant when we included the set of interactions of initial conditions
and the time dummies. With this same inclusion, the point estimates of the first and the
second policy become somewhat bigger. However, the coefficient estimated on the third
policy is still the strongest in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. Thus, it is
possible to infer that the difference in the evolution of the (real) value of legal
agricultural production across coca-growing and non-coca-growing departments does not
seem to be driven by differential trends across regions or even departments.
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These estimations are somewhat consistent with the evolution of the agricultural
GDP displayed in Figure 2.3. As stated before, the figure depicts that the difference in the
agricultural GDP of coca-growing departments relative to non-coca ones has increased
across the years of PC, especially during the official interdiction policy period, even
though they mostly follow a similar trend. Given that the difference in the AGDP across
coca-growing and non-growing departments starts at a high level even before PC, we
should interpret with caution the relatively large point estimate for the coefficient on the
last treatment variable. To mitigate concerns about this initial difference and to analyze
this pat-tern more rigorously, column 4 of Table 2.2 allows treatments to affect both the
trend and the level of the outcome variable. We thus interact each treatment variable with
a linear time trend that equals zero in the first year of the policy. The estimates suggest at
least three relevant aspects. First, the aerial spraying policy cannot be significantly
associated with a persistent increase in the agricultural GDP but with a significant
increase in its trend. Second, the manual eradication program further increased the level
of AGDP without significantly affecting the previous AGDP trend. Third, the interdiction
policies since 2007 substantially increased the previous AGDP level. However, the
interdictions can only be associated with a mild increase in the agricultural GDP trend
during the following years (about USD 26 million or 2.5% in the AGDP per year
afterward).
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.2 present the results of the triple difference
esti-mates. The results in column 5 suggest that increases in AGDP were mainly due to
the manual eradication, particularly in departments that had sort of eradication campaigns
before PC. However, the estimates in column 6 reveal more consistently that the
increases in AGDP were primarily because of the interdiction policies, especially in those
departments with more coca base and cocaine processing facilities dismantled after
2007.36

36

The coefficients presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.2 are the cumulative effect of each policy on
coca-growing departments, and they are in the measurement units of those policies. It is also important to
note that the estimated coefficients from columns 5 and 6 are not directly comparable to those in other
columns because the scales of the treatment variables are different.
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To conclude the discussion of the baseline results, we analyze the quantitative
interpretations and implications of the numbers in Table 2.2. One can directly read these
estimates as changes in the (real) value of agricultural production in US million dollars
after the corresponding intervention under PC. For instance, the estimates in column 3 of
Table 2.2 indicate that the AGDP of coca-growing departments increased, on average,
192.9 million USD from 2000 to 2003, 224.9 between 2004 and 2006, and 384.2 after
2007 compared to non-coca-growing departments. When we compare these increases to
the pre-2000 average AGDP of coca-growing departments, the estimated coefficients
correspond to increases ranging from 1% to 2% or even slightly more, considering the
estimates in column 2. Although these numbers could seem sizable, they are somehow
consistent with and comparable to the potential total annual value of coca production
estimated by the UNODC from 2002 to 2015. Figure 2.4 displays the evolution of that
value in millions of USD during most of the PC years. It is worthy to note that the annual
values calculated by the UNODC come from the factor of production quantities available
in the market (minus seizures as product loss) and estimated farmgate prices. The
UNODC also converts the values to USD based on the annual exchange market rate
average, as Colombia’s Central Bank reported. Thus, it is very likely that these values are
very low respective to the actual ones. It is also possible to infer from Figure 2.4 that the
average value of coca production during most of the years of PC was approximately
US$551 million per year, which represents around 2.5% of the annual average GDP in
the agricultural sector of coca-growing departments in 2002-2015.37 Furthermore, the
total value of coca was, on average, US$421, $US614, and US$496 per year in 2002-03,
2004-06, and 2007-15, respectively. These values are somewhat reasonably comparable
to the estimates in columns 1 to 4 in Table 2.2.

37

The UNODC Surveys estimate that the total coca production value from 2005 to 2015 was between 0.2%
and 0.6% of Colombia’s GDP and between 3% and 5% of the Colombian agricultural GDP. Moreover, the
total value of coca leaves traded from 2000 to 2013 was US$200 million per year, while the expected return
from coca leaves sales was around US$360 million per year, once subtracting the costs of production
(mainly labor and agricultural inputs) from the total revenues (Mejía and Rico, 2011; Mejía, 2016). Using
the average estimated number of households involved in coca cultivation from the UNOCD, the expected
annual return from the sale of coca leaves would be about US$2,250 per household.
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Figure 2.5 shows the gross average annual income per person of coca leaf
production and paste/base together with the number of farms (households) involved in
coca cultivation.38 We can observe that after 2007 the gross average annual income per
person of coca production decreased substantially from approximately US$2,600 in 2008
to about US$1,000 in 2013. It is also possible to see that the number of households
involved in coca cultivation declined significantly.
Thus, the baseline results are consistent with the experience of the coca-growing
departments during the PC period, where the overall increase in the value of agricultural
production was slightly above 100% (Coefficient of Variation−CV− ≈ 104%) compared
to the non-coca-departments of about 50% (CV ≈ 51%) percent. The cumulative
percentage increase in the difference between the value of legal agricultural production of
coca-growing departments to those non-coca departments reached almost 40% in 2015.
Our estimated coefficients explain roughly at least 77.7% and 87.5% of the differential
increase in the value of legal agricultural production across departments with and without
coca cultivation when averaged over the entire period between 1999 and 2015. The
interdiction policy itself contributed around 68% to this average increase. These estimates
can be considered the first ones linking the value of legal agricultural products directly to
the effect of PC’s policies aimed at curbing coca cultivation and cocaine supply.

2.5.2. Differential Trends and Other Contemporary Variations

Although the results across the different specifications in Table 2.2 are somehow
consistent, it is also reasonable to believe that treatment variables capture heterogeneous
and preexisting dynamics of the AGDP in coca-growing departments. To be this the case,
remarkable differences in the trends of AGDP in coca-growing versus non-coca-growing
departments should be present already before implementing anti-drug policies under PC.
Moreover, this would have to be the case conditional on the region-specific time
38

The UNODC estimates the growth of households involved in coca cultivation based on: (1) a
multivariate indicator (built considering the behavior of the affected area; (2) the population projection
(from the DANE) of the municipalities affected by coca; and (3) the growth trend as reported in each phase
of the coca productivity studies of UNODC. This information is available only starting in 2005.
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dummies and interactions of initial conditions that must add the value of legal
agricultural production and the time dummies already included in previous specifications.
To test such conjecture, we incorporate some relevant control variables to account
for preintervention trends (or a placebo intervention) in the value of legal agricultural
production. We insert a dummy for 1995–1999 interacted with a dummy variable
indicating coca-growing departments. This exercise aims to identify if the value of legal
agricultural production in the coca-growing departments was already differently
increasing some years before the anti-drug policies under PC. The results are in column 1
of Table 2.3. We can observe that the corresponding “preintervention placebo” is
relatively small and not statistically significant. Nonetheless, we can see that the
estimated coefficient for the variable 𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000 is not statistically significant, and its
magnitude has reduced substantially.
Thus, the estimates do not provide evidence that the treatment variables
𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000, 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 2004, and 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2007 capture a differential dynamic
behavior of the AGDP before the respective policies during PC. Column 2 of Table 2.2
estimates an additional specification that includes department-specific linear trends.
Although this specification is rather data demanding, the results show a low impact on
the estimated coefficient for 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2007. By contrast, all the point estimates
increased significantly, but they turned into less significant and not statistically
significant estimates for 𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000 and 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 2004).
It is important to note that the direct measures for the treatment policies used in
the triple difference regressions in Table 2.2 are only consistently available since 1999.
The sample is restricted to the period 1999-2015 in columns 3 and 4, presenting
analogous estimations to columns 1 and 2, respectively. The results for the AGDP do not
dramatically change with 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2007. Thus, the estimates for the effect of the
interdiction policy are qualitatively like those obtained in columns 1 and 2.
Naturally, significant alternative driving factors arise for the relative increase in
the value of agricultural production in coca-growing departments. To mitigate concerns
related to these competing explanations, we analyze how economic conditions
represented by the GDP per capita and the legal agricultural activity itself were evolving
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in these departments during the study period. This analysis could help shed light on
whether the increase in the value of agricultural production was practically explained
only by macroeconomic conditions and the economic growth of Colombia, creating
socioeconomic opportunities for the rural population, or due to endogenous expansions of
the Colombian agricultural sector. The last four columns in Table 2.2 attempt to explore
these relevant driving forces. There seems to be a direct effect on coca-growing
departments for GDP per capita. However, this effect loses overall statistical strength,
and it concentrates mainly in the mid-2000s as we include department-specific trends in
column 6. Regarding the share of legal agriculture in the total GDP, the estimates indicate
a statistically insignificant difference between coca-growing and non-coca-growing
departments. In general, the results suggest that it seems not likely that significant
structural changes in economic conditions or trajectory in the agricultural sector itself
could explain the relative increase in the value of agricultural production here observed in
coca-growing departments during the period of analysis.
As final tests to the parallel trends’ assumption, we conduct parametric and nonparametric tests for comparing the two types of departments. First, we run specifications
that include only the initial and final periods, where the initial period is 1995, and the final
varies from 1996 to 2015. This exercise allows us to detect the specific timing of the
differential behavior of the value of legal agricultural production across coca and non-cocagrowing departments. In Figure 2.6, the 20 coefficients estimated sequentially in this
procedure, with their respective standard errors, are plotted against the final period
included in each regression. The dynamics of the value of legal agricultural production
across the two types of departments seem very similar up to 1999 (when there was a not
statistically significant decline until 2000). The legal agricultural production value starts
increasing afterward in coca-growing departments. The difference in the value of legal
agricultural production across coca and non-coca-producing departments started being
statistically significant in 2006 and remained so until 2015. Since 2007, the difference in
the AGDP across the two groups remains relatively stable until 2010. However, it starts to
rise again from 2010 until 2015, when our dataset ends.
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Second, we do a more rigorous visual inspection of the pre-treatment trends or nonparametric parallel-trends tests (before PC) for the control group (non-coca departments)
and treatment group (coca-growing departments). The data are initially restricted to the
pre-interventions period (1995-1999) and plotted using a linear fitted trends comparison
graphical form that distinguishes the coca-growing and non-coca-growing departments
(See Figure A.2.5 in Appendix A). However, this test could be somewhat misleading
because it forces the data into linear time trends, which might obscure differences between
them. We use a subset-plot method developed by Cox (2010). This graphical display has
the advantage of showing all the data (not fitted values or just averages), so if there are
differences in outliers or in the variance that are inapparent in other methods, this exercise
can help to identify them. Panel A of Figure A.2.6 in the Appendix shows that most of the
non-coca-growing departments follow practically a parallel trend compared to most of the
coca-growing departments during the period of analysis. Note that almost all the blue
points corresponding to the non-coca departments in Panel A of Figure A.2.6 overlap the
orange dots of the treatment group before 1999. Panel B of Figure A.2.6 displays that
despite a few coca-growing departments (blue points) followed a similar trend to those in
the control group (orange points) even after 2000, most coca-growing departments
exhibited notable observational changes during the years of PC. Note that most blue dots
there cease overlapping the orange ones indicating significant changes in their trajectory
after 1999. Furthermore, the differences by construction in the composition of the treatment
group validate the triple difference approach we have used to compare within the cocagrowing producing departments.
Finally, a third way to analyze the parallel trend assumption is to squash the data
into the annual means in each group and then plot each group’s trend line separately. This
exercise is similar to that fitted trends comparison we used in Figure A.2.5, except that this
third approach does not impose a linear model on the changes in the value of legal
agricultural production over time. Figure A.2.7 shows that the parallel trend assumption
reasonably fits in the context of the present study, which is perhaps the most critical
assumption to ensure the internal validity of DID models. Therefore, this study provides
some statistical evidence that, in the absence of the anti-drug policies under PC, the
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difference in the legal agricultural production value between coca-growing departments
and non-coca-growing departments would have been relatively constant over time.

2.6.

Conclusions

This paper presents evidence of the increase in the value of agricultural production in
Colombian areas with coca cultivation following the introduction of a series of anti-drug
and anti-illicit crop production policies under Plan Colombia. The popular press and
academic literature have investigated the relationship between coca crop eradication and
anti-drug governmental strategies to reduce Colombian coca cultivation and cocaine
supply. Still, there is practically no empirical or direct quantitative evi-dence on the link
between such policies and their impact on the value of legal agricultural production in the
coca-growing areas. This research presents unique evidence of the increase in the legal
agricultural GDP mainly because of the interdiction of coca base/paste and cocaineprocessing facilities policy in Colombia (circa 2007). The increase in the value of legal
agricultural production documented here is undriven by notable changes in the economic,
geographical, or environmental conditions, nor preexisting trends in the GDP from
agriculture or the agricultural sector itself. Instead, the interdiction policy of coca paste
and cocaine-processing facilities in Colombia (circa 2007) has driven such an increase.
More specifically, this study points out that the interdiction policy since 2007 in
Colombia has boosted the value of producing conventional licit crops in the cocaproducing departments. Previous studies have documented the counternarcotics policy of
2007 as the most effective strategy for reducing cocaine production and coca cultivation,
which mitigates concerns about reverse causality. Coca-growing areas saw substantial
drops in coca cultivation consistently from 2007 until 2013. The licit crop production or,
more generally, legal agriculture of departments with areas under coca cultivation seems
to have benefited from such policy, while legal agriculture in departments without coca
cultivation was not. The estimates suggest that the agricultural GDP grew approximately
2.5% more per year in coca-growing departments since 2007 due to the interdiction
policy. The results also indicate that the value of agricultural production in the coca-
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growing departments gained a monetary benefit from that policy of about US$284.2
million. Overall, our estimates roughly explain between 77% and 87% of the averaged
differential increase in the value of legal agricultural production across coca and noncoca-growing departments over the 1999-2015 period. Most of this increase is driven by
the interdiction policy, which explains about 68% of the total average differential
increase among the two types of departments. These estimates can be considered the first
ones linking the value of legal agricultural products directly to the effect of Plan
Colombia’s policies aimed at curbing coca cultivation and cocaine supply. Based on the
findings, efforts to reduce coca cultivation should emphasize anti-drug strategies in the
stages of production and trafficking that generate the highest value-added. This assertion
is particularly relevant for strengthening legal agriculture, at least in terms of its
production value.
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Table 2.1−Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables in the 1995–1999 and 2000–2015
Periods
Agricultural
GDP

Real
GDP

GDP per
capita

% GDP in
agriculture

Agricultural
land

Rural
Pop.

Mean
Temp.

Mean
Rainfall

Non-Coca-Growing Departments (N= 7)
Pre-2000

Post-2000

901.2

5,809.6

6,321.7

15.9

128.2

919.0

292.9

10.5

(112.9)

(437.2)

(6,049)

(0.91)

(20.90)

(72.3)

(0.45)

(1.21)

952.8

7,012.4

7,209.5

14.0

138.2

972.7

293.8

9.1

(52.3)

(257.7)

(5,969)

(0.40)

(9.86)

(43.2)

(0.26)

(0.54)

Coca-Growing Departments (N= 24)
Pre-2000

Post-2000

1,678.1

21,747

7,825.2

10.7

192.9

2,779.1

291.7

16.0

(107.9)

(2,475)

(10,050)

(1.10)

(12.9)

(246.3)

(0.23)

(1.43)

1,891.3

28,390

9,236.1

8.9

181.2

3,073.8

292.2

14.3

(76.4)

(2,011)

(12,546)

(0.48)

(5.75)

(160.3)

(0.13)

(0.75)

Notes: Averages are weighted by department total crop production in metric tons (standard errors are in parentheses). Variables are
agricultural GDP in million 2005 USD, real GDP in million 2005 USD, GDP per capita in 2005 USD (in thousands), percentage of
GDP in agriculture, agricultural land in thousand hectares, rural population thousand inhabitants, and the annual mean temperature and
rainfall. Pre-2000 is the average between 1995 and 1999 for each variable; post-2000 is the average from 2000 to 2015 for each
variable.
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Table 2.2−PC’s Policies and Value of Agricultural Production, 1995-2015, DID Benchmark Results
Departments with coca cultivation

Variables
𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000

Triple-difference
Indicators
Indicators
(During
(Before PC)
PC)
1999
2000-15
(5)
(6)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Treatments
interacted
with
linear trends
(4)

-0.0872

127.3*

192.9**

64.11

0.0423

0.00337

[84.53]

[75.01]

[74.38]

[84.60]

[0.0269]

[0.00243]

𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑

42.14**
[19.89]

𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 2004

123.3*

219.0*

224.9*

189.1*

0.901***

0.0102

[68.08]

[117.6]

[115.1]

[99.20]

[0.302]

[0.0104]

𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 2004
× 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑

29.87
[29.50]

𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2007

295.3***

428.1**

384.2***

323.8**

0.149***

0.0132***

[98.90]

[180.0]

[138.5]

[149.2]

[0.0219]

[0.00352]

✓

✓

✓

𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐. 2007
× 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑

26.08**
[12.61]
✓

Region FE × year FE

Observations
R-squared

✓
✓

Baseline charact. × year FE
651

651

651

651

651

651

0.874

0.882

0.896

0.882

0.889

0.883

Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets (clustering at the department). The dependent variable is the real value of agricultural
production (in 2005 USD). All regressions include a constant, department, and year dummies, and are weighted by total crop
production (in metric tons). Treatment variables are dummies = 1 between 2000–2003, between 2004–2006, and after 2007 interacted
with: dummy = 1 for coca-growing departments and = 0 otherwise (columns 1– 4); level of the corresponding indicator pre-PC (1999)
× dummy = 1 for coca-growing departments and = 0 otherwise (column 5); annual level of the corresponding indicator × dummy = 1
for coca-growing departments and = 0 otherwise (column 6). Columns 2 to 6 control for region-specific time dummies. Column 3
controls for interactions of year dummies with baseline (1995) values of the following department characteristics: agricultural land,
working-age population in rural zones, rate of internally displaced persons, rate of casualties, ratio of coca planted area to the national
area under coca cultivation, per capita GDP (ln), the fraction of GDP in agriculture, the average level of temperature, the average level
of precipitation, the proportion of permanent crops, the proportion of transitory crops, and the value of agricultural production.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.3−PC’s Policies and AGDP, Testing Parametrically for Parallel Trends and Some Other Effects
Effects on AGDP
and parallel trends,
1995-2015

Variables
𝐴𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 2000

Dependent
variable:
AGDP

Other economic changes
explaining the results,
1995-2015
Dependent
Dependent
variable:
variable:
GDP
Percent GDP
per capita
in agriculture

Testing
for
pre-trend

Department
linear
trend

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

8.159

33.67

-4.775

7.778

0.0551*

0.0557**

-0.00146

0.000551

[75.46]

[108.3]

[96.22]

[110.2]

[0.0309]

[0.0259]

[0.00784]

[0.00974]

𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 2004

131.5**

183.3

118.6

148.7

0.115*

0.116*

-0.00597

-0.00240

[61.60]

[117.8]

[82.83]

[119.6]

[0.0567]

[0.0663]

[0.00752]

[0.00946]

𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2007

303.5***

400.3**

290.6**

350.8*

0.167*

0.169

-0.00414

0.00211

[90.19]

[168.4]

[125.0]

[176.4]

[0.0894]

[0.118]

[0.0161]

[0.0190]

Placebo

20.62
[50.09]

Department
specific trend
Observations
R-squared

✓

✓

✓

✓

651

651

527

527

651

651

651

651

0.974

0.978

0.978

0.982

0.959

0.988

0.914

0.971

Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets (clustering at the department). The dependent variable is the value of agricultural
production (in million 2005 USD) in columns 1– 4, the log of GDP per capita in columns 5–6, and the share of GDP in agriculture in
columns 7–8. All regressions include a constant, department, and year dummies, and are weighted by total crop output in metric tons.
Treatment variables are dummies = 1 between 2000–2003, between 2004–2006, and after 2007 interacted with the dummy of the
coca-growing department. Pre-2000 placebo is a dummy for 1995–1999 interacted with the coca-growing department dummy.
Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 include, as additional controls, interactions of department dummies with a linear time trend.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 2.1−Coca Plantation Intensity in Colombian Coca-Growing Departments

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC.
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Figure 2.2−Annual Coca Crops in Coca-Growing Departments of Colombia, 1995-2015

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC.
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Figure 2.3−Agriculture GDP in Coca-Growing and Non-Growing Departments, Colombia, 1995-2015

Source: Own calculations based on data from DANE.

Figure 2.4−Total Estimated Value of Coca Leaf Production and Coca Derived Farm Products, 20022015
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Figure 2.5−Per Capita Gross Income from Coca Production and Farmers Involved in Coca Cultivation

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC.
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Figure 2.6−Timing of the Effects under Plan Colombia, All Coca-growing Departments, 1996-2015

Source: Own calculations based on data from EVA.
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APPENDIX A
Figure A.2.1−Coca Crops, Aerial Spraying, and Manual Eradication in Colombia, 1996-2014

Source: Own calculations, based on data from UNODC and ODC.
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Figure A.2.2−Number of Cocaine Processing Facilities Destroyed in Colombia, 1996-2014

Source: Own calculations, based on data from UNODC censuses and surveys and ODC.
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Figure A.2.3−Colombian Net Cocaine Supply and Cocaine Street Prices in the U.S.

Source: Mejía (2015)’s calculations, based on data from UNODC and the government of Colombia.

Figure A.2.4−Coca Crops, and Coca Base and Cocaine Seizures in Colombia, 19992014

Source: Own calculations, based on data from UNODC and ODC.
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Figure A.2.5−Predict Margins of Coca and Non-Coca Departments with 95% CIs, 1995-1999

Source: Own calculations based on data from EVA.
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Figure A.2.6− Real AGDP Comparison of Coca and Non-Coca Departments, 1995-2015

Source: Own calculations based on data from EVA.
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Figure A.2.7−Plot of Real AGDP of Coca and Non-Coca Departments, 1995-2015

Source: Own calculations based on data from EVA.
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APPENDIX B
Figure B.2.1−Effect of Cocaine-Laboratory Interdiction-Supply-Reduction Policy on Market for
Cocaine
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Figure B.2.3−Effects of Interdiction on Coca and Agricultural Production in Coca-Growing
Departments
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF THE RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD ON THE LAND
USE AND CROP YIELDS IN THE US GREAT PLAINS

3.1.

Introduction

The side effects of energy and environmental policies constitute one of the central
concerns of economists and policymakers. The design of these regulations can hinge on
whether the production standards in the energy markets can affect interrelated sectors at
extensive or intensive margins.39 The US government has enacted biofuel blending
targets (mandates) to tackle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, reinforce the security of
energy supply, and enhance rural economic development to some extent (Xiaoguang and
Madhu, 2013; Clancy and Moschini, 2017). Biomass40 to produce fuels and energy has
rapidly grown, perhaps mainly because of such policies. Farmers and biomass producers
thus could have faced significant variations in their land opportunity costs, production
possibilities, profitability, and operational environments.41
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was introduced in the 2005 Energy Policy
Act (EPA) and then significantly expanded in the Energy Independence and Security Act
39

The term extensive margin refers to the number of land units used to produce a determined crop output.
Intensive margin (or yield) refers to the crop output amount per land unit. An increase in land use for
agricultural production raises the extensive margin, and a land productivity increase represents an increase
in yields or the intensive margin.
40
Biomass is a renewable energy source obtained from plants and animals mainly used in energy
production, such as biofuels. In 2016, 48% of the US biomass consumption for biofuel production came
from agricultural residues, 41% wood, and 11% municipal waste (Energy Information Administration,
2017). The present study uses a measure of the individual crop quantity consistent with net primary
agricultural production (Trindade et al., 2015; Prince et al., 2001). This notion implies that the crop
biomass calculated for each county and year here includes the harvested crop and the residual aboveground biomass left in the field. This calculation implies a biomass quantity entirely harvested as forage
crops or twice the amount harvested in most grain crops. For instance, biomass from corn includes the
amounts of corn grain and corn stover potentially harvested for biofuel energy, where corn stover is
primarily a by-product or residual from corn grain production. This corn stover consists of stalk, leaves,
sheaths, husks, shanks, cobs, tassels, lower ears, and silks.
41
Carter et al. (2017) estimate that about 37% of the US corn crop went to the ethanol industry to blend
with gasoline in 2015, while in 2005, it was up to 14%. The federal government incentivized this rapid
growth in corn use by requiring a minimum annual quantity of renewable biofuel or ethanol content in
motor fuel. Since then, corn plantations have covered more agricultural land than any other crop in the
United States.
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(EISA) of 2007. This policy determines mandates for specified quantities of biofuels.42
The expanded 2007 RFS nearly doubled the previous ethanol mandate and turned corn
ethanol into 10% of finished motor gasoline in the United States in 2017, up from 3% in
2005. This study estimates the effects of the 2007 RFS biofuel mandates on the supply of
corn biomass and alternative crops evaluated at the intensive and extensive margins. We
use data on agricultural biomass produced in counties along the 41st north latitude
parallel in the US from 1960–to 2018.
Biomass accounts in the United States for about 39% of the total renewable
energy and almost one-quarter of the total primary non-fossil energy produced (US EIA,
2021). The prime input to produce ethanol in the United States is corn (US Grains
Council, 2021). Biofuels (biodiesel and ethanol) production from different crops has
offered the main alternative to fossil fuels regarding GHG reduction from a political
viewpoint. These biofuel regulations aim to support farm incomes, reduce dependency on
fossil fuels, and mitigate global warming effects (Carter et al., 2017). However, biofuels
compete with products conventionally used for human and animal consumption, which
has raised concerns about food security mainly because of the increase in food and feed
prices (Steer and Hanson, 2015). Regarding the last objective, biofuel production may
involve significant land-use changes leading to additional GHG emissions (Gohin, 2014).
The regulated expansion of biofuels could have triggered structural changes in the
US agriculture sector. The changes may occur mainly through an induced rise in crop
quantity supplied and cropland demands for producing biofuels to the extent that the
policy increases the prices of these crops. The percentage of corn used in the ethanol
industry grew to 40% around 2013 in the US, where corn is the feedstock used for 94%
of the US ethanol production (US Department of Energy Ethanol Fuel Basics, 2020). The
increase in corn prices since the 2007 RFS has been attributed mainly to the rise in
ethanol production (see, e.g., Condon et al., 2015, and Carter et al., 2017). However,
economics literature offers not enough empirical evidence that the federal ethanol
42

According to Anderson and Elzinga (2014), the original RFS had little effect on the corn quantity used
for ethanol. The reason is that the 2005 RFS set mandates at the levels required to meet just air quality
regulations for reformulated gasoline under the 1990 Clean Air Act (Anderson and Elzinga, 2014).
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mandates are structurally related to this phenomenon. Runge and Senauer (2007) found
that the expansion of ethanol production is closely associated with increasing corn
demand, prices, and producer profit. As far as we know, there are no studies structurally
and simultaneously quantifying the effects of such ethanol supply expansion on biomass
supply and land productivity. This study estimates the impact of ethanol mandates on the
corn biomass supply and the simultaneous response of land planted with corn in the US.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1.1 provides a
background of biofuel policies and the RFS in recent decades in the US and discusses the
relationship between ethanol market changes and crop-related prices and supply. In
section 3.2, we present the economic and econometric models of production used in this
paper. The data used in the analysis are described and illustrated in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 presents the estimation results. Section 3.5 concludes.

3.1.1. Mandates in the Ethanol Market

The 2005 EPA is the policy with the most significant role in the US biofuel industry
recently. The main reason for this is that mandates on minimum quantities of biofuels
consumption\production initiated with such legislation. Although the Act focused on
biofuel energy production in the US between 2005 and 2007, the EISA of 2007 expanded
mandated targets (Renewable Fuel Standards, or RFS) progressively since 2007 from 9
million gallons to 36 million gallons by 2022.
The analysis of biomass supply response to the RFS in this paper can provide
insights into the discussion on energy crops competing with food crops for land.
Responding to the potential increase in the price of corn relative to other crops due to the
RFS, for instance, can lead producers of this crop to expand such crop area (at the cost of
other crops) or increase yields. Carter et al. (2017) estimate the effects of the 2007 RFS
on the corn market and find that the mandates raised corn prices by about 30%. Smith
(2018) finds that the RFS that became law in 2007 increased soybean and wheat prices by
about 20%. The 2007 RFS impact estimation on corn biomass supply could provide
crucial insights into the farmers’ willingness to expand the crop supply or crop area in
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response to potential increased profitability attributed to the RFS-ethanol mandates.43
Evaluating how much the biofuel mandates contributed to higher crop prices would
require estimates of the underlying crop supply and demand elasticities (Roberts and
Schlenker, 2013). However, examining the effects on crop supply could benefit from the
assumption of price-taking crop producers as the perfect competition archetype. The
RFS-induced crop price increases (due to the rise in the demand for crops to produce
biofuels) may allow identifying econometrically the crop supply price elasticity. The crop
producers’ response to such price variations could translate into yield changes (i.e.,
effects at the intensive margin) or changes in the area planted (i.e., impacts at the
extensive margin). The identification strategy thus relies on exogenous price changes
affecting the crop demand to produce the corresponding biofuels.
Previous literature has investigated agricultural crop supply elasticities and crop
acreage responses consistent with a dual theoretical framework (see, for example,
Morzuch et al., 1980, Ball, 1988, Chambers and Just, 1989, Coyle, 1993a,b; Arnade and
Kelch, 2007). According to Coyle (1993a), because output and acreage decisions are not
separable in crop production, it may be unrealistic to assume that crop output decisions
and inputs allocations are modeled independently in agriculture. In his seminal papers,
Coyle (1993a,b) derived a system of equations for modeling crop acreage responses by
incorporating allocation decisions for fixed inputs such as land into a two-stage
aggregation model of multioutput production decisions. At least there are four advantages
of Coyle’s approach over alternative theoretical frameworks. The separability conditions
are consistent with a two-stage aggregation approach, more plausible, and less restrictive
than standard models, such as those following Nerlove (1979) or based on a single output
supply or acreage response equation. The dual approach permits the inclusion of
43

There was a rapid ascent of commodity prices between late 2005 and 2008 that led to renewed debate
about what drives the supply of food commodities. According to Roberts and Schlenker (2013), corn prices
nearly quadrupled (from 2 to almost 8 USD per bushel), followed by a brief drop in 2009–2010 due to the
recession, but the corn bushel broke 8 USD in 2011. These authors estimate supply elasticities of storable
commodities (corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat) to evaluate the impact of the 2009 RFS on commodity
prices, quantities, and food consumers’ surplus. They found that prices increase 20% percent if one-third of
commodities used to produce ethanol (shift in demand stemming from the US ethanol policy) went
recycled as feedstock. However, the US price received by farmers for corn has been between USD 3.1 and
USD 4.2 from 2013 to 2019 (USDA, 2020).

104

contemporaneous co-variance of disturbances across equations. The hypothesis of
competitive profit maximization implies symmetry/reciprocity restrictions on coefficients
across equations. Finally, the production decision scheme represents a two-stage
decision-making process for producers that is more empirically reliable and feasible to
recover the underlying technology.

3.2.

Methodology

3.2.1. Theoretical Framework

This study follows a dual model based on Chambers and Just (1989), Coyle
(1993a,b), and Arnade and Kelch (2007) as an attempt to assess the simultaneous effects
of RFS on corn biomass supply and acreage demand. The empirical approach analyzes the
technology for producing biomass within a set of counties across the central US Great
Plains. A relevant assumption is that production decisions are consistent with the profitmaximization behavior of farmers operating under perfect competition in both outputs and
inputs markets. Given the vectors of output and input prices and exogenous factors, farmers
choose an optimal vector of outputs and inputs. The exogenous factors include
environmental conditions or a county's physical characteristics (e.g., the topography,
climate, water field, soil organic matter, and time).

3.2.1.1.

Two-stage Profit Maximization Approach with Land Fixed and

Allocatable
The decision-making unit (DMU) produces a vector of 𝑀 + 1 annual crop outputs
𝒀 = (𝑌0 , … , 𝑌𝑀 ) using a vector of 𝑁 allocatable variable inputs 𝑿 = (𝑋1 , … , 𝑋𝑁 ) and a
fixed total amount of agricultural land (𝐿) allocated among the individual crops. The
producer follows a two-stage decision-making process, given non-allocatable fixed
inputs, exogenous factors (e.g., environmental or institutional variables), and time as a
proxy for exogenous technical change included in the vector 𝒁 = (𝑍1 , … , 𝑍 𝐾 ). In the first
stage, the DMU maximizes profits from each output given the land allocated to each
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crop. In the second stage of profit maximization, the DMU distributes the available
agricultural land optimally across crops. The profit function for each crop i is represented
by
𝑁

Π𝑖 (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑾, 𝑙𝑖 , 𝒁) = max𝒊 {𝑃𝑖 𝑌𝑖 − ∑ 𝑊𝑗 𝑋𝑗𝑖 : 𝑌𝑖 ∈ 𝐹 𝑖 (𝑿𝒊 ; 𝑙𝑖 , 𝒁)}
(𝑌𝑖 ,𝑿 )

∀ 𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑀 (1)

𝑛=1

where 𝑃𝑖 is the price of the crop 𝑖; 𝑌𝑖 is the produced quantity of crop 𝑖; 𝑾 =
(𝑊1 , … , 𝑊𝑁 ) is the vector of the variable inputs’ prices; 𝑿𝒊 is the vector of variable inputs
quantity used in producing crop 𝑖; 𝑙𝑖 is the amount of land allocated to the crop 𝑖
production. The producer’s dual profit function is assumed to be continuous and twice
differentiable with respect to all its arguments; linearly homogenous and convex in
prices; and non-decreasing in output prices 𝑃𝑖 , while non-increasing in variable inputs
prices 𝑾.
The second stage implies that DMUs allocate available agricultural land to
optimally managed crops. The producers thus solve the constrained optimization problem
yielding:
𝑀

Π(𝑷, 𝑾, 𝐿, 𝒁) = max

𝑙0 ,…,𝑙𝑀 ,𝜆

{∑ Π𝑖 (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑾, 𝑙𝑖 , 𝒁)

𝑀

+ 𝜆(𝐿 − ∑ 𝑙𝑖 )}

𝑖=0

(2)

𝑖=0

where 𝑷 = (𝑃0 , … , 𝑃𝑀 ) represents a vector of the 𝑀 + 1 crop prices; 𝐿 is the total amount
of land allocatable to the 𝑀 + 1 crops, 𝜆 is the shadow price of agricultural land, and the
other variables are defined as above. Using Hotelling’s lemma, we obtain the output
supply and variable input demand equations conditional on 𝐿 and 𝒁, and acreage
demands are implicit in the first-order conditions (FOC) from equation (2). The
(negative of the) partial derivative of the profit function [equations (1) − (2)] with
respect to the variable input price 𝑊𝑛 yields the optimal variable-input demand:
𝑀

𝑀

𝜕Π
𝜕Π𝑖
−
= −∑
= ∑ 𝑋𝑛𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑛∗ (𝑷, 𝑾, 𝐿, 𝒁)
𝜕𝑊𝑛
𝜕𝑊𝑛
𝑖=0

where

𝑋𝑛𝑖∗

∀ 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁

(3)

𝑖=0

represents the optimal allocatable 𝑛th variable input used in producing crop

𝑖 and 𝑋𝑛∗ is the total level of the 𝑛th variable input employed over the 𝑀 + 1 crops.
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Similarly, by differentiating equation (2) with respect to the output price of the crop 𝑖, we
obtain the output supply function of that crop (𝑌𝑖 ):
𝜕Π
𝜕Π𝑖
= 𝑌𝑖 (𝑷, 𝑾, 𝐿, 𝒁) =
= 𝑌𝑖 ∗ (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑾, 𝑙𝑖 , 𝒁)
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖

∀ 𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑀

(4)

where 𝑌𝑖 ∗ represents the optimal output quantity of crop 𝑖. We can also derive the optimal
allocation of the quasi-fixed factor land to crop 𝑖 from the restricted profit function as the
negative of the derivative with respect to land price, 𝜆𝑖 . Following Arnade and Kelch
(2007), the first-order condition of the (constrained) profit function in equation (2) with
respect to the quasi-fixed factor (𝑙𝑖 ) results in the shadow price equation for land used in
the production of the output of crop 𝑖:
𝜕Π 𝜕Π𝑖
=
− 𝜆 = 𝜆𝑖 (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑾, 𝑙𝑖 , 𝒁) − 𝜆 = 0
𝜕𝑙𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑖

∀ 𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑀

(5)

where 𝜆𝑖 is the shadow price of the additional unit of land allocated to the production of
crop 𝑖. We can infer from equation (5) that the shadow prices of land across alternative
crop equations are equal at the optimum44:
𝜕𝛱𝑗 (𝑃𝑗 , 𝑾, 𝑙𝑗̅ , 𝒁) 𝜕Π0 (𝑃0 , 𝑾, 𝑙0̅ , 𝒁)
=
𝜕𝑙𝑗
𝜕𝑙0

∀ 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑀

(6)

We can further infer from (5) that the shadow price of land allocated to each crop
(i.e., 𝜆𝑖 ) equates to the overall shadow value of the marginal land unit:
𝜕Π
𝜕Π𝑖
= 𝜆 = 𝜆𝑖 (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑾, 𝑙𝑖 , 𝒁) =
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑙𝑖

∀ 𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑀

(7)

Because the term 𝑙𝑖 represents the area allocated to the 𝑖th crop and is represented
in each shadow price equation in (7), jointly solving the shadow price equations and the
constraint: ∑𝑀
𝑖=0 𝑙𝑖 = 𝐿 for the allocation terms (𝑙𝑖 ) obtains a function for the area devoted
to crop 𝑖. This result applies for every crop by considering that equations (6) and (7)
together suggest that:

44

𝜕Π𝑗
𝜕𝑙𝑗

=

𝜕Π𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑖

= 𝜆, with 𝑖, 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝑀. Moreover, the inverse of each

Previous studies have shown how to explicitly recover the land allocation vector from the multioutput
profit function (see, for instance, Chambers and Just, 1988; Paris, 1989; and More and Negri, 1992).
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cropland shadow price equation in (7) is equivalent to an acreage demand equation (𝑙𝑖 )
that is a function of all product prices, all variable input prices, and the total amount of
cropland:
𝑙𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖 (𝑷, 𝑾, 𝐿, 𝒁)

𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑀

(8)

The main feature of interest from each of these crop area functions is that they include
output prices as arguments, which is the key to calculating the response of area to a price
change (Coyle 1993a,b; Arnade and Kelch, 2007).

3.2.2. Empirical Implementation
To implement the model empirically, we specify a normalized quadratic profit
function, a member of the class of flexible, functional forms. This normalized quadratic
profit function satisfies homogeneity properties by construction, and it eases in imposing
symmetry, monotonicity, and convexity properties (Chambers, 1988; Arnade and Kelch,
2007). We normalize the input and output prices with one of the prices of the output
(e.g.,𝑃0 ) and impose symmetry. The profit function for the normalized quadratic is:
1
𝜋 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖0 𝑝𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗 𝑙𝑗 + ∑ 𝜀𝑘 𝑍 𝑘 + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖ℎ 𝑝𝑖 𝑝ℎ + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑘 𝑝𝑖 𝑍 𝑘
2
𝑖

𝑗

𝑘

𝑖

ℎ

𝑖

𝑘

1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝑖 𝑙𝑗 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑗 𝑙𝑗2
2
𝑖

𝑗

𝑗

+ ∑ ∑ 𝜀 𝑗𝑘 𝑙𝑗 𝑍 𝑘
𝑗

(9)

𝑘

where 𝜋 = Π/𝑃0 and 𝑝𝑖 represents both output and input prices normalized on 𝑃0 . By
using Hotelling’s Lemma, the optimal output supply function of the 𝑖th crop and optimal
variable input demand equations are respectively expressed as:
𝜕𝜋
= 𝑌𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝑖0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖ℎ 𝑝ℎ + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑘 𝑍 𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 𝑙𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑖
ℎ

𝑘

𝑘

(10)

𝑗

𝜕𝜋
= −𝑋𝑛∗ = 𝛼𝑛0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑛ℎ 𝑝ℎ + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑘 𝑍 𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑗 𝑙𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑛
ℎ

∀ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑀

𝑗

∀ 𝑛 = 𝑀 + 1, … , 𝑁 (11)
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where 𝑌𝑖∗ represents the profit-maximizing supply of the 𝑖th crop output of a county, and
𝑋𝑛∗ denotes the profit-maximizing demand for the 𝑛th variable input. We also
differentiate equation (9) with respect to the acreage term (𝑙𝑗 ) to obtain the shadow price
of land used in producing crop 𝑖:
𝜕𝜋
= 𝜆𝑗∗ = 𝛿𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗𝑗 𝑙𝑗 + ∑ 𝜀𝑗𝑘 𝑍 𝑘
𝜕𝑙𝑗
𝑖

∀ 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝑀

(12)

𝑘

where 𝜆𝑗∗ denotes the shadow price of the parcel of land optimally allocated to produce
the 𝑗th crop. To obtain the 𝑗th acreage response equation, we manipulate the system of
𝑀 + 1 equations derived from (12) using equations (6) and (7) and including the land
constraint 𝑙0 = 𝐿 − ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑗 . Replacing this constraint into the expression (12) for the
crop 𝑖 = 0 and then subtracting the resulting equation from each of the other equations in
the system of equations in (12) to reduce the system to 𝑀 equations, we obtain:
𝑀

0 = (𝛿𝑗 − 𝛿0 ) + ∑(𝛾𝑖𝑗 − 𝛾0𝑖 )𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗𝑗 𝑙𝑗 − 𝛿00 (𝐿 − ∑ 𝑙𝑗 ) + ∑(𝜀𝑗𝑘 − 𝜀0𝑘 )𝑍 𝑘
𝑖

𝑗=1

𝑘

∀ 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑀

(13)

Solving this expression for 𝑙𝑗 other than 𝑗 = 0 gives estimable equations for the
optimal allocations of land as a function of crop output prices, variable input prices, total
available land (𝐿), and other exogenous factors:
𝑙𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗0 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑖 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜐𝑗0 𝐿 + ∑ 𝜐𝑗𝑘 𝑍 𝑘
𝑖

∀ 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑀

𝑘

1

1

𝛿00

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝛿𝑗𝑗

where 𝜃𝑗0 ≅ 𝛿 (𝛿0 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝛿00 ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑗 ); 𝜃𝑗𝑖 = 𝛿 (𝛾0𝑖 − 𝛾𝑗𝑖 ); 𝜐𝑗0 ≅
1
𝛿𝑗𝑗

(14)
; and 𝜐𝑗𝑘 =

(𝜀0𝑘 − 𝜀𝑗𝑘 ) are all reduced form parameters to be estimated. The production of

agricultural outputs (corn, soybeans, and other crops) arises from a profit-maximizing
allocation of (finite) cropland across the three alternatives.
To evaluate the effect of the policy at the extensive and intensive margins and
consistent with recent work addressing agricultural supply response to price changes
induced by the biofuel expansion (e.g., Carter et al., 2017; Moschini et al., 2017:
Hendricks et al., 2014, Berry 2011), we postulate both a land allocation response and a
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yield response. For this, we can rearrange the equations (10) and (12) using the
𝑀
constraint ∑𝑀
𝑗=0 𝑙𝑗 = 𝐿 or 𝑙0 = 𝐿 − ∑𝑗=1 𝑙𝑟 such that we have the estimable equations:

𝑌𝑖∗ = 𝜑𝑖0 + ∑ 𝛼 𝑖ℎ 𝑝ℎ + 𝜌𝑖 𝐿 + ∑ 𝛽 𝑖𝑘 𝑍 𝑘
ℎ

∀ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑀

(15)

𝑘

−𝑋𝑛∗ = 𝜓𝑛0 + ∑ 𝛼 𝑛ℎ 𝑝ℎ + 𝜔𝑛 𝐿 + ∑ 𝛽 𝑛𝑘 𝑍 𝑘
ℎ

where 𝜑𝑖0 = 𝛼𝑖0 −

∀ 𝑛 = 𝑀 + 1, … , 𝑁

(16)

𝑘

𝜌𝑖 ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑗 ;

𝜌𝑖 = ∑𝑗 𝛾𝑖𝑗 ; 𝜓𝑛0 = 𝛼𝑛0 − 𝜔𝑛 ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑟 ; and 𝜔𝑛 = ∑𝑗 𝛾𝑛𝑗

are all parameters to be estimated. we can obtain the price elasticity of supply and infer
the extensive and intensive margins. Furthermore, from the acreage response equations
(14) and the supply function for biomass from corn in equation (15), we can obtain the
price elasticity of supply and infer the extensive and intensive margins. First, denote 𝒑 =
𝑃

(𝑝1 = 𝑃1 , . . . , 𝑝𝑀 =
0

𝑃𝑀+1
𝑃0

, . . . , 𝑤𝑁 =

𝑃𝑁
𝑃0

𝑃𝑀
𝑃0

) as a vector of normalized crop output prices and 𝒘 = (𝑤1 =

) as a vector of normalized variable input prices. Second, considering

that agricultural land (L) is the only quasi-fixed input such that a crop yield is a ratio
between its output and cropland (land productivity), we have:
𝜕𝑦𝑖 (𝒑, 𝒘, 𝐿, 𝒁) 𝑝𝑖 𝜕𝑌𝑖 (𝒑, 𝒘, 𝐿, 𝒁) 𝑝𝑖 𝜕𝑙𝑖 (𝒑, 𝒘, 𝐿, 𝒁) 𝑝𝑖
× =
−
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑌𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑙𝑖

(17)45

where 𝑦𝑖 represents the crop yield per acre resulting from dividing 𝑌𝑖 by the optimal
quantity of land planted (𝑙𝑖 ). Equation (17) in elasticity form is:
𝑦𝑝

𝜖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑝 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑝

45

(18)

Following Babcock (2011), agricultural sectoral models define agricultural supply (Y) as the product of
area (L) and yield (y). A change in output results from dY =dA×Y + dY×A, where the first term measures
the change in output at the extensive margin and the second term measures the change at the intensive
𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑦
margin. Define the supply response to higher output prices as
= 𝑌×
+ 𝐴 × or, in elasticity form,
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑃
𝜀𝑌 = 𝜀𝐴 + 𝜀𝑦 , where 𝜀𝑌 , 𝜀𝐴 , and 𝜀𝑦 are price elasticities of total supply, area, and yield, respectively. A
crop yield response in logs is 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖 – 𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑖 . From this way of thinking about agricultural (crop)
supply, we obtain equation (17).
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where the left-hand side is the price yield elasticity as the intensive margin, the first righthand side term the price crop-output supply elasticity, and the last expression represents
the price elasticity of planted land as the extensive margin.

3.2.3. Estimation
This paper studies the impact of RFS mandates on the intensive and extensive
margins of biomass produced in 101 counties in Colorado, Nebraska, Iowa, and
Wyoming from 1969 to 2018. For this, we estimate a system of equations (i.e., output
supplies, derived demand for variable factors of production, and crop acreage demands)
obtained from (14) − (16):
𝒀 = 𝝋0 + 𝝋1 𝒑 + 𝑨𝒀 𝒘 + 𝝋2 𝐿 + 𝑩𝒀 𝒁 + 𝜺𝒀

(19)

𝑿 = 𝝎0 + 𝝎1 𝒑 + 𝑨𝒋 𝒘 + 𝝎2 𝐿 + 𝑩𝒋 𝒁 + 𝜺𝑿

(20)

𝒍 = 𝝊0 + 𝝊1 𝒑 + 𝑨𝒍 𝒘 + 𝝊2 𝐿 + 𝑩𝒍 𝒁 + 𝜺𝒍

(21)

where 𝒀 is a vector of crop biomass quantities (tons harvested including stalks and
leaves) of corn, soybeans and other crops; 𝑿 is a vector of variables inputs including
fertilizer and chemicals (measured in implicit quantity indexes), labor, and capital; 𝒍 is a
vector of the acreage planted with corn, soybeans, and other crops; 𝐿 is the total
cultivated area in the county; 𝒑 is a vector of corn and soybeans prices relative to an
index of the biomass price for all other crops; 𝒘 is a vector including the prices of
fertilizer, chemicals, labor (wages), and capital relative to the price index of biomass
from all other crops; 𝒁 = (𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑟, 𝑫𝑫, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) with 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 as the fraction of
planted land in the county that is irrigated, 𝑟 as annual precipitation in centimeters, 𝑫𝑫 as
a vector of temperature degree-day interval variables (the total length of time, in days,
that the crops were exposed to temperatures in a specific range during the growing
season), and 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 1,…,49 as a proxy for exogenous technical change; 𝝊’s, 𝝋’s, 𝝎’s,
𝑨′𝑠, and 𝑩′𝑠 are set of parameters to be estimated; and the 𝜺’s denote sets of stochastic
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error terms in the system of equations. We assume correlated error terms (𝜺’s) across the
equations above.
The critical assumption here is the significant dirent effects of the policy in the
ethanol market on the crop (or input) markets related to such biofuel production. As
stated before, corn is the main crop used in producing ethanol in the United States. Thus,
the mandates on ethanol production would significantly and exogenously affect the prices
(mainly through the demand) of the staple crops used to produce such biofuel, i.e.,
essentially corn.

3.2.4. Endogenizing Corn Price to the RFS

We use the RFS policy in the ethanol (gasoline) market as a potential source of
exogenous variation in the price of corn. To implement the model empirically and identify
the extensive and intensive margins in corn production due to the policy, we thus specify
an additional equation for corn price as a function of a variable proxy for the effects of the
RFS mandates since 2007. We use this proxy as an instrument for the corn price equation.
This variable is used to identify the impact of corn price variation due to the 2007 RFS on
the output supplies, input demands, and crop-acreage demand equations.
We approximate the policy by the variable 𝜁. To specify this variable, first, consider a
dummy variable (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 if the year ≥ 2007; = 0 otherwise) indicating years of
exposure to RFS mandates expansion starting 2007. We also use a variable denoted 𝑅𝐹𝑆 as
a direct measure of the 2007 RFS effect on the corn markets. More specifically, 𝑅𝐹𝑆 is
equal to the state-level fuel ethanol production in barrels capturing potential shocks to the
demand for biomass from corn. To create a county-level variation and to further specify 𝜁
for capturing the intensity of the policy effect or exposure, the terms 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝑅𝐹𝑆 are
also interacted with (or multiplied by) the inverse of the distance of each county’s centroid
to the closest biorefinery producing ethanol (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 −1). Therefore, the instrument for
corn price is given by:
𝜁 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 −1 × 𝑅𝐹𝑆

(22)
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where 𝜁 is assumed to be a proxy for the 2007 RFS mandates shock to corn demand, and
more concretely, corn prices. This variable is our instrument for corn prices. It indicates
the years when the counties were exposed (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) to some extent or intensity (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 −1)
to potential corn demand shocks, increasing corn prices induced by the mandated quantities
reflected in the ethanol production (𝑅𝐹𝑆). The first-stage equation is thus estimated as:
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛 = 𝜓0 + 𝜓1 𝜁 + 𝜴𝑽 + 𝜈

(23)

where 𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛 = 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛 /𝑃̂𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 is the price of corn relative to an index of the biomass price
from all other crops except soybeans (𝑃̂𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 ); 𝑽 represents all other exogenous variables
in the model including 𝒁 defined as before and 𝑪 representing a vector of county
dummies; 𝜓0 , 𝜓1 , and 𝜴 are parameters to be estimated; the 𝜈 denotes the corresponding
stochastic error terms of the equation. It is worth noting that even though corn prices (and
soybeans prices) are determined at the national level, we end up having these prices at the
county level because we divide those national prices by an index of the biomass price
from all other crops, which varies by county.

3.3.

Data

We obtain data for 101 counties along the 41st parallel north in part of the
Midwestern US over 1969-2017. Figure 1 shows the area of analysis that stretches from
the Rocky Mountains to the Mississippi River across Nebraska (47 counties), Iowa (47
counties), Colorado (4 counties) Wyoming (3 counties). The region is not just a significant
cereal production area in the US but may also have worldwide implications for similar
agroecosystems. This area includes both a vast gradient of weather and soil and
underground water characteristics that are highly representative of agriculture production
in other temperate regions of the world (Trindade, 2011).
The construction of the variables used is based on information from the National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the United States Historical Climatology Network (USHCN), and the USS
Energy Information Administration (EIA) State Energy Data System (SEDS). The
information about state-level ethanol production was retrieved from the Primary Energy
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Consumption Estimates by Source, 1960-2017 of the USS EIA. To compute the distance
of each county to the closest ethanol biorefinery, we also use data on the georeferenced
locations of these biorefineries in the US retrieved for the year 2010 from the Renewable
Fuels Association (RFA).46
Data on annual crop outputs and total acreages planted per crop in the county are
from the surveys conducted by the NASS-USDA. The vector of crop outputs 𝒀 indicates
total biomass production in metric tons47 of dry matter. To simplify the econometric model,
we aggregate crops into three groups: corn, soybeans, and all other crops produced in the
county, including wheat, barley, sorghum, rye, oats, hay, and sugar beets. Thus, vector 𝒀
consists of the aggregate of all above-ground biomass produced by corn, soybeans, and all
other crops in the county. The total amount of biomass produced from 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠
and all other crops (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠) for county 𝑐 in year 𝑡 is calculated as: 𝑌𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑐,𝑡 =
𝑄𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑐,𝑡
𝐻𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝

× (𝐷𝑀𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 ) and 𝑌𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 = ∑𝑐

𝑄𝑜,𝑐,𝑡
𝐻𝐼𝑜

× (𝐷𝑀𝑜 ), where 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠

and 𝑜 indexes all other crops produced in the county each year. The county-wide harvest
for crop 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠, 𝑜 expressed in metric tons is denoted by 𝑄𝑖 . The term
𝐻𝐼 denoting harvest index is the fraction of the above-ground biomass of crop 𝑖 =
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠, 𝑜 that is harvested (Hay, 1995; Unkovich et al.., 2010)48. The term
𝐷𝑀 indicates the dry matter proportion of the harvest for crop 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑜.49 We also

46

The RFA provides the location of U.S. fuel ethanol plants by county. These production facilities are
classified as installed ethanol biorefineries, operational ethanol biorefineries and biorefineries under
construction/expansion. We use the location of the installed and operating ethanol biorefineries on September
1, 2010 retrieved from http://www.ethanolrfa.org/bio-refinery-locations/ to construct the weighting variable
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 −1 . In 2010, the U.S. ethanol industry was made up of 200 nameplate refineries with a total capacity
of 13.544 million gallons per year (MGY): 192 of which were operating with an annual capacity of 12.9
MGY, while 12 plants were under construction or expansion. See Urbanchuk (2010) for a detailed description
of ethanol plants location in 2010. In general, the ethanol biorefineries concentrated in the Midwest corn-belt
states, mainly in Iowa and Nebraska. See the current location in https://ethanolrfa.org/biorefinery-locations/
at a county level, and https://ethanolrfa.org/where-is-ethanol-made/ at a state level.
47
For instance, coefficients to convert to metric tons (i.e., tonnes) from bushels were 0.0254 for corn,
sorghum, and rye and 0.0272 for wheat and soybeans.
48
The harvest indexes used were 0.5 for corn and sorghum for grain; 1 for corn and sorghum for silage and
hay; 0.4 for soybeans, rye, and barley; and 0.35-0.85 for other minor crops.
49
The dry matter fraction for a crop is equivalent to one minus the respective moisture index of that crop.
Following Loomis and Connors (1992), the moisture indexes used were 0.145 for corn and sorghum for grain,
barley, and rye; 0.55 for corn and sorghum for silage; 0.135 for wheat; 0.13 for soybeans and beans; and
0.10-0.78 for all other minor crops.
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compute the comparable prices of corn and soybeans by dividing each crop price by a
biomass weighted average value of all other crops, excluding corn and soybeans. This value
is calculated by dividing the value of total production (price×quantity) of each crop by the
total biomass produced. This value was then calculated as 𝑝̂ 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑐,𝑡 =

𝑄
∑𝑜(𝑃𝑜,𝑐,𝑡 )× 𝑜,𝑐,𝑡 ×(𝐷𝑀𝑜 )
𝐻𝐼𝑜

𝑌𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑐,𝑡

where 𝑃𝑜,𝑐,𝑡 is the reported price for crop 𝑜 (other than corn and soybeans) in county 𝑐 at
year 𝑡 and 𝑝̂ 𝑜,𝑐,𝑡 represents the “average price” of all other crops except corn and soybeans.
The variable inputs considered are fertilizer, chemicals, labor, and capital. The
fertilizer and chemicals inputs represent implicit quantity indexes. These indexes were
estimated using county-level expenditures on these inputs reported approximately every
five years by the Census of Agriculture published by the USDA–NASS. We divided the
reported input expenditure by a national level input price index obtained from USDA–
Economic Research Service for fertilizers and USDA–NASS for chemicals (base 19901992=100) for each census year. We apply inter-census interpolation to these county-level
quantity indexes by using annual state fertilizer indexes. All these values were finally
divided by the index in Adams County, Nebraska, for 1969. We also measure the variable
labor following a similar approach to fertilizer and chemicals. Data on the number of total
hired farm workers and total expense with hired farm labor (US$1,000 payroll) was
obtained from the USDA Census of Agriculture Historical Archive for the census years
from 1964 to 1992 and USDA–NASS for the census years from 1997 to 2017. We use that
total county-level number of hired farmworkers as a proxy for labor and create the nominal
wages for each census year/county resulting from dividing the total payroll by the number
of these hired workers. Linear interpolation was used for both series to fill the information
gaps between the census years. We deflated all these wages using the corresponding 1969
value for Adams County, Nebraska.
We also created a capital input variable using data on the inventory of tractors,
trucks, and agricultural equipment on the farm place at the county level, also retrieved from
the NASS-USDA censuses. The time series for the cost of capital derives from the
information about the US expenditures on each of these items from ERS/USDA
considering the Producer Price Index for Farm Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing
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(Index Dec 1982=100, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted) from the Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED), and the depreciation rates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). To calculate the “quantity of capital” for each county, we calculate the county share
of each of three equipment types (tractors, trucks, and machinery) to the national level,
based on the values of each census year. Linear interpolations were used between census
years to obtain equipment shares for the non-census years. We then multiply these shares
by the national annual capital stock using corresponding depreciation rates, service life (in
years), and declining-balance rates. Finally, we aggregate all the resulting annual values to
obtain county-level annual capital stock. 50
The independent variables consist of the prices of variable inputs and outputs (all
normalized or divided by the 𝑝̂𝑜,𝑐,𝑡 ), the share of irrigated cropland, weather variables and
time as a proxy for exogenous technical change. The irrigation variable is the ratio of
irrigated cropland to total planted cropland by county and year. Weather variables
included are yearly precipitation and annual temperature intervals. We use weather
station data collected from the High Plains Regional Climate Center. Using this
information, we estimate degree-days (𝐷𝐷)51 and precipitation as the distance-weighted
average (of the five closest weather stations to the county center) of daily (minimum and
maximum) temperature and daily precipitation level in centimeters, respectively (see
Trindade, 2011, for more details). The annual precipitation variable was bounded to the
“growing season”52 by summing up values obtained from March through August each
year. The number of hours each day was added for March through August and then
divided by 24 to compute the 𝐷𝐷 variables. We further use a set of three aggregated 𝐷𝐷
variables, i.e., the number of days in a year with temperatures between 0 and 29ºC
50

The data on the national capital stock is from the NASS-USDA censuses. The data on depreciation rates,
services lives, and declining-balance is from:
https://apps.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/national/wlth2594/tableC.htm
51
An adaptation of the agronomic measure “growing degree days” is used to measure the effect of
temperature. According to the agronomic literature, a “growing degree day” is the amount of time (in days)
when the level of temperature is above a certain threshold; hence when the temperature exceeds by one degree
a given threshold for a period of 24 hours, one accumulated degree day occurs (Ritchie et al., 1991; Trindade,
2011).
52
In this study, we define the “growing season” as the period from March to August as in Schlenker and
Roberts (2009), Trindade (2011), Miao et al. (2015), and García et al. (2019) because planting and harvesting
of corn, for example, in most growing states starts in March (NASS 2010).
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(𝐷𝐷0029); 30 and 35ºC (𝐷𝐷3035); and higher than 35ºC (𝐷𝐷35𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠). Table 3.1
presents summary statistics of all previously described variables.

3.4.

Empirical Results

The purpose of this study is to determine quantitatively the effects of the Renewable
Fuel Standards on the corn supply and acreage using a county-level panel data framework
of an area in the US Great Plains for the period from 1969 to 2017. I estimate the entire
system of equations given by (19) − (21) through a Seemly Unrelated Regression
Estimation (SURE). The estimates are more efficient by estimating all equations together
because the SURE takes account of the very likely potential correlation between the error
terms in the vectors 𝜺𝒀 , 𝜺𝑿 , and 𝜺𝒍 . Furthermore, simultaneous estimation allows me to
impose cross-equation “symmetry” restrictions, particularly the corresponding cross-price
effects in the equations. This implies that, for instance, the cross-price slope effect (slope)
of demand for fertilizer with respect to the price of chemicals equals the slope of demand
for chemicals with respect to fertilizer price.
A three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation is used to endogenize relative corn
prices to the demand shocks caused by the RFS mandates for identifying corn supply and
corn acreages demand equations. This identification strategy is conducted to retrieve the
effects of such policy on the extensive (acreage) and intensive (yield) margins of corn
biomass supply. At the same time, instrumenting corn prices, efficiency gains by
accounting for correlation of errors 𝜺’s, and the possibility of imposing cross-equation
coefficient restrictions are still a feature allowed by the 3SLS estimation.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 present the 3SLS estimation of the system of equations in
(19) − (21). Table 3.2 shows the estimates of the crop output supply equations in (18)
and the variable input demand equations in (19). These equations were restricted to satisfy
symmetry between the cross-price parameters in the crop supplies, variable inputs
demands, and crop acreage demands. The table contains a total of ninety-one parameters,
sixty-two of which are significant at the 1% level, five at the 5% level, and five at the 10%
level. Columns (1)-(3) present the estimates for the three crop output supply equations
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considered here, whereas columns (4)-(7) correspond to those of the variable inputs derived
demand equations. The estimated coefficient for the own-price coefficient of corn is
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for soybeans is
insignificant though it is positive as expected. These coefficients imply that if corn price
(relative to other crops) increases by 1 dollar a year, the quantity supplied of corn biomass
increases by around 1.8 million metric tons. The cross-price coefficients indicate that, in
production, corn and soybeans are complements, but corn and all other crops are
substitutes, while soybeans and all other crops are complements. Regarding the increase in
the total available cropland, it seems to affect corn quantity supplied more than all other
crops. On the other hand, the coefficients estimated for the variable time across the columns
(1)-(3) suggest that the trend of the output supplies reflects a biased technological change
mainly towards corn and apparently against all other crops together, excluding soybeans.
The input demands in columns (4) to (7) of Table 3.2 show that all the computed
own-price effects are statistically significant and have a negative sign as expected.
Moreover, the cross-price coefficients between fertilizer and chemicals indicate that these
inputs are complements in production, while labor and capital inputs appear as substitutes
for fertilizer. We can also observe that the cross-price elasticities for capital and labor
suggest that these factors of production can be considered substitutes. All inputs are
affected positively by increasing the total amount of land allocated to crop production,
especially capital. If the price of corn (or soybeans) increases, the demands for fertilizer,
chemicals, and capital input also increase, while the demand for labor decreases (though
this last effect is not statistically significant). The coefficient in the variable time indicates
that the exogenous presence of a technical change in crop production is biased towards
fertilizer and chemical usage and against capital and labor. An increase in the ratio of
irrigated land increases the supply of corn and the demand for fertilizer, chemicals, and
labor input. However, the soybeans supply and the supply of all other crops and capital
demand decrease when the ratio of irrigated land increases.
Table 3.3 presents the 3SLS estimates of crop acreage demand equations (21) for
corn, soybeans, and other crops. The table contains thirty-nine parameters, thirty-one of
which are significant at the 1% level and only one at the 5% level. All own-price effects
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(corn and soybeans) have a positive sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The crop output cross-price effects have positive signs between corn and soybeans acreage
demands but negative between corn and other crops acreage demand. The cross-outputprice effects are positive between soybeans and other crop demand areas. These estimated
coefficients imply that the demand for crop areas increases with their output prices. Also,
those coefficients reveal that corn and soybeans are complements (also other crops with
soybeans) in cultivation, whereas corn and other crops are substitutes. The coefficients of
total crop acreage in response to own crop price are significant at the 1% level for all three
crop categories. The coefficient for the time trend is positive for corn and soybeans and
negative for other crops. These results imply that technology changes have led to increased
land allocated to corn and soybeans and a decline in the land allotted to all other crops
across the years.
Table 3.4 presents the first-stage regression estimates following the specification in
(23). We can observe that P-Corn (corn price relative to P-Ocrops in 1969) responds
significantly to variations in the variable RFS-Shock (𝜁). This latter variable is in thousands
of barrels of fuel ethanol. The results are robust to other specifications in columns (2) and
(3) of table 3.4. We used the first-stage specification of equation (23) in column (1) of
Table 3.4 to estimate the results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The simple average national price
for corn from 1969 to 2017 was approximately 107 nominal US dollars per metric ton (mt).
The estimated average price for other crops (excluding corn and soybeans) was 95 nominal
US dollars per mt during the 1969-2017 period. The average ratio is ($107/$95 ≈ 1.13=)
113: 100. This ratio eases putting our estimates from the first-stage regression in context.
The estimated coefficient of 0.0014 for the RFS Shock (𝜁) in the price equation displayed
in Column 1 of Table 3.4 means that a unit increase in the ratio (1.13) when assuming a
1,000 barrels of fuel ethanol increase after 2007 for the fixed or constant counties' distance
to the closest biorefinery. Therefore, the average ratio changed to 2.36 (236: 100), about
2: 1, implying that the 2007 RFS almost doubled the price of corn relative to all other crops
price (excluding soybeans price) in the 41st Parallel Region within the 1969-2017 period.
We use this exogenous variation in corn price because of the 2007 RFS mandates to
identify the parameters estimated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
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Table 3.5 reports own-price and cross-price elasticities calculated from the
parameter estimates in tables 3.2 and 3.3, evaluated at the mean of all the observations. We
have three sets of price elasticities: output supply, variable input demand, and crop area.
All own-price elasticities have the correct sign, i.e., both corn and soybean supply
elasticities are positive, and all variables input demand elasticities are negative. The crop
acreage demand elasticities have a positive sign for their own-output price. Overall, the
coefficients reflect the patterns of those in tables 3.2 and 3.3. The estimated elasticities
could be considered somewhat small (or mostly inelastic) but indicate crop supply
responses to prices that are not unreasonable given the RFS mandates. The own-price
elasticity of corn supply implies that if the corn price were to double due to the RFS
mandates, corn output would rise by about 87%. Own price elasticities of inputs and for
crop area are generally inelastic. Due to the RFS mandates, a doubling of corn prices would
raise the land devoted to corn production by approximately 59%.53 With these price
𝑌𝑝
𝑙𝑝
elasticities, specifically for corn supply (𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛
≈ 0.87) and corn land 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛
≈ 0.59, we
𝑦𝑝

𝑌𝑝
𝑙𝑝
approximate the corn yield price elasticity using equation (18) as 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛 = 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛
− 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛
≈

0.87 − 0.59. The estimated corn yield price elasticity so calculated is approximately 0.28.
We find positive and statistically significant estimates for the corn price effects on
corn biomass supply and acreage demand. Our findings show that the corn biomass supply
response to increases in relative corn price (RFS-induced or otherwise) reflects changes at
the extensive margin, increasing the demand for cropland producing corn, and the intensive
margin that increases yields (output per acre). Moreover, the results indicate that the corn
supply and area planted are price inelastic, which means that quantity supplied and corn
acreage both increase by smaller percentages than relative corn price increases. Column
(1) of Table 3.2 shows that the average biomass supply of corn would have increased by
more than 1.8 million metric tons per county and year in response to the observed corn
price increases caused by the RFS requirements reported in Table 3.4. The annual acreage
demand for corn response to the corn price increases since the 2007’s RFS mandates (see

53

However, note that the relatively small own-price elasticities for crop acreages may be so since a large area
is already devoted to corn (and soybeans) production. A doubling of corn prices would still significantly
reduce the land devoted to other crops in the region by more than 100%.
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Table 3.4 for this price increase) is approximately 32 thousand acreages per county.
Finally, using the results in Table 3.5, we break down the total corn biomass supply
increase caused by the mandates-induced corn price rise (reported in the first-stage
regression in Table 3.4) as 30% due to yield increase (intensive margin) and 70% to acreage
expansion (extensive margin). Thus, corn yields are less responsive to corn price changes
than the area planted with corn in the analyzed region.
These results are consistent with some previous studies estimating agricultural
supply response to price changes induced by the RFS. (see, e.g., Hendricks et al.,
2014; Mochini et al., 2017; Kim and Mochini, 2018). Berry (2011) provides an extensive
review of existing empirical evidence on yield elasticities that shows that previous work
reveals that virtually all of the crop supply response comes from acreage response, not from
a yield response. Our results imply that corn supply translates into both land allocation and
yield responses. Corn acres are more elastic than corn yields to the exogenous price
variations associated with the implementation of the RFS after 2007.

3.5.

Conclusions
We investigated the effect of crop and variable inputs prices and environmental

and policy variables on corn, soybeans, and other crop yields and acreage in the US
Midwest using a panel dataset for the 1969–2017 period. More specifically, this paper
explores the extent to which the corn price effects induced by a policy in the energy
market also affected corn biomass supply and crop acreage demands. These effects
translate into elasticities at the intensive and extensive margins of agricultural land use of
crops produced at the county level. A profit function model is specified to represent
agricultural decision-making units in the region. We use a two-stage profit maximization
approach with land assumed fixed but allocatable for crop production. Crop acreage
demands are estimated jointly with output supply and variable input demand equations
using a normalized quadratic functional form and county-level panel data from the region
over 49 years. Simultaneous equations panel model is adopted to analyze land use and
crop yield responses to exogenous output prices changes using the 2007’s Renewable
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Fuel Standard. Through this policy, the US federal government mandates specific
quantities of total biofuels and ethanol from starchy crops, i.e., essentially corn. The corn
price effects of these mandates are assumed to create exogenous market shocks to the
supply of corn in several counties along the US Great Plains. Our results show that the
corn biomass supply and the demand for land to produce corn have grown because of the
price increases induced by such mandates. For each 1% increase in corn price due to the
RFS, the corn biomass quantity supplied increases by about 0.87%. This change occurs
because the counties in the region allocated more land to corn production and partly
because they produced more corn per land unit. Of the increase in corn biomass supply
caused by the mandates, 62% is due to policy-induced price-yield increase, and 38% is
because of policy-induced price-acreage expansion. Response to the RFS thus occurs
primarily at the intensive margin. These findings have important implications for future
policies on promoting renewable energies combined with economic policies. The results
of this analysis might have a crucial external validity because the climatic and hydrologic
ranges observed in the analyzed area may be representative of other important temperate
regions of the world. The main contribution of this paper is to provide some insights into
the current discussion on the implications of the US RFS for the agricultural commodity
markets, productivity analysis of agricultural production, and to a certain extent, the
environmental consequences of this type of policy.

Table 3. 1 – Summary Statistics, 101 41st Parallel Counties, 1969-2017
Variables
Units
Metric tons
Corn Biomass (Q-Corn)
Metric tons
Soybeans Biomass (Q-Soy)
Metric tons
Other Crops Biomass (Q-Ocrops)
Acres
Corn Planted Area (A-Corn)
Acres
Soybean Planted Area (A-Soy)
Acres
Other Crops Planted Area (Q-Ocrops)
Acres
Total Cropland (Land)
Index
Fertilizer
Index
Chemicals
Workers
Labor
Machines
Capital
1969 dollars per metric ton
Price of Corn (P-Corn)
1969 dollars per metric ton
Price of Soybeans (P-Soy)
Numeraire
Price of Other Crops (P-Ocrops)
Index
Price of Fertilizer (P-Fertilizer)
Index
Price of Chemicals (P-Chemicals)
1969 dollars per worker
Wages
Index
Price of Capital (P-Capital)
Fraction
Irrigated acres fraction
24 hour days
𝐷𝐷(0 𝑡𝑜 30)
25 hour days
𝐷𝐷(31 𝑡𝑜 34)
26 hour days
𝐷𝐷(35+)
Centimeters
Precipitation

Mean
652,207.1
146,977.3
116,485.9
112,142.4
56,933.4
99,126.8
268,202.7
3.17
9.61
1,084
34,578.1
1.13
2.48
−
0.03
0.02
47,005.3
0.05
0.20
165.37
4.03
0.16
52.09

Min
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1,250
0.08
0.12
0.20
8,251
0.40
0.00
−
0.01
0.01
107.34
0.01
0.00
132.23
0.14
0.00
9.48

Max
2,293,663
670,914
1,309,579
279,700
232,000
1,356,010
1,008,710
10.83
39.32
11,662
147,584
2.43
5.76
−
0.08
0.06
47,8045
0.13
0.91
178.83
12.78
3.55
125.21

Std. Dev.
410,756.17
130,053.89
145,127.64
56,089.62
45,249.15
161,140.21
95,148.89
1.61
6.57
1,019.28
8,446.43
0.28
0.92
−
0.01
0.01
44,650.44
0.02
0.27
5.84
2.32
0.29
16.62

122

Table 3. 2– 3SLS estimation of the output supplies and derived input demands from the system of equations in (19) and (20)
Dependent Variable:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Q-Corn
Q-Soy
Q-Ocrops
Q-Fertilizer
Q-Chemicals
P-Corn
1904.029
533.4238
-968.937
639.286
3729.535
[130.6268]***
[103.9753]***
[211.9889]***
[97.1311]***
[208.7567]***
P-Soy
533.4238
222.1666
105.7722
464.2425
1960.337
[103.9753]***
[302.7588]
[548.9199]
[149.9761]***
[168.3306]***
P-Fertilizer
639.286
464.2425
485.6729
-1036.06
-152.505
[97.1311]***
[149.9761]***
[333.4057]
[234.0583]***
[207.1736]
P-Chemicals
3729.535
1960.337
-1292.76
-152.505
-9012.08
[208.7567]***
[168.3306]***
[607.3453]**
[207.1736]
[646.7977]***
Wages
-0.0535
-0.1145
0.0256
0.129
-0.0232
[0.0862]
[0.0326]***
[0.0394]
[0.0435]***
[0.1452]
P-Capital
3.8395
6.9825
6623.252
42.099
1.9971
[1.8365]**
[3.6258]*
[27688.0043]
[4.4396]***
[10.1346]
Land
0.0024
0.0006
0.0006
0.0012
0.0037
[0.0000]***
[0.0000]***
[0.0000]***
[0.000047]***
[0.0001]***
Irrigation
726.4833
-54.9756
-37.2622
189.879
280.2434
[15.9702]***
[5.6589]***
[7.0382]***
[9.4052]***
[31.0073]***
𝐷𝐷(0 𝑡𝑜 30)
-12.577
0.7842
0.0255
0.9504
2.6894
[2.1340]***
[0.2121]***
[0.2610]
[0.2879]***
[0.9584]***
𝐷𝐷(31 𝑡𝑜 35)
-0.0036
6.9765
-4.9472
-1.2675
-14.8255
[0.0003]***
[0.7782]***
[0.9661]***
[1.0755]
[3.5537]***
𝐷𝐷(35+)
-5.5445
-46.4187
15.7536
19.1999
115.5497
[16.6184]
[6.1645]***
[7.5070]**
[8.4135]**
[27.9137]***
Precipitation
1.4722
0.9096
-0.8544
0.222
1.2629
[0.2442]***
[0.0911]***
[0.1175]***
[0.1227]*
[0.4047]***
Time
9.2699
4.3102
-2.1193
2.5832
27.8136
[0.2884]***
[0.1404]***
[0.2487]***
[0.2044]***
[0.4829]***
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.

(6)
Labor
-0.0535
[0.0862]
-0.1145
[0.0326]***
0.129
[0.0435]***
-0.0232
[0.1452]
-0.0004
[0.0002]*
0.0023
[0.0005]***
0.0035
[0.0001]***
0.8495
[0.0670]***
-0.0003
[0.0012]
-0.0048
[0.0047]
0.0412
[0.0341]
-0.0007
[0.0005]
-0.0257
[0.0006]***

(7)
Q-Capital
3.8395
[1.8365]**
6.9825
[3.6258]*
42.099
[4.4396]***
1.9971
[10.1346]
0.0023
[0.0005]***
-3372.57
[459.5165]***
0.051
[0.015]***
-0.6408
[0.1187]***
0.0018
[0.0035]
0.0353
[0.0131]***
-0.1748
[0.1015]*
0.0026
[0.0015]*
-0.0328
[0.0036]***
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Table 3. 3 – 3SLS estimation of the crop area equations from the system in (21)
Dependent Variable:
(1)
(2)
A-Corn
A-Soy
P-Corn
32.7319
3.9688
[2.9610]***
[2.5782]
P-Soy

3.9688
[2.5782]

24.3586
[5.8932]***

P-Fertilizer

-78.357
[7.9224]***

-45.6191
[6.7360]***

P-Chemicals

119.7935
[17.7440]***

6.2592
[14.5540]

-0.0011
[0.0013]

-0.0041
[0.0011]***

P-Capital

-2815.18
[792.1089]***

3812.579
[633.6176]***

Land

0.00004
[0.0000004]***

0.00002
[0.0000003]***

9.424
[0.2626]***

-1.9928
[0.2041]***

𝐷𝐷(0 𝑡𝑜 30)

-0.0039
[0.0086]

0.1538
[0.0255]***

𝐷𝐷(31 𝑡𝑜 35)

-0.1788
[0.0318]***

-1.0427
[0.2003]***

𝐷𝐷(35+)

1.2075
[0.2473]***

-1.0438
[0.2003]***

Precipitation

0.0188
[0.0036]***

0.0218
[0.0029]***

Time

0.0872
[0.0070]***

0.1277
[0.0057]***

Wages

Irrigation

Notes: Both output prices (P-Corn and P-Soy) and variable input prices (P-Fertilizer, P-Chemicals,
Wages, and P-Capital) are real values relative to P-Ocrops in 1969. Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 3. 4 – First-stage estimation results of equation (23)
Dependent Variable: P-Corn
(1)
(2)
RFS-Shock (ζ)
0.001
0.0014
[0.0001]***
[0.0001]***
Time

(3)
0.0008
[0.0001]***

-0.0002
[0.000025]***

-0.0003
[0.000029]***

Irrigation

-0.025
[0.0032]***

0.0245
[0.0015]***

𝐷𝐷(0 𝑡𝑜 30)

0.0008
[0.0001]***

0.0007
[0.0001]***

𝐷𝐷(31 𝑡𝑜 35)

0.002
[0.0002]***

0.002
[0.0003]***

0.003
[0.0016]*

-0.0045
[0.0020]**

0.0005
[0.000024]***

0.0005
[0.000026]***

0.1039059
[0. 0030342]***

-0.0441
[0.0100]***

-0.0362
[0.0115]***

✓

✓

Observations

4,824

4,824

4,824

R2

0.717

0.719

0.717

-0.0002
[0.000024]***

𝐷𝐷(35+)

Precipitation

Constant

County Dummies

Notes: P-Corn is in real values of corn price relative to P-Ocrops in 1969. The variable RFS-Shock (𝜁)
is in thousands of barrels of fuel ethanol. Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level.

Table 3. 5– Output Supply and Variable Input Demand Elasticities, and Cropland Response Elasticities
P-Corn
P-Soy
P-Fertilizer
P-Chemicals
Wages
Q-Corn
0.8737972
0.0386937
0.0705223
0.3335907
-0.0082814
[0.0599472]***
[0.008]***
[0.011]***
[0.019]***
[0.013]
Q-Soy
0.035
0.151
0.561
-0.040
0.8411733
[0.113]
[0.049]***
[0.048]***
[0.012]***
[0.0075422]***
Q-Ocrops
-1.536
0.431
0.302
-0.204
0.017
[0.186]***
[0.106]***
[0.082]***
[0.116]*
[0.105]
Fertilizer
0.338
0.050
-0.153
-0.015
0.026
[0.051]***
[0.016]***
[0.034]***
[0.022]
[0.009]***
Chemicals
0.869
0.092
-0.008
-0.418
-0.003
[0.049]***
[0.008]***
[0.012]
[0.030]***
[0.011]
Labor
-0.021
-0.010
0.020
-0.003
-0.114
[0.035]
[0.003]***
[0.007]***
[0.012]
[0.066]*
Capital
0.130
0.055
0.438
0.018
0.035
[0.063]**
[0.028]**
[0.046]***
[0.077]
[0.008]***
A-Corn
0.5866567
0.013697
-0.3822133
0.4406773
-0.0078322
[0.053]***
[0.009]
[0.039]***
[0.065]***
[0.009]
A-Soy
0.101
0.158
-0.263
0.032
-0.028
[0.071]
[0.038]***
[0.039]***
[0.073]
[0.007]***
A-Other Crops
-1.900
0.195
1.130
-0.840
0.045
[0.101]***
[0.034]***
[0.077]***
[0.140]***
[0.013]***

P-Capital
6.3E-06
[3.1E-06]**
0.0003
[0.0002]**
-0.633
[0.951]
9.3E-05
[9.7E-06]***
2.1E-06
[8.9E-06]
4.5E-06
[1.0E-06]***
-0.539
[0.073]***
-0.2072531
[0.058]***
0.326
[0.054]***
-0.006
[0.112]

Land
2.050
[0.029]***
1.704
[0.037]***
1.065
[0.026]***
1.072
[0.015]***
1.552
[0.023]***
-0.667
[0.116]***
0.045
[0.014]***
1.328326
[0.017]***
1.007
[0.020]***
1.689
[0.027]***
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Source: Own computations.
Notes: Elasticities are computed at the sample mean values of the variables from Table 3.1 and using coefficient estimates taken from Tables 2 and 3; numbers in
brackets are standard errors calculated with the delta method provided by Papke and Wooldridge (2005). Output prices (P-Corn and P-Soy) and variable input prices
(P-Fertilizer, P-Chemicals, Wages, and P-Capital) are real values relative to P-Ocrops in 1969.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 3. 1− Selected Counties along the 41st Parallel

Source: Elaborated based on Trindade et al. (2011).
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